

Institute for the New Chile

ASO-37

Political mobilization and
class alliances in Chile:
1970-1973.

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POLITICAL MOBILIZATION AND CLASS ALLIANCES IN CHILE,
1970-1973.

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The experience of the Popular Unity government of President Salvador Allende in Chile from 1970 to the tragic coup of September 1973 has attracted widespread interest and discussion.(1) However, many interpretations ignore a great deal of the very valuable research conducted in Chile during the Popular Unity (hereafter UP) government. One intention of this article is to draw attention to this research, primarily in the area of social class, and the interrelationship between political and social change.

What makes this research of considerable interest, certainly transcending its national boundaries, is its relevance to fundamentally important issues. The UP experience was a rare example of an attempt to combine structural reform with institutional and constitutional legality; it offers a case study of the extent to which profound reform can be combined with the transference of state power from one class to another.(2) Although one should be careful of drawing close analogies between events in Chile and possible political developments in countries such as France or Italy, the questions provoked by the UP experience touch upon central issues of political debate. How far and how fast can a political system absorb profound change and yet remain a parliamentary and constitutional democracy? How do social classes react under conditions

of economic crisis and political stress? Is a peaceful road to socialism possible in a country where capitalism is firmly entrenched? Allende's victory also brought into sharp focus the central issue of the 'dependency' debate - could a small, unevenly developed country successfully break out of a dependent relationship with the U.S.A.?

But before we can attempt to answer these questions - let alone consider their relevance to other countries - we must understand as fully as possible the internal political and social processes of the UP era. Very rarely, for example, has the relevance of a class system to political behaviour been so obvious (if none the less complex). The brave attempt at basic reform, the debate it provoked, and the crisis it caused, threw the Chilean class system into sharp relief. The defence of class hegemony under assault made clearer its nature, its tactics, its supporters (not least its foreign ones), and its methods. The attempt to create a rival or counter hegemony based on the working class, when representatives of that class actually control the government, similarly expose the difficulties and achievements of that process.

It is not my intention to consider total explanations of the UP government's behaviour, nor of its fall.(3) Rather, this article will look at four elements in process of political and social change during this period. These four topics have been chosen because of their importance to the politics of this period. But they are also central questions of political analysis (not least in writings of Weber and Marx). How can one define the composition and explain the political behaviour of the middle class? What

is the political role of the trade union movement? How can distinct social groups be welded into a political coalition? And, finally, what is the relationship between ideology and political domination? Only by giving such questions a specific application in a setting like that of Chile 1970-1973 can we attempt to answer them; and only by answering them with reference to a specific context can we advance the theoretical debate.

The first issue to be considered is the social composition and political behaviour of the middle sectors, a group whose internal differentiation is better conveyed by the Spanish capas medias.

The numerical size and political importance of this group made its support, or at least neutrality, a vital political factor in the strategy by which Allende intended to convert his electoral base from the minority vote he received in 1970 into an irresistible majority.

Allende's speeches are full of references to the capas medias.

'We guarantee that middle and small scale businesses may rely on the close collaboration of the State to ensure the sound development of their activities'. (Allende, 1973: 65)

or 'We intend to take over 1000 estates this year. But there is nothing for the small and medium scale farmer to fear because we extend the same consideration, the same respect and the same regard to such farms as we extend to their industrial and commercial counterparts in Chile'. (Allende, 1973: 110)

and again, 'We have never spoken of a republic of workers and peasants ... We believe that clerks, technicians, professional people, small and medium scale businessmen and industrialists constitute great social forces which ought to be and are with us facing the great national task which lies before us. The position of these groups is very different

from that of sectors of the upper bourgeoisie, the oligarchy allied to foreign capital or the great landowners'. (Allende, 1973: 116)

Secondly, this article will look at certain aspects of the working class and its behaviour, notably the role of organised labour, and of the pobladores, and of the relationship between various segments of the working class.

Thirdly, there will be an examination of the process of social mobilization in this period. What were the new forms of popular mobilization? How far did they go? Could they have been the basis of a poder popular (people's power) of a new proletarian hegemony?

Finally, the question of ideology and of the role of the mass media attracted a great deal of attention during this period. Though much of the writing on ideology is obscure, to say the least, it does raise important questions for consideration.

CLASS ANALYSIS IN CHILE BEFORE 1970

Before examining the social changes that took place after Allende's election, it is necessary to look briefly at previous perceptions of the Chilean social structure, and the kinds of conclusions that politicians drew from their view of the class system.

Until the development in the late sixties of movements like the Left Revolutionary Movement (MIR) and the United Popular Action Movement (MAPU), the ideological debate on the left was largely conducted between the Socialist and Communist parties.(4) Much of that debate was conducted, and fiercely so, about the theoretical postulates of Marxism

and the interpretation of, amongst others, the experiences of the USSR, Cuba, China or Yugoslavia, rather than the meaning of socialism in the Chilean context. It was noticeable that the experience of power in 1970, and the growth of alternative Marxist parties, switched the centre of debate to a national framework.

Before 1970 there was relatively little consideration of how the union movement in Chile, weakly organised but highly politicised, could transcend its 'economistic' functions and relate to a drive for working class political power. The major Chilean labour confederation (the CUT) was allocated a rather passive, supportive role by the parties. At the national level, the CUT did receive some attention from the politicians, but at the regional and provincial level, neglect by the parties was notorious, and the CUT very weak.

Even a peaceful transition to socialism will involve massive mobilization. But popular mobilization before 1970 had tended to be a phenomenon only of specific and temporary crises. Both parties of the left, and in spite of Socialist rhetoric to the contrary, were largely parliamentary parties.

Both parties analysed society in a static and mechanical way, particularly the middle class or bourgeoisie. For example, Luis Corvalán, the secretary general of the Communist party, wrote as follows:

"The bourgeoisie of course are not homogeneous and there are antagonisms between their various groups. There is the top bourgeoisie, the monopoly type section linked with North American imperialism and the landed oligarchy. This sector is reactionary. But there is, in addition, the petty bourgeoisie which act with the proletariat, and the middle, wavering and

unstable bourgeoisie, hovering around the centrist parties and at times siding with the working class and at others taking a reactionary stand. We are working to get the middle bourgeoisie to join the anti-feudal and anti-imperialist movement'. He adds, somewhat surprisingly, 'on some issues and in definite circumstances, we try to neutralise or even to enlist the support of the big bourgeoisie for one or other undertaking.' (Corvalán, 1959: 43-4)

The Socialist party rejected this analysis, arguing that there was no real national bourgeoisie with interests opposed to imperialism. But the point is that both parties remained at the level of abstract assertion. When the UP came to power, that debate was not only not resolved, but there was hardly any agreement amongst the various parties of the UP of the need for, or way to win over, sectors of the middle class.

Before 1970 only a minority of the labour force was organised in unions. The proportion may have been 30%, high in international terms, but this still left most workers outside the union structure. A considerable proportion of that majority were shanty town dwellers, working in the tertiary sector, or so it was assumed. For the Marxist parties, these were the lumpenproletariat. Once so labelled, they could be neglected, and apart from some local Communist activity, it was only when the Christian Democrats began the active political penetration of the poblaciones, that the Marxist parties awoke to their political potential. The point is that the neglect of this sector was based on theoretical assumptions (that if it was not part of the industrial proletariat then it could not develop correct class consciousness) rather than on empirical investigation of the social composition, occupational structure and, indeed, class consciousness of

the pobladores.

One peculiarity of this period was the heavy concentration of research, both academic and political, that was devoted to the rural sector. Only 20% of the labour force works on the land, but much more than that proportion went into research and political organisation. This was presumably a product of the intense interest (not just in Chile) in agrarian reform, and of the relatively low level of political involvement of the parties in the countryside compared with the towns. The issues involved - the birth and rapid development of peasant unionisation, the expropriation of the latifundia, the problem of low production - were crucial ones in the transition to socialism (or indeed to the Christian Democrats vision of a communitarian society). But the academic and political emphasis on rural society does contrast rather dramatically with, for example, the relative neglect of the role of trade unions, or indeed of the political behaviour and attitudes of the middle classes.

THE PROBLEM OF THE MIDDLE CLASS

Why was the political behaviour of the various groups, loosely called the middle class, so important to the Allende government? From the outset, Allende called for their involvement in the UP movement. This concern was repeated in a statement issued by the UP in 1972 at the El Arrayán reunion; 'the UP recognises the legitimate right of wide sectors of small and medium business to a stable and developing role. It has been said, time and time again that our programme is not in conflict with the interests of

the non-monopoly sector' (Comité Nacional de la Unidad Popular, 1972: 46)

That one of the central failures of the UP was in this area is the view of Nicos Poulantzas.

'The question of the petty bourgeoisie stands not only at the centre of current debates on the class structure of the imperialist metropolises, but also of debates on the dominated and dependent peripheral formations, as is shown by various analyses of the problem of marginality..... It was on this question, among others, that, as now know, the socialist development in Chile came to grief.' (Poulantzas, 1975: 193)

Many assumptions about the middle class in Chile beg a large number of questions. How numerous is this social sector? Is it, in any meaningful sense, a social class? What are its internal divisions? Could any faction of this group be won over to the UP government? How were its interests expressed politically? No more than an outline of an answer can be attempted here, but even this can convey some sense of the complexity of the problem.

a. Size and structure

The active labour force in Chile in 1970 has been estimated at 2.6 million. Of this total, 21% worked in agriculture, 16% in manufacturing industry, 12% in commerce and 27% in services.(5) Within the occupational structure several so-called middle class groups deserve attention.

Firstly, a very numerous sector consists of white collar workers (empleados), who enjoy many financial and legal privileges compared with blue collar workers in Chile, have a separate system of union organisation, distinct political allegiances, and usually see themselves as a superior social strata above blue collar labour (obreros).(6) In manufacturing industry, white collar workers make up 24% of the labour

force (compared with 54% for blue collar workers); in the service sector, 49% (38% blue collar); and 29% in the commercial sector (18% blue collar). (Sánchez, 1974: 57-8)

Secondly, there are the self-employed workers (trabajadores por cuenta propia) defined as those who do not employ paid, non-family labour.(7) They make up 16% of the labour force in manufacturing; 13% in services; and rise to 42% in commerce (with those who do employ labour consisting of about 8% of this group). The self-employed are therefore an important part of the occupational structure in Chile; in 1967 out of a total labour force of 2.4 million, some 570,000 fell into this category.(8) A very large part consists of itinerant street traders; in 1970 almost two-thirds of the labour force in commerce (just over 300,000 in all) fell into this category. (Castells, 1974: 94)

Thirdly, the industrial structure is characterised by a large number of very small enterprises, and a relatively small number of very large oligopolistic concerns. Most industrial employment therefore is generated by companies with a very small workforce indeed; in 1960, 46% of the labour force in manufacturing worked in enterprises classified as artisanal, that is employing five workers or less. This sector is declining in importance. Compared with 1957, when there were an estimated 70,000 small and artisanal enterprises, by 1969 there were 28,700 (the decline being most marked in the artisanal as opposed to the slightly larger concern). (Castells, 1974: 78) Workers in these establishments were not allowed to join unions, for the minimum size permitted for union organisation was 25 workers. But what interests us here more than the ambiguous class position of the work

force, is that of the employers. Can they be called part of the bourgeoisie, with an assumed identity of interest with employers many times larger than them? Or could they be assumed to occupy an antagonistic position vis-a-vis monopoly capital, as Allende believed? The class position of the self-employed, and of the owners of very small enterprises in general is ambiguous, not to say contradictory. As Castells (1974: 50) puts it, 'they are at the same time confronted by and dependent upon industrial and commercial capital, tied to the State by their needs for credit yet afflicted by State taxation, objectively close to the working class yet in daily opposition to it'.

Finally, there is the question of the class position and identification of the employees of the State itself. In 1970, 313,800 people were employed directly by the central government, and another 109,900 by various state enterprises, (Sánchez, 1974: 57) Amongst the largest groups were the teachers and educational administrators (73,000) and the health employees (55,000). (Castells, 1974: 98) Although legally debarred from forming unions, in fact public employees circumvented the law and created very militant if not politically radical unions. Politically their allegiance was given normally to the non-Marxist parties (at first to the Radicals, but later to the Christian Democrats) and it was far from certain in 1970 that the employees of the state would assist in the transference of state power from one class to another.

The change in the composition of the labour force generally worked in favour of the growth of the tertiary sector. The proportion employed in agriculture declined from 30% of the total work force in 1952 to 21% in 1970; and in manufacturing industry from 19% to 16%. But in

the same period, employment in commerce rose from 10% of the labour force to 12%, and in services from 22% to 26%. (Riberio and de Barbière, 1973: 174) In the service sector in the ten years after 1960, the labour force grew by 170,000 workers. (Sánchez, 1974: 57)

b. Occupation, poverty and the State

Two points arise from a consideration of these figures and of the distribution of income. The first is that the distribution of poverty is highly complex. The second, that the role of the state is of great importance both directly and indirectly for many of these occupational groups.

The difference between the average income of a white collar and a blue collar worker narrowed during the 1960's from 3.97 at the start to 2.05 at the end of the period. (Sanchez, 1974: 58) But this conceals the widening of income distribution that took place within those two broad categories. The poorest group in Chile is found in the agricultural sector; but the next poorest, 'is formed by workers in service activities, both wage and salary earners and self-employed. The third group is formed by industrial workers, probably in the small and medium enterprises. The poorest segment, i.e. earning one minimum wage or less, comprises the vast majority (three quarters or more) of workers in agriculture and services and only slightly over 40% of industrial workers.' (9) The problems that this pattern of poverty creates for a socialist redistribution of income are obviously great. But the point to be stressed here is that the spread of incomes inside that category often called 'middle class' is very wide, and that sectors of it will be earning less than the manual workers

in modern industry or, especially, copper mining. There was no simple economic recipe or formula that could by its application win the gratitude of the middle sectors; nor indeed was there any simple solution to the problem of making more equal the distribution of income.

The question of who controls the state, and in whose interest, is a directly relevant one for more than that admittedly large part of the working force employed by the state. The role of the state as a supplier of credit and of investment is also of critical importance for much of industry. The proportion of public investment as a percentage of all investment rose from 28% in 1940 to 71% in 1968. (Sánchez, 1974: 61) The kind of investment decisions, of credit policies, and of incomes policies, made by the government in Chile directly affected the economic survival of a large number of small and medium entrepreneurs. This group, if persuaded that the policies of the government were adverse to its interests, could be the basis of fierce opposition, as Allende found out. It could not be ignored by any government seeking to create a political climate favourable to large electoral majorities.

Analysis of the UP's treatment of the middle class has criticised the failure of the government to disaggregate the various factions or strata within the capas medias, and to devise the appropriate winning strategy for each faction. Castells (Benítez, 1974: 452) argues that the error of the UP government lay the way in which it lumped all these diverse groups together, and treated them in a uniformly economic fashion instead of separating out those groups whose economic interests were in contradiction with the long

term interests of the oligarchy. In advice far easier to give than to follow he suggests that the various groups must be related to their role in the productive process, and the ideological interests that the productive process determines.

With the authority of a Secretary-General of a leading UP party, still actively engaged in the process of trying to understand the failures of the Allende government in order to create a successful resistance movement, Jaime Gazmuri (1975) rejects the usefulness of the concept of the petty bourgeoisie when applied to Chilean society.(10) He argues that a policy of alliance must start from as precise a delineation as possible of the social structure, and of the various classes - their formation, economic peculiarities, ideologies, politics and interrelations; adding sternly that this is not an academic luxury but a political necessity.(11)

Castells (1974: 30) has argued that there is no structural contradiction between the petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat, nor indeed between the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie; 'it depends upon the persons and on the conjuncture'. Poulantzas (1975: 151) affirms that 'the petty bourgeoisie is not a bourgeoisie smaller than the others; it is not part of the bourgeoisie at all, since it does not exploit, or at least is not chiefly involved in exploiting wage labour. The difference between a craftsman in an artisanal or even semi-artisanal enterprise, and a small employer who exploits ten workers, is not of the same order as that between the latter and an employer who exploits twenty workers; there is a class barrier involved

which cannot be reduced to a difference in magnitude'.

The question in the end, as Poulantzas (1975: 334-5) recognises, is a political one.

'The petty bourgeoisie for its part has no autonomous long run class position, and as history has shown, it cannot in general have its own political organisations. The polarization of the petty bourgeoisie towards proletarian class positions depends on the petty bourgeoisie being represented by the class struggle organisations of the working class themselves; these organisations cannot just take hold of the petty bourgeoisie and drag it along like a ball and chain.'

But, in practice, in Chile in 1970 did the representatives of the working class have this option? Did the working class parties miss an opportunity to win over leading sectors of the middle class?

c. Middle class politics

The UP had very little electoral support from the middle class to begin with; it is not the case that it lost many middle class votes through its economic blunders.

Although the Radical party (though not all of it) supported Allende in 1970, by that date the Radicals were a shadow of their former selves, and in no way could they be seen as representing the middle class. By the late 1960s, the electoral base of the Radical party had been reduced to a few agricultural and mining provinces; the party was very weak in the great urban centres of Santiago and Valparaiso. (Muller-Plantenberg, 1972: 158) One electoral study (Ayres, 1973: 142) found that there was 'virtually no relationship between Radical voting in 1969 and Allende voting in 1970. And what relationship exists is a slightly negative one (i.e. the higher the vote for the Radicals in 1969, the lower the vote for Allende in 1970)'. It was

further weakened by the defection of a right wing group, the Democracia Radical, in 1971, which took away a third of the party's electoral support. As a consequence of these divisions, and with the tense political polarization of 1972-3, the Radicals, both those for and those against the government, lost heavily in the congressional elections of 1973 (reduced from 25 deputies to 8).

Historically the middle class has a long record of identification with movements that have rejected marxism. A public opinion survey in 1958 (Briones, 1963: 392-4) found that 45% of artisanal workers and self-employed identified themselves as 'right' and another 14% as 'centre' (with 23% only supporting the 'left'); small businessmen went heavily for the right, with 48% supporting it, and another 31% professing allegiance for the centre (which included the Christian Democrats); and white collar workers were only slightly more to the left in their political preferences.

A careful study (Muller-Plantenberg, 1972: 170) of the elections of 1969, 1970 and 1971, concluded that 'the urban middle classes counted very little in the electoral support for the UP'. Robert Ayres' study (1973: 145-7) of voting in Chile showed that the presence of what he called the 'administrative lower class' correlated strongly and positively with voting for the Christian Democrats, and negatively with support for the Socialists and Radicals. In the case of the 'autonomous lower middle class' (the petty bourgeoisie) there was a positive correlation with voting for the traditional right (the National party and its predecessors, the Liberals and Conservatives) and a

negative one with voting for the Radicals, Socialists and Communists.

Even amongst the unionised white collar sectors there is a marked difference in political affiliation compared with the blue collar workers. In the national elections for the CUT (the national labour confederation) in 1972, although overall the parties of the UP gained a large majority, in the voting returns of the white collar unions, the Christian Democrats took 41% compared with 22% for the Communists, 19% for the Socialists and only 7% for the Radicals.(12)

An important part of these white collar unions were composed of state employees, who enjoy a very high level of unionisation. Public sector unions in Chile have a history of militancy, but not of identification with the political programmes of the left. One of the problems that faced the Allende government was the uncooperativeness of the public sector, much of which identified itself with the supposedly beleaguered middle class.(13) It has been argued (Poulantzas 1975: 272) that the class interests of the bureaucracy lie with the dominant capitalist system. 'A large part of the agents of the repressive and ideological state apparatuses (teachers, journalists, social workers, etc.) participate ... in the tasks of ideological inculcation and political repression of the dominated classes and particularly of the chief victim, the working class itself.'

Could this pattern of behaviour have been changed, and the Chilean bureaucracy become an instrument of political transformation rather than of conservative domination?

There is relatively little analysis of the public bureaucracy, in Chile, (14) but it has been argued (Zemelman, 1974: 36) that the UP never adopted the correct tactics in relation to the bureaucracy, assuming that a party militant by definition would be an efficient administrator. The attitude of the UP towards the bureaucracy was contradictory - at one and the same time it wished to deny its separate existence and to use it. This attitude alienated the bureaucrats as a class and made for an inefficient state administration.

d. Middle class organisation

The Chilean middle class has a long history of organisation and indeed of insurgency. The middle classes took to the streets in 1931 in order to overthrow the dictatorship of Ibáñez. From the campaigns of Alessandri, or José Santos Salas in the 1920s, or even the Popular Front in the 1930s the middle sectors in some ways were the militants of the political world. One argument (Marini, 1973: 74-75) is that the Chilean petty bourgeoisie has occupied a relatively autonomous position vis-à-vis the State and the large bourgeoisie, which has enabled it to maintain a class identity (unlike Brazil or Mexico where this social sector is dominated by State and capital). This position has been facilitated by the parliamentary and democratic system in Chile which allowed the petty bourgeoisie an independent arena of political influence from which it could take advantage of the opportunities offered by the growth of the public sector. Therefore, if it benefitted greatly from the existing system, it could only be expected that a perceived challenge to that system would produce a

strong reaction in its defence.

The attack on the UP government was led by the gremios, those associations of professional men and businessmen largely identified with the right, and able to mobilise considerable sectors of the Chilean population, as the 'bosses strike' of October 1972 so clearly showed. The small shopkeepers were organised in a gremio of some 160,000 members (claimed to be 90% of the total in the country) and led by a member of the National party; the lorry owners, many of them owning only one or two trucks, could call on over 25,000 members, and their leader León Villarín became one of the most famous opponents of the UP; and the confederation of professional colegios brought together twenty associations of professional people, such as the 20,000 members of the accountants gremio or the 7,000 doctors. (Whitehead, 1974: 45)

Although these organisations existed well before the Allende government (the lorry owners union dated from the mid-fifties) they grew in numbers, militancy and organisation in this period. Associations that represented distinct interests - big and small commercial concerns for example - came together to make common battle against the Allende government. The professional associations formed a confederation in 1971 (with an estimated 114 affiliated organisations). (Mattelart, 1975: 59) There is no secret now that many of them enjoyed funding from the CIA. But foreign funds, and the new unity with larger economic concerns should not lead us to disregard the widespread and intense support the gremios enjoyed amongst their members and the Chilean middle class. As Whitehead writes (1974: 45), 'to

dismiss them as puppets manipulated by big capital would under-estimate the intensity of feeling of many of their members. It seems that the big traders may have tended to be slightly more conciliatory towards the government than the small shopkeepers. Similarly there was some evidence that the 35 large trucking firms would have liked to call off their strike action before Villarín was ready to do so'.

e. Could the UP have won support in the middle sectors?

Allende and the Communist party hoped to divide monopoly capital from small and medium sized concerns. In the political field they hoped to divide the Christian Democrats, and win the support of its left faction. Was this a forlorn hope? It was obviously not easy, for a large part of the middle class was closely linked ideologically and organisationally with the right.

The economic expansion of the first year of the UP brought considerable gains to many sectors of the petty bourgeoisie. But while some of them had never been so well off, never had they been so fierce in their opposition to the parties and policies of the left. (Gazmuri, 1975: 51) It is true that with the JAPs (the supply and price committees) the government created a network of local control over the provision of basic necessities. But many small shopkeepers were involved in this process, which in some cases guaranteed them supplies which might otherwise have been unobtainable. Yet the fear of the future was stronger than the benefits of the present, and many shopkeepers feared that the JAPs were one step towards eliminating them altogether. (Kay, 1975: 9; Gamero, 1975: 132)

According to the Radical politician Luis Bossay, the Radicals had to oppose the government, because it wanted to nationalise everything - the trucks, the sewing machines, butchers shops, all land, even basic agricultural tools. Obviously this was false, but it was what opponents of the government wanted to be believed, and in the heightened tension of 1972 and 1973 many members of the middle class did believe such propaganda.

The UP strategy of winning over the petty bourgeoisie consisted of a fairly clear economic policy and a rather confused ideological one. It was assumed that many small and medium sized enterprises were opposed, objectively at least, to the large and often foreign owned firms, and that a policy of guaranteeing the smaller entrepreneurs credits, spare parts and a share of the market would at worst neutralise them and at best win them over. (López, 1975: 158-160; Castells, 1974: 78) It is difficult to know how this policy would eventually have affected the loyalties of the small and medium entrepreneurs, because the security necessary to make such a policy effective was not present after the first year of the UP. (Whether this was due to economic mismanagement, adverse movements of world prices or domestic and foreign sabotage, is too complex a problem to examine here.)

But the second element of the strategy did not even reach the stage of unsuccessful implementation. Ideological warfare, especially when the opposition controls most of the mass media, is not easy. It has been argued (Gamero, 1975: 132) that the government's concentration on the proletariat left no role for the middle sectors; that the

very real and distinct cultural, educational and ideological beliefs and aspirations of the middle class were brushed aside. But how could these different aspirations have been incorporated into the UP programme? There are no clear indications. One of the most perceptive of Chile's political commentators (Maira, 1973: 14-15) recommended 'the integration of the middle class with the destiny of the nation'. This involved a process of education and demonstration that the destiny of those who make up the middle class is not that of becoming capitalists, nor of reaching their standard of living, for that is simply not possible for the majority of Chileans. They must be 'invited to share and be offered a place in the process of making a more independent, more sovereign, and more developed Chile'. A noble vision, no doubt, but the essentially rhetorical level at which this kind of debate was conducted, is exposed by the question he then puts; 'The real issue is - how do we do it?'

Without economic security, it is likely that ideological persuasion, however well planned, would have little impact. Had the UP been able to provide the safe haven for small proprietors that was intended, perhaps ideological persuasion would have been unnecessary. But like so many questions about the politics of this period, no definitive answer is possible. The UP was not tactically consistent, however firm its long term intentions may have been. Perhaps it was impossible for the UP to win over the middle sectors while it permitted the 'unthinking action of infantile leftism' as former Socialist party Secretary-General Anícelto Rodríguez puts it (1975: 42), to haunt the

imagination of those sectors with a Chile in which they had no future. Perhaps the battle was lost before it was won, and no policy could have persuaded the middle classes to desert their historical representatives for the Marxist parties. Perhaps a better economic performance would have lessened the intensity of the conflict and at least permitted the UP to finish one presidential period, whatever the outcome of an election held then. It is a testimony to the importance of the Chilean experience that such questions, unanswerable as they may be, continue to capture our attention.

TRADE UNIONS AND THE WORKING CLASS

"The factor that, in our judgement, prevented us from converting the favourable objective conditions and the generally correct overall strategy into a decisive victory for the working class and the people, was the absence of a united, homogeneous and hegemonic proletarian leadership at the centre of the UP and the government." Central Committee of MAPU OC, May 1974. (15)

This criticism was levelled at the major political parties of the UP, but insofar as the union movement is highly politicised in Chile, can it be regarded also as a reflection of the inadequacies of the union movement? Did the Chilean trade union movement meet the challenges it faced? This section will examine the strength of the

union movement, its relationship with the unorganised sectors of the working class, and the limitations of the process of worker participation in running industry.

a. Unions: size and politics

Calculating the number of unions and unionists in Chile is an uncertain operation. (16) According to official figures, the distribution of legal unions in Chile was as follows:

Insert Table 1 here

However, to legal unions we must add those members in public sector organisations which had no legal status as unions, though in practice they functioned as such. So, adding 300,000 to the original 600,000 and allowing say another 100,000 for the unions formed after October 1971 (this was still happening in the countryside) we reach an approximate figure of one million in unions out of an active labour force of 2.6 million, a relatively high proportion in international terms.

But this is only a small part of the story. Almost half of all unions in Chile had a membership of fewer than fifty members; and there were only forty with over two thousand members. The number of workers in unions more or less doubled between 1967 and 1972, but most of this increase was either in the rural sector, or was the product of a further proliferation of very small unions in manufacturing industry. (17) Strong federations (like the copper workers, and some public sector unions) or powerful plant unions (like some textile and metalurgical unions) were the

Table I

unions: structure and membership

	<u>No.</u>	<u>Members</u>	<u>Average size</u>
<u>sindicatos industriales</u> (plant unions)	1,561	202,771	129
<u>sindicatos profesionales</u> (professional unions)	2,824	247,003	87
<u>sindicatos campesinos</u> (rural unions)	<u>587</u>	<u>152,532</u>	259
	4,972	602,306	

SOURCE: 'Memoria del Consejo Directivo al 6 Congreso Nacional de la CUT.' Santiago. December 1971, p.84. The figures refer to legal unions registered up to October 1971.

Table 2

Employment in manufacturing industry, 1967

<u>persons employed</u>	1 - 4	5 - 9	10 - 49	50 - 99	100+
<u>no. of enterprises</u>	21,450	5,251	5,353	694	692

SOURCE: Lucio Geller, 'Algunas preguntas sobre la construcción del socialismo en Chile', Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional, no. 9, September 1971, p. 106.

exception; the small weak plant union (the sindicato industrial), or even smaller white collar union (the sindicato profesional), was the rule.

Although the weakness of unions in Chile was partly a product of a restrictive legal code (and the UP government never had sufficient force in Congress to push through a thorough legal reform), the small size of the unions is also a consequence of the structure of industry.

Insert Table 2 here

Using a different method of classification, Castells (1974: 83) estimates that there were 124,800 workers and employees in the dynamic industrial sector, 138,700 in the intermediate sector and 287,000 in the traditional sector. Or dividing it according to size, 44% of the workforce was employed in large factories (of 200 and more workers); 40% in medium sized concerns (of between 20 and 199); and 16% in small firms (of between 5 to 16).

The meaning of such figures is fairly clear. The union movement was very dispersed. There were great internal variations in size, strength and wealth. Compared with the huge powerful bureaucracies of Argentina, the Chilean movement was weak, though it did develop a remarkably high degree of class consciousness.

Nevertheless, we should not underestimate the spread of political opinions inside the labour movement, even amongst those sectors that supported the UP. Commenting on union elections in Chile in 1973, Touraine (1974: 137-9) noted that in the elections for the steel workers unions in

Huachipato, the majority was gained by the opposition, even though previously the UP had a majority. This he attributed to the 'economistic' attitude of the highly paid steel workers, very similar to the 'gremialismo' of the middle classes. The contrast with the textile workers of the Sumar Factory was sharp. Here a combative working force had resisted the entry of the armed forces into the factory to search for arms.

The copper workers in Chile, especially in the Chuquicamata open cast mine, have long been regarded as the least politically committed of Chilean workers, even though historically they have chosen left wing leaders. According to Petras, 'Workers come to 'Chuqui' for one reason: to make money. After a few years many of them leave. There is little community feeling amongst the working class. Geographically apart, socially isolated, uprooted from their normal class environment, in transition toward new occupational opportunities - the copper workers in Chuquicamata are salary conscious but not class conscious.' (18) He quoted a union leader saying that the miners 'vote for Left unionists because they are more effective negotiators of new contracts'. In elections held in 1973 for the employees union, the Christian Democrats won 3 seats, the National party 1, and the UP 1; previously the UP had held 3 seats and the Christian Democrats 2. Among the blue collar workers the Christian Democrats went up from 1 to 2 representatives on the 5 man union executive. (19) In the voting for the employees union, the Christian Democrats took 45% of the 2,419 votes cast; and 30% of the 2,754 blue collar workers. Neither the miners of Chuquicamata, nor

those of the El Teniente mine, where in 1973 there was a long and damaging strike, were prepared for long to moderate their wage demands in the overall national interest (though there is a good deal of evidence that in the El Teniente strike the activists were largely the Christian Democratic white collar workers who, by that time, in common with many of their party had come to identify the national interest with the overthrow of the government).

It would be a mistake to assume that the attitude of the copper workers and the steel workers were totally untypical of the rest of the working class in Chile. A survey comparing the attitude of workers in various occupations found some very un-socialist attitudes amongst the textile workers too. (20) Naturally it was amongst sectors of the white collar workers that the UP faced strongest opposition, but it must be remembered that some of those unions had been led by UP militants. The Chilean airline, LAN Chile, went over to the Christian Democrats with a 3 to 2 majority for them on its executive. In the Union of Educational Workers (SUTE), possibly Chile's largest union, in the January 1973 elections the Christian Democrats made big gains taking 35,600 votes to the 36,500 for the UP, and increasing their representation on the executive from 3 to 16. In the Health Workers Federation (FENATS) the Christian Democrats and two small anti-UP parties won a plurality with 5,200 votes out of 13,000, partly because the Socialists and Communists were unable to agree on a common list and presented separate lists each gaining about 3,000 votes. (21)

The biggest test of unionists' political preferences came with the first ever national direct elections for the executive of the CUT in 1972. The results were as follows;

Insert Table 3 here

Although UP candidates took over 70% of the total vote, the Christian Democrats were dominant in the white collar sector. Moreover the Christian Democrats had a plurality in Central Santiago with 35,000 votes, compared with 30,000 for the Communists and 25,000 for the Socialists, and they were able to control the regional branch of the CUT for Santiago province. In many white collar unions, like the teachers union, the opposition parties had a majority, while in such working class unions as the coal miners less than a tenth voted for the opposition, (and only an eighth in the case of the construction workers). (Whitehead, 1974: 30)

It is also interesting to note the almost complete lack of support for the Frente de Trabajadores Revolucionarios (the Workers Revolutionary Front) which followed the political line of the ultra left MIR.

There are few available figures of party membership for comparison. Moreover, the meaning of membership differed between the parties, with the Communists exacting much more disciplined loyalty than any other party. Luis Corvalán, (Labarca, 1973: 68) the secretary general of the Communist party, claimed that there were 250,000 members of the Communist party and youth movement, organised in 10,000 cells. He added that 75% of the membership was working class. The Chilean communist party was conceived as a mass movement rather than an elitist party. Castells (1974: 425-6) gives the following figures for party membership; Communists 160,000; Socialists 80,000; MAPU

Table 3

Voting in the CUT national election 1972

Manual workers

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>%</u>
<u>Communists</u>	113,000	38
<u>Socialists</u>	95,900	32
<u>Christ. Democ.</u>	47,400	16
<u>MAPU</u>	22,000	7
<u>FTR (an MIR group)</u>	5,800	1
<u>Radicals</u>	<u>5,600</u>	1
	291,400	(this includes voting for other small parties)

White Collar workers

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>%</u>
<u>Christ. Democ.</u>	61,000	41
<u>Communists</u>	33,000	22
<u>Socialists</u>	29,000	19
<u>Radicals</u>	<u>11,000</u>	7
	146,000	(including minor parties votes)

SOURCE: official CUT returns. Slightly different figures are published by Castells, (1974:427). But as the counting took about six weeks and was disputed, it is not surprising that such discrepancies exist.

50,000; MIR 10,000; Christian Democrats 60,000; and 30,000 for the National party and other far right groups. But he gives no source for these figures which seem improbably high. The point remains that the mass base of the UP lay with organised labour.

Yet even allowing a generous 40% estimate for the proportion of the labour force in unions, and even omitting from the calculation those who could not form unions (employers, armed services etc.) there were still many people outside the union structure. In particular there were women, and the inhabitants of the so-called shanty towns.

b. Women and the UP

Women played an active role in politics during the UP government, but in opposition rather than in support of it. The first mass demonstration against the UP, and the last, were carried out by women. (22)

The economic role of women in Chilean society contrasts sharply with that of men. Of the active labour force in 1970, 77% was male and only 23% female (in 1952, the proportion was slightly higher at 25%). (Ribeiro and de Barbière, 1973: 175) Of a total female population of 4.5 million in 1970, only 13% were economically active, compared with 44% of men. Of the women who undertake paid employment, relatively few do so in the manufacturing sector (18%). Most women are employed in the services sector (53%), with just over a quarter of all women working as domestic servants, though the real number is probably higher as an estimated 45% of domestic servants are not registered by their employers for social security benefits. (Mattelart, 1975: 22) Less than 3% of the female labour

force is registered as employed in agriculture. In fact most female labour in agriculture is unpaid familial work on small plots. (23)

In its report to the CUT Congress in 1971, the national executive stated that 'work on the feminine front is undoubtedly one of the weakest areas of the CUT's activities. This is basically due to a lack of concern on the part of the CUT itself, and its federations and base unions ...' One survey found, in 1972, that the traditional attitudes of the male employers towards their women workers were generally shared by those workers themselves. (Ribeiro and de Barbière, 1973: 175) The attitude of women workers towards their unions was described as passive; and the problems that women faced at work were seen as individual ones, rather than as group problems capable of collective solution.

It is hardly surprising that women's electoral behaviour is markedly more conservative than that of their menfolk. In the 1970 Presidential elections for example, in the mining communes where Allende had his highest support, 45% of the male electorate supported him, but only 39% of the female electorate; for Alessandri, 15% of men voted, and 22% of women. Alessandri's highest vote was recorded in communes where service sector occupations predominated. In those communes, 44% of men voted for him, but 50% of women. (24)

There is some slight evidence that sex differences were lessening in favour of class differences by 1972. In the process of popular mobilization, as local communities rather than just the factories became involved in the defence of

their interests, women played a more active role. Comparing the 1971 municipal elections with the 1970 presidential one, support for the UP rose 6.5% amongst men, but 7.9% amongst women; and support for the right dropped 10% among men, but 13.7% amongst women. Women were presumably responding favourably to the policies of income redistribution the first year of the UP government. But the gap between male and female voting was still marked. In the March 1973 elections, 61% of the female vote went to the opposition, compared with 51% of male votes. (Whitehead, 1974: 40)

Traditional methods of political mobilization through unions would reach only a small part of the female population of Chile. Redistributive measures might win support, but such support would be conditional upon a successful economic policy, which the UP could not sustain. How then could women have been won over to the UP? It is enough to pose the question to realise its complexities. Ideological and cultural conditioning over a very long period of time is hardly tossed aside overnight, especially when the mass media remained in the opposition's hands and counted on external financing, and when the proposed and long overdue educational reforms had to be shelved because of the intensity of the opposition those proposals aroused, not least in the Church and the military. That the UP aspired to give Chilean women dignity and an actively participatory role in the new society is beyond doubt. But little advance was made. What was more notable and more politically important was the fierce opposition aroused amongst middle and upper class women to whole idea of a marxist government. When their

cars were under threat, this was hardly the right time to worry about the social conditions of their maids.

c. Politics and the 'pobladores'.

The major cities of Chile, especially Santiago, are surrounded by a ring of campamentos, (somewhat inaccurately translated as shanty-towns). The inhabitants of the campamentos were, according to the Christian Democrat theory of marginality, recent rural migrants, lacking class consciousness, instrumental in their political and social attitudes, and largely employed (or underemployed) in the marginal fringes of the tertiary sector. The Christian Democrats, with their policy of 'popular promotion' (promoción popular) attempted to recruit them into their electoral clientele. The reality of the situation however was more complicated.

The problem in essence is one of housing. Most state housing provision is simply too expensive for the urban poor. So very often the poor take the solution into their own hands and seize land designated for housing, and then construct their own dwellings. It is usual to distinguish between the campamento and the población. The campamento is the product of a land seizure of 'los sin casa' (the homeless); and the social organisation that arranges the land seizure and the subsequent administration of the campamento is the product of the would-be inhabitants and an external political agent, often the left wing MIR, though seizures were also encouraged at times by the Communist party and by the Christian Democrats (when the UP was in power). The población is the product of state planning and a more orderly occupation of a site and distribution of

lots or houses. But the social composition of the two types of community was very similar, and the factors that divided the communities - political allegiance most notably - were distributed equally inside both forms, and did not distinguish campamentos from poblaciones. (Cuellar et. al. 1973: 155-6) Some campamentos and poblaciones were well organised and had developed strong local systems of justice for example; others were very disorganised, unpoliticised and with high rates of crime.

The problem was certainly a large one. There were 275 officially recognised campamentos up to the end of May 1972, and there were more tomas (land seizures) later in the year. They formed a large circle around Santiago, and housed some 83,000 families, or 456,000 people - an estimated one-in-six of the inhabitants of Gran Santiago. (Santa Maria, 1973: 105) There were tomas before the UP came to power, but the number increased greatly in the last year of the Christian Democratic, and the first of the Allende governments, partly as the pressure on land was increasing, but mostly because those organising the tomas no longer expected the brutal opposition from the police and army that had occurred previously. The number of tomas increased from 8 in the country as a whole in 1968 to 220 in 1970, and 175 in the first half of 1971. (Castells, 1974: 271)

The number of pobladores had grown nationally to 800,000 in 1972, an inevitable reflection of a housing policy that favoured the middle class. In 1966 just under half of the families in large cities lacked sufficient income to rent minimum accommodation (defined as 36.7 sq. metres) and another 27% could afford only minimum accommodation.

The housing deficit of 400,000 dwellings in 1966 had grown to 585,000 in 1970. (Castells, 1973: 9)

But the pobladores were not a group apart from the urban working class. They were not recent rural migrants; they were not largely employed on the fringes of the tertiary sector; they were not some kind of lumpenproletariat totally lacking class consciousness and wide open to manipulation by urban caudillos. (Franco, 1974: 522-3)

The social structure of the campamentos was similar to that of the working class in general. There were no more recent rural migrants, in fact slightly fewer, in the campamentos than in Santiago as a whole. The occupational structure included a high proportion of industrial workers, again slightly higher than in Santiago as a whole. But there was a difference in the kind of industrial establishment in which they were employed. Most of those employed in the secondary sector from the campamentos worked in the poorly paid construction sector or in the small and medium sized plants of traditional industry. So their income levels were lower than the average of workers in secondary sector as a whole. The campamentos also showed a higher proportion of very poor in such occupations as itinerant street vendors than the poblaciones, but nevertheless in both types of settlement the core of employment was typical of the working class in Santiago as a whole. (Castells, 1973: 18) And sizeable groups of white collar workers and members of the petty bourgeoisie also lived in these settlements. (Castells, 1974: 253)

There was a great deal of investigation of the social composition and political attitudes of the pobladores during

the UP period. (25) The findings point to considerable variations inside the campamentos of political allegiance and social attitudes; but there was certainly no uniform set of attitudes that distinguished the pobladores from the rest of the population. Several surveys pointed towards the prevalence of an economic attitude towards political involvement, but this is hardly surprising given the deprivation that they, along with the mass of the Chilean population, were suffering, nor did such attitudes distinguish them from the rest of the population.

Mobilization in this sector during the UP period was impressive. The campamentos were the centre of the MIR's strength, with the aim of 'from the seizure of land (toma del sitio) to the seizure of power'. The level of organisation was high. An estimated 60% of the inhabitants belonged to the Juntas de Vecinos (Neighbourhood Committees); in 1972 there were at least a thousand that had secured legal recognition; and there were twenty-two associations at the commune level uniting numbers of juntas. (26)

The question facing the UP was how the pobladores could be mobilized as part of the overall alliance. But the answer seemed to have been based, at least initially, on the assumption that the inhabitants of the campamentos were qualitatively different in their occupational structure and political behaviour from organised labour. In other words, the central axis of UP policy revolved around the organised industrial proletariat. In so far as the MIR contributed something positive to the UP's task, it was perhaps a realisation that rather than a conflict of interest between these two sectors, there was a community of interest. The

people living in the campamentos were victims of a housing crisis, but that crisis was not something separate from the overall economic and class structure. Only by a drastic reform of the dominant economic system could the housing problem be solved. (Castells, 1973: 23) The so-called marginals were no more or no less marginal than the majority of the working class. A pre-condition for a successful conquest of state power was the fusion the demands of the pobladores, and those of organised labour, into one overall political strategy.

d. The unions and worker participation

The UP government wished to bring the unions, and especially the CUT, into the forefront of the political stage. The intention was to involve the union movement in economic planning from the national to the local level, at least in those companies that formed part of the state sector of the economy (the APS or area of social property). The government had multiple aims; through such participation the working class would gain confidence enough to intensify the campaign for the takeover of state power; and through such participation the government hoped to construct a system of socialist planning, distribute the surplus more fairly, and reduce inflation without reducing consumption.

But in this area, more than most perhaps, time and inherited structures worked against the government. The UP lacked congressional authority to press for an overhaul of the anachronistic labour code. Moreover, a long established industrial relations system creates patterns of behaviour that cannot be transformed overnight or even in a couple of years. One cannot pass any conclusive judgement

Table 4

Strikes in Chile

<u>Private Sector</u>	<u>No. of Strikes</u>	<u>Total Days of Strike</u>	<u>Total workers involved</u>	<u>Total Man Days Lost</u>
1964	564 (88)		138,476	
1969	977 (206)		275,405	972,382
1971	2,377 (178)	18,153	251,966	1,281,834
1972	2,474 (104)	11,097	262,105	1,177,186
<u>Public Sector</u>				
1971	322	1,088	50,431	132,479
1972	815	2,881	135,037	476,965

SOURCE: Landsberger and McDaniel (1975:623), using the official figures in the Mensajes of the President. Figures in brackets refer to legal strikes; all other strikes, and all strikes in the public sector, were illegal.

on what might have happened to worker participation in the long run. Moreover, political differences between the cautious Communists and the adventurous Socialists were very marked in the labour movement, and this tended to weaken its capacity for united action. The Communists, for example, tended to view participation mostly in terms of increasing production and efficiency. (27) The Socialists, MAPU and MIR were more concerned with increasing the intensity of class conflict.

Although the government wished to intensify the class war, it wanted to do so in a gradual and controlled way. So while it was not opposed to strikes as such - on the contrary it could only have welcomed some of them - it was hardly in the government's design for the strike level to rise to the heights that it did.

Insert Table 4 here

These figures on strikes give some idea of the way in which the working class was not responding to the pleas for labour discipline made by the government, and especially by the Communist party. Another indication of the gap between the government's plans and the workers' intentions is shown by the way in which the participation schemes operated in practice, even though the executive of the CUT and the government had agreed on the broad lines of government-union cooperation. (Fallabella, 1975)

The government signed an agreement with the CUT in December 1970, on the following major points,

1. the need for worker participation in management,

2. the representation of the beneficiaries of the social security organisations on the board of directors, 3. reform of books three and four of the Labour Code, 4. legal recognition of the CUT, and an obligatory dues payment from unionists of 0.5% of their salaries, 5. overall salary rise, with more for the lowest paid, 6. increased family allowances, 7. food allowances, 8. 100% pension increase, 9. greater job security, 10. reduction of unemployment.

(Zapata, 1974a: 12) Neither the government nor the CUT was strong enough to enact all these reforms, but the very act of signing an agreement was an important symbolic triumph for the CUT. Some of the omissions are interesting however. There was nothing on the reorganisation of the labour movement to create powerful industry wide federations, nor any reference to the abolition of the distinction between blue collar and white collar status, though these two issues had been long standing aspirations of the trade union movement. The agreement concentrated largely on economic issues, an emphasis that was even more marked in those parts put into practice. This insistence on economic revindications is understandable given the low level of wages, and the high rate of inflation, but the agreement has been criticised for limiting itself largely to economic handouts from the government and for doing little to mobilize the working class, or help to reorganise it, with longer term objectives in mind. (Zapata, 1974a: 37)

The government concentrated its efforts on involving workers in participating in the industries of the APS. How did this work in practice?

In the first place participation in industrial control

could involve only a relatively small part of the working population. At best on government plans, ten percent of the labour force in manufacturing would be brought into the state sector by the policy of nationalising the large monopolies; for the remainder, little more than increased wages and social security benefits were offered. (28) The government argued against the spread of worker participation to the private sector on the grounds that this would mean the incorporation of those workers into the capitalist system and therefore weaken their determination to pursue the class struggle. (29) The government also insisted that the form of participation could not follow the decentralised style of Yugoslavia, for given the monopolistic structure of Chilean industry, this would give disproportionately enormous power to the workers in those large enterprises (the power of the copper workers was a constant preoccupation of the Allende government).

However, in spite of government policy the actual number of workers within the state sector was much greater than the government had planned because many workers occupied factories and demanded their incorporation into the APS.

Insert Table 5 here

Given the monopolistic structure of Chilean industry, on the government's plans the state owned and mixed sector would account for just under half of total production, and 70% of fixed assets. But only a little over 22% of the industrial work force would be occupied in the state and

mixed sectors. As de Vylder (1976: 152; also Bitar and Moyano, 1975) points out, this 'amounted to trying to nationalise some two-thirds of the whole industrial capital with the active help of only about twenty percent of all industrial workers. The remaining eighty percent should vote for socialism and defend the government in confrontations with the Right, and support the 'struggle for production', but they should not undertake any militant actions against their own employers who were, in theory, their own allies, allies of the working class. But it did not and could not work this way.'

The Government-CUT agreement laid down a detailed blueprint for participation. Factories were to be run by administrative councils, consisting of one government appointed president, five representatives of the workers and five of the state. Though this gave the government the majority, the workers could demand the recall of any government representative by a vote in the general Workers Assembly. There also existed a host of other committees and councils for worker participation in the factories. The exact role of trade unions in this new scheme was rather uncertain and became a great source of friction. In theory it was supposed that unions would concentrate less on their traditional economic functions, and more on overall political and educational tasks, and in aiding the struggle to increase production. In practice the blueprint was seldom copied in detail; the role of the Administrative Council was often very weak, while other more spontaneous forms of worker participation flourished (especially after October 1972). (30)

At the most central level, the integration of the CUT into planning mechanisms hardly worked at all. (31)

Table 5

No. of firms in the APS

	Nov.1970	Dec.1971	Dec.1972	May 1973
state ownership ¹	31	62	103	165
under intervention or requisition	—	<u>39</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>120</u>
total	31	101	202	285

1. included both social and mixed areas (i.e. jointly run by state and private sector) and 6 new industries created after 1970.

SOURCE: Vylder (1976:149)

Had all the establishments in the APS run participation schemes, then something like 200,000 workers would have been involved. (32) But given the small proportion that in fact operated schemes, the numbers involved were probably about 60 to 70,000. (Castillo et. al. 1973B: 14)

One of the major difficulties was the relationship between the participation organs and the trade unions. The unions were suspicious that their role would be superseded. The worker representatives on the various participation organs were uncertain of their functions and their power, and were often not well equipped to play a part in taking complex technical decisions. The tensions grew as inflation accelerated. Traditionally unions fought for wage increases at least equal to the rate of inflation; whereas the representatives in the participation organs would be under pressure to seek for increases less than that rate.

There is one excellent study of a specific factory that illuminates the many difficulties. (33) The application of the procedure was delayed because the local union resisted it as an imposition from above that would reduce its power. The workers representatives played a minor role in the Administrative Council, and in practice the power of the General Administrator (appointed by the government) was greatly strengthened. Labour discipline relaxed and there was an increase in the number of unproductive hours. Worker participation at most levels was low; workers stressed that they simply didn't have enough time to participate as many of them were working overtime or studying in the evenings. And the opposition parties (until 1972 the Christian Democrats controlled the white

collar union) had every interest in seeing the experiment fail. Workers leaders stressed that the training given by the government and the CUT for the new tasks was totally inadequate (one weekend training school). Nevertheless, those surveyed did stress their overall support for the transference of their factory to the APS. Their jobs were more secure, their pay better, they felt freer in the factories, and at the shop floor level felt that they were contributing something to the running of the factory. Interestingly in the elections for the unions in 1972, both the manual and white collar unions swung to the left (with only 1 Christian Democrat left compared with 5 previously); and in the October 1972 crisis the factory responded to the call from the government and the CUT to keep production going.

Although the factory studied may not be typical, two of the major problems it faced were general. The first was the great power concentrated in the Administrative Council. Although there were five elected representatives on the council, only three represented blue collar workers, (though they could not be union leaders). The technical staff elected one, as did the white collar workers. In many cases this resulted in great power being exercised by the General Administrator. Secondly, the production committees and the unions saw themselves very often as performing contradictory roles. Indeed in some cases, forewarned by others experiences, unions refused to allow into the factories representatives of the CUT to explain how to implement the participation procedures.

Participation was limited to the factory level. There

were no regional or central organisations to give a wider view. Though workers were represented at sectoral level planning in the Chilean Development Corporation (CORFO), this was secured through the unions and not through the participation organs.

The dominant group imposing this kind of participatory model was the Communist party, with its constant emphasis on the need to increase production and to curb labour indiscipline. Allende was preoccupied with this problem and publicly criticised, for example, the copper workers, and the textile workers at the large Sumar factory in Santiago. In his presidential message in 1973 Allende (Landsberger and McDaniel, 1975: 624) stated that 'the workers must make a decision: they must say whether we continue with an economic policy whose symbol is El Teniente or if we go toward the sacrifice of having less money for the sake of greater progress and more prosperous development'. Yet some members of the government still criticised Allende and the Communists for offering the working class in practice not much more than economic incentives. (34)

The government did introduce into congress in early 1972 a bill which would have altered the balance of power in the APS between workers and management. In particular it sought to strengthen the power of the Workers Assembly and to give it greater power of recall over members of the administrative council. It sought also to increase the proportion of workers on the administrative council. But the bill was rejected by Congress. (Raptis, 1974: 378)

The last year of the UP government saw an intense process of mobilization, as the plans of the government were

attacked more fiercely from the right, and criticised more severely on the left. The government did not only lose its authority against an increasingly united opposition, but it also lost a considerable degree of control over its own supporters. The bosses strike of October 1972 produced a powerful reaction from the working class as it began to devise new forms of resistance. The government, and the CUT, were spectators of a process which they started by opposing and came to accept only when it was too late.

THE PROCESS OF MOBILIZATION

Although the UP government saw an impressive acceleration in popular mobilization, nevertheless since the 1950's such mobilization had been gathering speed, though in more conventional forms. For example, the urban labour force in unions doubled in the six years of the Christian Democratic government, and peasant unions grew from practically nothing to over 120,000 members by 1970. Perhaps most spectacular of all was the expansion of the electorate. The proportion of registered electors as a percentage of the total adult population grew from 36% in 1952 to 80% in 1970, or in numbers from 1.1 million to 4.5 million (in 1973). And the number of votes cast rose from 957,000 in 1952 to 3.7 million in 1973. The left received just over a third of a million votes in 1958; in 1973 this had risen to 1,589,000. (Borón, 1975: 84-8) To the already large number of urban sector strikes one must add their rapid growth in the countryside too, where the 3 strikes of 1960 had increased to 39 in 1964, 648 in 1968 and 1,580 in 1970. (Borón, 1975: 98) Seizures of farms, urban land sites and factories also

increased. In 1968, 16 farms were invaded by their workers; in 1970 the number had risen to 368. In the same period the number of urban land seizures rose from 15 to 352; and the number of factory seizures from 5 to 133. (Borón, 1975: 94)

However, what was distinctive about the situation following the bosses strike of October 1972, was a widespread feeling that popular power (poder popular) had risen to such heights that it was no longer just a challenge to the dominant order, but could have taken control and created a socialist state. The political choice in 1972-3 was between further compromises with the bourgeois parties and politicians and an effective end of the hope of creating socialism, or the further development of popular power as the only guarantee of irreversible progress along the road to socialism. (Zemelman, 1973: 199)

But what did 'popular power' mean and what forms did it take? The most limited definition came from the Communist party, anxious to keep such movements within the bounds of legality, and the control of a disciplined centralised state and party apparatus. (35) This was in line with the overriding importance that the Communist party gave to creating an alliance with the middle classes, but obviously it encouraged a 'formalistic notion of political mobilization in which (for example) political mobilization of the peasant base was almost synonymous with the organisation of a mass meeting'. (Roxborough, 1974: 16) Although the MIR and the left of the Socialist party held much more aggressive views on the need to promote popular power, it was not until the last few months before the fall of the govern-

ment that the Socialists backed the grass roots movements.

The government was cautious. In its electoral programme for example, the UP had stated that the local UP committees (the CUP's), would 'above all prepare the way for the exercise of popular power'. In practice, however, the CUPs never overcame the differences that divided the parties, and they mostly fell into inactivity. (Maira, 1973: 79) This was a serious setback to the plans for popular mobilization. What did eventually happen in, for example, the cordones industriales (local organisations of factory workers in the industrial belts surrounding the major cities) was a process of overcoming party sectarianism by forcing local community cooperation, of involving people who were independent of parties or even members of opposition parties, and of developing a working class ideology. These three indispensable tasks might have started earlier, and on a much wider scale, had the CUPs been at all successful. (Castells, 1972: 31)

The government also discouraged tomas and on several occasions the police were used, sometimes with violence, against the squatters.

In Concepción in July 1972, several parties of the UP organised a People's Assembly. The resulting confusion over this episode indicated the ambivalence of the government and of the parties to such initiatives. Allende and the Communist party feared that the intention was to by-pass congress, and create a separate de facto people's legislature. Originally the local Communist party had supported the proposal, but they withdrew and the local Communist provincial intendant prohibited a planned street

demonstration. Even the national committee of the MAPU disavowed the participation of the local MAPU. In practice the Assembly seems to have been much less of an ultra-leftist plot than the Communists feared, and much more a serious debate over the alternative paths of popular mobilization then developing at the grass roots level. (Castells, 1974: 432)

Partly in response to those kinds of pressures the UP leadership was forced to revise its politics. At the El Arrayán meeting in mid-1972 (Nueva Sociedad, 1972: 48) it laid much more emphasis on popular mobilization, and stated that 'the delays and inadequacies in this area constituted one of the principle criticisms and self-criticisms made at the meeting.' That meeting stressed the need to involve people who were not members of the UP parties, and it was emphasised that people must be given a real share in the taking of decisions at the local level. Perhaps there was neither time nor authority left to put these proposals into action, for they remained as aspirations rather than achievements.

One general vein of criticism of the UP was that the relationship between the government and the masses was lopsided. The government was the major protagonist of the Chilean revolution, leaving the people a rather inert passive and receptive role. Although there was plenty of evidence of a desire for popular participation, the channels for this were inadequate. What involvement there was, limited itself to economic activities; there was little opportunity to share in political power. (Castillo et. al., 1973b: 4) One indication of impatience at the government's slowness is the

large number of firms that were taken into the state sector as a direct result of worker pressure rather than government plans. In June 1972 the major entrepreneurial groups, the SFF, (the Sociedad de Fomento Fabril), presented a report to Congress stating that there had been 263 factories intervened (and that these employed 185,000 workers and contributed 53% to gross industrial production). Over 70% had been intervened because of labour conflict. (36) The government's ideas about the extent of the APS were more limited than those of the workers. (37) It was not until June 1973 however that the CUT decided to lend its full weight to such activities and to advocate by-passing Congress and creating an overall coordination structure for the workers in the APS. (Zemelman, 1973: 208)

The process of mobilization took place at various levels. The supply and price juntas (the JAPs) were set up to involve people in the process of distribution of popular goods. There was widespread development of organisations in the poblaciones. Production and vigilance Committees were set up in the factories. Finally, the cordones industriales mobilized large numbers of workers in their localities.

a. The JAPs

Economic difficulties and a growing black market gave rise to concern in many poorer sectors of society about the supply of basic foodstuffs. This concern was shared by Allende's first Economics Minister, Pedro Vuskovic, and he met with the worried housewives in June 1971 to discuss methods of dealing with the problem. The outcome of the discussions were the JAPs, which though they spread

throughout the country, remained strongest in Santiago.

There were precedents in Chilean history for organisations like the JAPs, but nothing on the same scale. They were formed largely in working class districts on the basis of representation of the neighbourhood committees, mothers centres and other local organisations, and also representatives of the small shopkeepers. The aims of the JAPs were to combat price speculation and hoarding, and to act as a distribution agency. They grew rapidly, and by mid-1972 there were about a thousand of them nationwide (of which 675 were in Santiago), and there were also ten JAPs at the wider commune level. Collaborating with the JAPs were an estimated 8,000 small shopkeepers. In Santiago something like 60% of all meat and 30% of poultry were distributed through the JAPs. The various state distribution agencies collaborated closely with them, one agency maintaining a department to train inspectors for the JAPs. (Castillo et. al., 1973b: 16) In March 1972 there was held a large assembly of representatives from the various Santiago JAPs.

According to Minister Vuskovic, the JAPs were to form part of the process of building poder popular. The opponents of the government were extremely hostile towards an experiment which, whatever its larger political implications (or lack of them), represented an improvement in the distribution of basic goods to the lower class. But perhaps it is an exaggeration to see the JAPs in too overtly political a form. It is not altogether clear how their primary function would correspond, except perhaps in some very long term sense, with a broader political strategy of taking over State power. Given the close

relationship between the JAPs and the state, it was more than a possibility that the relationship would end by stressing the dependence of the JAPs on the State and the associated bureaucratisation of their operation. (38) In some cases too, the local JAP was taken over by the small shopkeepers, or by a political party and used as a further instrument of patronage.

Perhaps in the political field the JAPs served best to train local leaders, giving them experience of responsibility in taking decisions. Although it is very difficult to make any firm generalisations the presence of local Communists as organisers of the JAPs was often noted by observers, and this kind of organisation was more to the liking of the Communist party than the less controllable cordones. Like the cordones however, the JAPs proved their importance in October 1972, and whatever their shortcomings as instruments of the class struggle, the JAPs were an important and impressive form of popular mobilization, involving sectors of the population (especially women) who were outside the scope of more orthodox forms of mobilization through parties and unions.

b. The pobladores

Few poblaciones were as well organised and as highly politicised as the MIR dominated Nueva Habana settlement in Santiago. Contrasting the attitude of the other left parties with that of the MIR, one of their spokesmen said that 'the traditional left wing agencies organise the squatters until the next elections, when they introduce lighting, water etc. MIR rejects elections in principle - we work continuously with the squatters. The leaders of

the settlements of the UP don't live in the settlement, they come in a car twice a week to attend meetings. The absentee leaders are not present to execute the programme. MIR leaders are totally integrated in the settlement. We work because we believe in the revolution.' (Petras, 1973: 45) Nevertheless, the contrast with the other parties was not so complete; many of the other settlements exhibited high degrees of solidarity and organisation - though they were not always associated with the parties of the UP. (39)

One experiment which shows the opposition facing the UP was the attempt to set up brigadas del trabajo (work brigades) to organise the building of houses in the campamentos, preferably in association with small building firms. The idea was potentially fruitful on several fronts; it would help towards the solution of the housing and unemployment problem; it would create a spirit of self-confidence amongst the campamento dwellers and help them to organise; and it would create links between the poor and the small construction firms, hopefully severing those firms from their dependence on the large construction companies organised in the Cámara Chilena de la Construcción (the CCC, the Chilean Chamber of Construction Companies). (40)

However the CCC threw its weight against the government's housing programme, especially those parts that fixed low quota repayments on housing to encourage the poor to buy their homes, that encouraged small enterprises, that sought to expand the state's role in housing and, of course, the work brigades. (Castells, 1973: 27) The large companies still retained their dominant position in the construction

industry, including their privileged access to state credit. (41)

The government's achievement in building houses was rather creditable, (42) but two important aims - the splitting of the big companies from the smaller ones, and the development of work brigades - were defeated by the political opposition and the power of private capital.

The social changes that took place in the campamentos are complex, and it is difficult to know how widespread they were. For example, there were a number of experiments in the administration of popular justice, heralded on the left as an important ideological advance in the creation of a rival proletarian system of justice over the dominant bourgeois one. (Cueller et. al., 1971) That such experiments did exist (and that the existing judicial system did exhibit a notorious class bias) was undoubtedly true, but they were limited to a small number of the campamentos.

The overall organisation of the pobladores and their relations with the government were not entirely free from the state paternalism practised by the previous Christian Democratic government, and the politics of such organisations were certainly not free from the political infighting that weakened the UP. The government set up the Oficina Nacional de Pobladores and the Central Unica de Pobladores, and the function of both was to stimulate popular participation. In practice, though like the JAPs it obviously helped to train a considerable number of local leaders, the relationship between the government and the pobladores tended to become bureaucratised. The government did not find it

possible, for example to solve the problem of distribution of houses and building plots without the occasional violent clash between the police and the pobladores. (Alvarado et. al., 1973: 65)

The Socialists and the Communists disagreed over the role of such organisations, and the Socialists withdrew from the Communist dominated Central Unica de Pobladores, arguing in favour of a much greater extension of poder popular, and also for the development of organisations of pobladores at the regional and provincial level (where such organisations were very weak: a similar problem of the JAPs and the APS). Although many of the pobladores were manual workers, they were not often employed in the large concerns that formed part of the APS, so that their experience in worker participation was limited. Only in the October crisis of 1972 was the radical potentiality of the poblaciones made apparent, and then only for a short time.

c. The production and vigilance committees

The production and vigilance committees were formed to involve workers in the private sector of the economy. They were to consist of an executive of five to ten members elected in a general assembly of the workers. The function of these committees was to keep up production levels, to prevent sabotage by the capitalist owners, to inform on the level of utilisation of the plant, on the supply of materials to the factory and its type of production. (Larrain and Castillo, 1971: 183-4)

In practice they functioned in a variety of ways. In some cases they were little more than an appendage to the union, and so had little life or role (there were even

examples of the committees being appointed by the unions). Moreover, the tasks they were asked to undertake were often difficult technical ones, complicated enough even with the support of the management, and virtually impossible in opposition to it. But in other cases the committees had to assume virtual responsibility for the running of factories when they were abandoned by their owners, or when particularly fraudulent management practices had led to conflict. In 1972, these factories organised themselves into a Federación de Empresas y Brigadas de Trabajadores which consisted of eighty enterprises employing 10,000 workers. This federation was known as the Social Area of the Poor, for many of the factories were unprofitable and old, a factor which made officials of the APS resist including them in the state sector, even though this was the intention of the federation.

Perhaps of most importance was the role these committees played in paving the way for the large number of factory seizures and the eventual development of the cordones. Most of the concerns in the APS were there by the will of their workers rather than by government design. In some cases the committees had created a situation of dual power inside their factories which led eventually to the toma of the factory and its incorporation into the APS. These factories formed the basis for working class mobilization in 1972.

d. The cordones industriales

The French sociologist Alain Touraine (1974: 12-13) was very impressed by the development of the cordones. In his words,

'whatever else happens, Chile has given to the revolutionary movement an original form; the cordones industriales. Factory workers, generally from the social sector, organise on a territorial basis and a few dozen factories form the starting point of a cordón, such as those of Cerrillos, Vicuña MacKenna, Macul, Mapocho, Santiago Centro etc. The city is surrounded and penetrated by the cordones. At times it has moved to a higher stage, the comando comunal, the beginning of local dual power structure that prepared the way for poder popular. It is a class movement. The presence of party militants prevents irresponsible political action, but this is very far from making the cordones the vanguard of political movements. The very Communists and the CUT leadership recognise the autonomy of the cordones at the same time as they feel threatened by a movement that rejects the centralised and bureaucratic nature of the CUT. This class movement tends to create a territorial organisation based on the commune for lack of trust in the government, because of the antagonism of other parts of the State, and of the armed forces that often intervene with extreme brutality in the name of the law over arms control.'

The first cordón to be established, the Cordón Cerrillos-Maipu has fortunately been studied in detail and it is possible to trace its origins, development, problems and achievements. (43) The cordon had its origins in a Comando Coordinador formed in June 1972 to press for the inclusion of several of the local industries engaged in strikes into the APS. Although the initiative was initially welcomed by the Socialist party, the party changed its mind after the initial June mobilization and the Comando Coordinador was left with only the support of the extreme left parties (basically the MIR, and two revolutionary communist parties). The transformation of the local organisation (and its imitation in other parts of Santiago) came with the October crisis, when the problem of ensuring the supply of basic necessities meant organisation on a communal rather than factory level (though the Cordón Cerrillos was slower undertaking this task than its

imitators). For the problems that the cordones faced were not simply those of work; rather, they were a combination of factors which interrelated to create a situation of deprivation. In the case of Cerrillos for example, one considerable problem, and one which brought sectors of the opposition (mostly the Christian Democrats, but even groups further to the right) into local organisation was that of inadequate public transport. The cordón also included local peasant groups that had been engaged in land tomas.

However the core element of the cordón that remained most consistently active were the organised unionists engaged in the process of taking their factories into the APS, and organised in the, to give the full title, Comando Coordinador de los Trabajadores del Cordón Cerrillos Maipú (though sometimes it was called the Comité Coordinador de Luchas de la Comuna). Faced with the slowness of the government, and the opposition of the Communist party, the workers of some thirty industries decided to take matters into their own hands, but though many of them were members of the Socialist party they did not receive the full hearted support of that party. The pressure of the workers of the cordón on the government led to a change of policy about incorporating the factories of the area into the APS; and this success of grass roots pressure led to the formation of similar movements elsewhere. The local CUT was notable for its almost total absence from these events. (44)

The movement superseded party affiliations. There were even attempts to stop the parties making capital out of the workers' successes, by for example, prohibiting the

distribution of party literature at meetings of the workers Comando. The solidarity created in the factories during the October strike was impressive; that in the commune as a whole less so. Nevertheless, the experience was important in demonstrating the potentialities of united action of all the inhabitants of a given area - industrial workers, peasants, pobladores - and in cutting across the sex and party divisions that were the normal characteristics of Chilean political life. But one must not exaggerate the uniformity of class consciousness in the cordón. The struggle to take the factories into the APS united workers, temporarily at least, above parties, but the same degree of integration was certainly not characteristic of other activities in the commune. Neither the agricultural workers nor the pobladores ever achieved the level of activity and integration in the overall Cordón Cerrillos that the industrial workers achieved in their comando. Moreover, the presence of many white collar workers and some pobladores provided a strong electoral base for the opposition. In the 1971 municipal elections of a total vote of 26,301, the largest single party was the National party with 8,265 votes, followed by the Socialists with 7,575, the Christian Democrats with 4,799 and the Communists with 4,061.

If the popular mobilization in October 1972 was impressive, and even if the figure of perhaps 100,000 workers active in the cordones is not much of an exaggeration, one must be cautious in assessing their significance. They were after all very short-lived organisations, responding to a crisis. The degree of organisation of the industrial workers was always higher than that of other sectors. The

comandos comunales, intended to unite all the grass roots organisations in an embryonic popular power were not significant numerically and did not develop. Nor indeed were the cordones ever in a position to assume the basis for the seizure of state power. Their activities in many ways were defensive rather than offensive, taking over the role of unions when these failed to defend the interests of their members. (Castells, 1974: 13-14; Zemelman, 1973: 205) The cordones served more as coordinators of the activities of local trade unions than as a vanguard of revolution.

In any case, the cordones would have needed to work with the support of the government, the political parties and the official union movement in order to have formed part of a successful overall political strategy. But the government was anxious to stop the process of factory tomas, the Communists not at all keen on the cordones, and though local Socialists often took the lead in establishing them, the attitude of the party as a whole was ambivalent. The CUT favoured the policy of returning factories to owners (on the lines of Millas new economic policy) and in some areas it is alleged the CUT tried to organise parallel cordones. (45)

Not until a few months before the coup did the CUT fully accept the existence of the cordones and start coming to terms with the strategy that acceptance implied. But the politics of those last few months were incredibly complicated and bitter, and it was hardly the time for an abrupt change of policy by the government. Touraine's initial comments on the cordones may exaggerate their

originality. (46) But the cordones were a remarkable demonstration of the potentialities of working class unity, for once superseding the normal partisan divisions of the Chilean left.

e. The Consejos Campesinos

Questioner: Which form of organisation in the so called reform sector do you think ought to be promoted?

Calderón (Socialist Minister of Agriculture): There is ... one form of organisation which ought not to be promoted, the asentamiento. All the peasant organisations agree that on the asentamientos there exist no incentives for the workers; that irresponsibility, alcoholism and absenteeism develop there: that they are a failure from the point of view of production, that the asentados start exploiting their own class brothers Secondly frankly speaking I do believe that the Comités Campesinos CERAs etc. are to a large extent armchair products. In practice you go to a CERA and you notice that it works in much the same way as an asentamiento.

Interview published in Chile Hoy July 1972 and cited in de Vylder (1976: 196).

The Allende government inherited a fairly advanced agrarian reform law from the previous administration. To a large extent the UP was the prisoner of that reform law, and of the process of rural mobilization that had started under the Christian Democrats as that party attempted to create a loyal rural political clientele. As the quotation from Rolando Calderón indicates, the UP's attempt to redirect the direction of rural change was far from successful.

The UP government accelerated the changes that had started under the Frei administration. By the end of 1972, virtually all large estates over 80 basic hectares had disappeared. (47) But not all had passed into the reform sector. Many had been subdivided in anticipation of the law, so that by 1972, 27% of arable land was held in estates

of between 40 and 80 hectares (and another 25% in farms of 5 to 40 hectares) and the government did not have the power in Congress to lower the level appropriate for expropriation to 40 hectares. So even after the virtual elimination of the latifundia, two-thirds of all productive land in Chile remained in private hands. (de Vylder: 1976)

Estate seizures had increased from 9 in 1967 to 1278 in 1972, often in anticipation of the process of expropriation, or they were local tomas organised by the Mapuches in Southern Chile demanding the restitution of lands lost in the nineteenth century. The widespread picture of rural anarchy depicted by the right was far from the truth. In some ways what was striking about the reform was its limitations. Only 20% of the rural labour force were direct beneficiaries of the reform, and many of them organised in state supported asentamientos (designed by the Christian Democrats as a transitional collective undertaking to develop into individually owned plots) fiercely resisted the spread of the benefits outside the limited group of those who were entitled to participate in the distribution of expropriated properties (largely permanent and resident estate labourers). The large number of minifundistas (an estimated 100,000 owning on average one tenth of the land of an asentado) and the even larger number of landless labourers (an estimated 350,000) did not benefit from the reform process, except in some cases from higher wages.

The number of peasants organised in trade unions grew rapidly in this period.

Table 6

Rural Trade Unions

<u>Union</u>	1969		1972	
	<u>Members</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Members</u>	<u>%</u>
Ranquil (Communista-Socialist) Unidad Obrero	31,000	30	132,000	48
Campesino (MAPU)	-	-	41,000	15
<u>Total pro UP</u>	<u>31,000</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>173,000</u>	<u>63</u>
Libertad (right wing)	23,000	22	39,000	14
Triunfo Campesino (Christian Democrat)	48,000	46	61,000	22
other opposition	2,000	2	4,000	38
<u>Total anti-UP</u>	<u>73,000</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>105,000</u>	<u>38</u>
TOTAL	103,644		277,895	

SOURCE: Vylde (1976:209)

Insert Table 6 here

Apart from the spread of unions however, other groups, mostly opposed to the UP also organized in the countryside. The Confederation of Asentamientos allied with the Christian Democrats, was a powerful source of opposition to the government, and they made common cause with the medium sized farmers.

Developments in the Chilean countryside have attracted a great deal of investigation (48), so the point which needs attention here is simply that the UP's efforts to create alternative, and more socialist forms of rural organisation such as the CERA's (the Agrarian Reform Centres) or the various peasant councils were not very successful.

The CERAs, which were supposed to be organised on a more socialist basis than the asentamientos, partly by absorbing nearby landless labourers, were few in number and differed little from the asentamientos. There were only 150 created up to mid-1972, whereas 318 asentamientos had been created in this period to join the 628 created by the Frei government. (49)

The Consejos Campesinos were created to promote the development of poder popular in the countryside. But most of them were essentially promoted by the state rather than locally, and many of them were taken over by opponents rather than supporters of the government. Of the 260 set up at the commune level by mid-1972, only 10% were created as a direct result of local pressure, whereas 65% had been set up as a result of government decree, and the rest by a

combination of decree and direct election. But less than half of them functioned with any degree of life (and only 10% of those set up by decree did so). They appeared to have had most meaning in the Mapuche areas where they served to aid those groups in their drive to retake land. (Castillo et. al., 1973b: 12) The fears of some members of the UP that the consejos would create a situation of dual power in the countryside was not realised. The Consejo Nacional Campesino that was supposed to unite the local and provincial consejos was in fact controlled by opponents of the UP, (and hence rarely summoned). The really strong consejos campesinos existed where a powerful commune level union, dominated by one party, could control the local rural situation; the kind of situation where the consejo was least needed. (Maffei and Marchetti, 1972: 131) The landless labourers did not find in the consejos the vehicle that they lacked in the prevailing union structure (which involved largely the resident permanent estate labour force, the inquilinos).

The conflicts that took place in the Chilean countryside are difficult to analyse in simple class terms. In the Central Unica Campesina, formed in December 1971 to coordinate the opposition in the countryside, were represented members of asentamientos, small proprietors and estate labourers. The opposition was fierce, powerful and well-financed. If it is true that the level of mobilization in the countryside was indeed impressive when compared with its long history of political backwardness, a great deal of that mobilization preceded the UP, was in opposition to it, or was related to simple economic grievances that would not

necessarily lead to a higher level of class conflict. Moreover, the specific organisational form chosen by the UP, the consejo campesino, had very limited success. The elimination of the latifundia in the countryside rather than removing the class enemy of the UP, in some ways served to strengthen it. The aim of the Christian Democrats was to create a powerful rural middle class and strengthen the institution of private property in the countryside. A complete agrarian reform in line with the general policy of the UP would have required a government with much more time, power, ruthlessness and popular support than it enjoyed.

THE IDEOLOGICAL BATTLE

One of the criticisms frequently levelled at the UP was its lack of attention to the role of ideology. It has been argued, for example, that this inattention laid the way open for the systematic ideological assault of the right, manipulating such favourite myths as that Chile was basically a middle class country facing the assault of a troublesome minority led by foreign agitators, that Chile was a country of easy social mobility, that the independent entrepreneur was the backbone of the economy and so on. (50)

If the remedies proposed to counter the dominant ideology were not clear, what was striking was the domination of the mass media by the opposition. Six right wing dailies circulated to an estimated 540,000 people compared with the 312,000 reached by the five pro-UP newspapers; in the provinces the right controlled 41 out of 61 leading newspapers, the left only 11; and of the 155 radio stations

(which reached many more people than the newspapers) 115 were against the government and only 40 supported it. (Mattelart and Piccini, 1973: 253-4) The figures for periodical publications were even more strongly biased against the UP, with the opposition reaching an estimated readership of 2.7 million compared with 20,000 for the government. (Mattelart, 1970) Many of these magazines were aimed at housewives or teenagers, and were far from predominantly political. Nevertheless during the Allende government they were constantly used to carry an anti-marxist message. Although there were many magazines and many radio stations, the majority of them, and the most powerful and popular, were controlled by three major economic groups.

The leading opposition newspaper was El Mercurio, edited by a former active Chilean Nazi. According to the report of the Senate Committee on covert action in Chile, (1975: 20), local CIA controlled groups placed CIA inspired editorials almost daily in Mercurio and, after 1968, 'exerted substantial control over the content of that paper's international news section.' In the words of that committee report, 'By far the largest and probably the most significant instance of support for a media organisation was the money provided to El Mercurio ... The 40 Committee authorised \$700,000 for El Mercurio on September 9th 1971 and added another \$965,000 to that authorization on April 11th 1972. A CIA project renewal memorandum concluded that the Mercurio and other media outlets supported by the agency had played an important role in setting the stage for the September 11, 1973 military coup which overthrew Allende'.

The campaign of opposition to the government was hysterical and frequently badly distorted. Latin American observers were often amazed that the government allowed such views to circulate freely in the press, and undoubtedly the press and radio aimed to inflame opinion and incite a coup against the government. (51)

But what was the government to do to counter opposition control over the media? It was politically dangerous, if not impossible, to censure such newspapers as El Mercurio, for one of the guarantees that Allende gave the Christian Democrats in return for their support in the Congressional vote necessary to ratify the popular vote when no one candidate has an absolute majority in the Presidential elections, was precisely freedom of the press. Moreover, the government hoped to persuade, not coerce the Chilean people along the road to socialism, so it had to be careful in its dealings with the mass media.

Internal critics of the UP drew extensively on writers such as Lukacs, Luxembourg and Gramsci (52) for the burden of their attack on the cultural and propaganda policy of the government. (53) In their view the ideological battle was indispensable in the task of transforming the state from a capitalist to a socialist one. Yet they saw the ideological offensive of the UP as at best defensive, at worst non-existent, with the government's dailies attempting a vain circulation struggle with the opposition popular dailies by concentrating on the two staples of the reading public, sex and violence. Not until the El Arrayan meeting did the UP leadership take seriously the question of political persuasion through the mass media. But the political parties, which should have

led the ideological offensive never had an agreed policy. As a result they tended to concentrate on trivialising issues, such as attacks on the personal integrity of Christian Democratic leaders (which served only to drive those leaders closer to the National party and the extreme right).

Yet it is not difficult to understand why a government facing serious economic and political problems should neglect the remoter concerns of ideology, given, anyway, that the ideological unity inside the UP was very relative. Moreover, many of the cultural critiques made against the government seemed to carry implicitly the assumption that it was only necessary for a few intellectuals to hand the people their correct ideology to redress the situation. (54) Other writers stressed that the people must evolve their own ideology; but how was this possible without government control over the opposition's means of communication and without a strong government lead in the first place?

On his visit to Chile, Castro remarked that the right had learnt more than the left from the first year of the UP government. But the Chilean government, unlike the Cuban, faced a whole range of institutional opposition, and lacked the enormous wave of popular support that Castro enjoyed after his victory. Even with complete State power, the Cuban government too has had failures and setbacks in its attempt to create a new socialist man, and has come to rely on the consumerism incentives that left-wing critics in Chile attacked the Chilean communist party for advocating.

It is hard not to sympathise both with the government,

and its critics. How could the government break the dominant bourgeois modes and values given its weakness and lack of unity? But how could it hope to create the necessary commitment without stressing heavily the ideological battle? It might also be argued that the government, after all was not doing so badly in this field. In 1973, for example, its total vote was around 44% of the poll, which was higher than Allende's vote in 1970, though lower than the municipal vote in 1971, (when the UP enjoyed a higher Radical vote and when the economic situation was much better).

If ideological commitment is best derived from direct popular action, then the events of October 1972 were perhaps as important in the creation of such commitment as any government control over the means of communication. Insofar as the development of class consciousness under the pressure of events such as the October 1972 crisis was seen to be a serious threat to the existing order, the right had even more need to urge the military to stage a coup. The fear of the present military government of any idea deemed as subversive is a sad testimony to the extent to which large sectors of the population were committed to such ideas.

CONCLUSIONS

The Cuban revolution produced an immense literature concerned to extract 'lessons' from Castro's defeat of the dictatorship of Batista. While partisans of the revolution tried, unsuccessfully, to apply the Cuban model to other Latin American countries, opponents of Castro refined, with

great success, techniques of counter-insurgency. But was the Cuban model defeated because its opponents learnt more than its proponents - or because the Cuban experience was so rooted in its own national characteristics that any attempt to extract general comparative conclusions from it was predestined to fail? The Chilean experience has produced the same kind of attempt to extract general lessons. Is the attempt valid?

There are (at least) two ways of looking at the question. In the first place, one can look at the crucial problems produced internally by the social crisis of the UP government; such problems relate to the general sociology of revolution. Secondly, one can look at the experience from the perspective of comparative politics to assess its relevance to other countries.

The first perspective has been the concern of this paper. Allende and his government attempted to mobilize a majority coalition to achieve a transition to socialism. The problems created by that process transcend purely national boundaries, even if their precise relevance to another country, or indeed to Chile at another time, will have to take into account differences in the balance of social and political forces.

One impressive development in Chile was the extent to which mobilization took place in terms of community rather than just work place. The cordones showed how a crisis could unite the inhabitants of an area in common defence of their interests. Such movements were important and novel because they cut across union divisions, workplace divisions, even, to some extent party differences. (55)

Apart from mitigating the differences between the UP parties, the cordones also drew in some members of the Christian Democratic party. This importance was potential rather than fully realised, but the cordones were a new method of political action in Chile, and the fear that they aroused on the right is testimony that the opponents of the government realised the extent of the threat that they presented to the dominant order. That threat would not have been so dangerous if it had been posed in terms of traditional mobilization through trade unions and parties. Most of the urban and rural poor were not members of unions, let alone political parties. If popular mobilization is really to pose a serious challenge to the dominant order, in other words to become class mobilization, then it will have to transcend union and party organisations, for they involve limited numbers of people and operate within restrictive institutional patterns designed to weaken their potential.

Yet the experience of mobilization in Chile, impressive as it was, also showed the limitations of such a process when it does not enjoy wider political support and when it lacks the means to transform a response to a crisis into an assault on state power. One reason for the instability of the cordones was the absence of institutions between the local grass roots organisations and the apparatus of central government. This lack of intermediary structures was general to all popular mobilization undertaken during the UP government. A more stable form of organisation at regional or provincial level might have captured crisis commitment and turned it into a permanent and offensive instrument of working class power.

The Chilean experience also illuminated the crucial importance of the so called middle sectors in the process of constructing majority political coalitions. How far could the government advance towards the middle classes without starting to lose some of its working class support? How far should it have separated the diverse elements in the capas medias and tried to devise distinct policies for each of them? What might serve to win over the allegiance of the public bureaucrats would not necessarily suit those white collar employees in the service sector, let alone the small industrialist or self-employed worker. Could the government ever have won over substantial sectors from the middle classes? The question must remain hypothetical in the Chilean context, but it does pose general questions about the nature of the social alliances that might be constructed to press for radical reform.

Finally, the experience of the UP posed the questions of control over the mass media, and of the role of ideology. These questions are far from limited to Chile. Every government seeks some kind of legitimacy, and the deeper rooted that legitimacy is, then the securer the government and the less it has to rely on violence and repression. Chile was unique, however, in trying to promote a socialist legitimacy at the same time as allowing unhampered freedom to its opponents to discredit the government. The efforts of the Allende government to persuade the Chilean nation to adopt a socialist consciousness were, in view of the obstacles to that path, by no means unsuccessful. And the effort of the people themselves to come to terms with their own class experience was, in the crises of 1972 and 1973,

not far short of remarkable. But the process of building a socialist consciousness was hardly beginning before the experiment was cut short. How far it would have gone, given the political and social structure of Chile is not now a question it is possible to answer.

The military coup of 1973 was, after all, intended to curtail social and ideological experiments of a sort that might have led the Chilean people to shape their own future.

Such general problems - the role of the middle class, of ideology, of mobilization - present themselves to any government or political movement attempting basic social, political and economic change within a constitutional framework. They also present themselves to authoritarian governments, but such governments do not have to walk the political tightrope of democracy and of electoral challenge. Yet the limitations of the Chilean case also need to be stressed.

In the first place, few third world countries have a political system at all comparable to that of Chile before 1973, when constitutional government and political parties were the main institutions and agencies of political life, giving the political system a 'western' appearance. Indeed, the political comparison could be made more obviously with countries like France or Italy, than with other countries of Latin America, let alone the Third World in general. But the social and economic contrasts with France or Italy are as striking as the political comparisons. Chile is a much poorer, much less industrialised, much more heavily externally dependent country than either France or

Italy, with a larger tertiary sector, and a much smaller and weaker industrial proletariat.

Most foreign commentators extracted from the Chilean experience precisely those lessons that it suited them to extract. The response of the Soviet Union and China, for example, was predictable. The fall of Allende was used as another occasion for the display of Sino-Soviet hostility. The USSR argued that, in the words of a Tass commentator 'the temporary defeat of the progressive forces in Chile would serve to enrich the strategy and tactics of such forces throughout the world, raising their vigilance and strengthening their resolve'. Whereas China, which unlike the USSR did not break off diplomatic relations with Chile, through its spokesman in the United Nations answered that 'one should not forget how harmful the absurd theory of so-called peaceful transition is to the anti-imperialist revolutionary struggles'. But guerrilla warfare - both rural and urban - had failed earlier in Latin America for reasons that remain unaffected by the Chilean experience.

Both the French and the Italian Communist parties seemed to draw the conclusion that they must continue with the united front tactics. The Italian CP journal Rinascita commented on September 21st, 1973 that the 'democratic present and future of our country depends on overcoming the rift between the policy of the Communist party and the Christian Democrats'. The Argentine Communist Party argued that 'it is better to go slowly.' In its view alliances with the bourgeoisie and even with the military were still necessary and possible, but the vital question was 'who should lead this great coalition of forces?'

Castro stated that the Chilean coup reinforced his theory of the need for armed struggle, but he also added in a speech on September 28th, that though 'people without weapons could not make revolution, weapons without people were similarly inadequate'. It is doubtful if Cuba will change her present policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of Latin American countries to help the Chilean underground on a massive scale.

All these arguments, apart from those of the Chinese (and the Albanians) are directed towards the problem of creating a popular majority for revolutionary socialism whether the means for that achievement involve violence or elections. Yet it seems impossible to create that majority unless a militant industrial and mining proletariat by itself is such an overwhelming numerical force that middle class support is a desirable extra, but still an extra, and the peasantry is passive or numerically insignificant (active support is perhaps too much to hope for). The alternative would seem to be that when a regime is totally discredited and unpopular, then a nationalist, though not necessarily socialist revolution is possible. But the first situation points in practice to a reformist regime rather than a revolutionary one and the second situation points to violent revolution which may, but does not have to lead to socialism. Neither points to the Chilean model of a peaceful road to revolutionary socialism.

Perhaps the real significance of the failure of the UP must be sought in the South American context, as the most advanced and most radical attempt to transform a backward and dependent country. The failure of reform governments

and their replacement by authoritarian military regimes has been the dominant theme (with national variations) of South American politics in the 1960's and 1970's. With the most developed civilian political tradition in the continent, Chile was able to make the most determined bid to break away from a pattern of external and internal elite domination. The strength of that attempt during 1970-1973 was such that only a fiercely repressive dictatorship could reassert control over society.

NOTES

1. Much of the writing on the UP period is partisan and ephemeral. Two useful surveys are Rybacek-Mlynkova (1976), and Valenzuela and Valenzuela (1975). A great deal of material, to which copious reference will be made, is contained in the academic reviews and monographs published in Chile up to 1973. The two most useful books so far published on the period are Castells (1974), and de Vylder (1976). Whitehead (1974) provides a useful synthesis and an intelligent commentary. I am grateful to Laurence Whitehead for the loan of some of the material used here.

2. I do not intend in this article to deal directly with the problem of the State, and the question of the relative autonomy of the State from social classes. Theoretical works are plentiful: consult for example, Poulantzas (1975). But the attempt to move from theory to the study of a particular state is rather unsatisfactory. such works (though they contain much that is interesting and informative) see Garcés (1974), and a special issue of the Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional (1972).

3. And this issue is dealt with by Faúndez (1975).

4. As a considerable part of my book, (Angell, 1972), is concerned with the relations between those two parties, I will not repeat the arguments nor the bibliography contained therein. For a stimulating commentary on the parties, especially the socialist party in the last months before the coup, there is Touraine (1974).

5. These are official census figures. They are

deployed to great effect in a very detailed interpretation of the Chilean occupational structure in Castells (1974).

6. These points, and references to the literature on it, are contained in Angell (1972). An interesting recent article is Sánchez (1974).

7. It should be clear that most of this discussion on the middle class refers to the urban sector rather than the rural sector. As events in the countryside have received considerable attention elsewhere, I will make throughout only passing reference to them.

8. Foxley and Muñoz (1974: 34). Some international comparisons are interesting; self-employed workers as a percentage of the labour force in the U.K. were, in 1966, only 4.2%; in Argentina 12% (1960); in Brasil 35.1% (1960); and in the Dominican Republic, 43.9% (1960). Murmis (1975: 13-14).

9. Foxley and Muñoz (1974: 34). As they write, 'The solution is not only to impose minimum wages, as these will either be evaded or will just make the employment problem more acute.'

10. Gazmuri is secretary-general of MAPU-Obrero y Campesino. His analysis is contained in an impressive study of the problems of the Popular Unity.

11. The dangers of mechanical interpretation of the social structure were shown in the agrarian policy of his own party. '... according to MAPU's definition, in the 40-80 basic hectares group there exist both big agrarian bourgeoisie and medium agrarian bourgeoisie. The fluidity of the definitions and fact that the groups tend to shade off into each other poses a number of problems for political

organisations in any specific locality, since while the big bourgeoisie is to be attacked, the medium bourgeoisie is to be won over or neutralised.' Roxborough (1974: 6).

12. These were the official CUT figures kindly supplied by Laurence Whitehead.

13. 'The data available on the bureaucracy indicate that all strata of it identify with the middle class.' Petras (1969: 321). He reports the results of a survey in which 72% of the respondents in the civil service identified themselves as middle class (compared with 11% for the upper and upper middle, and 14% for the lower-middle and lower).

14. Though there is an excellent study of the Frei period in Cleaves (1974); see also Sulbrandt (1972).

15. Cited in Gazmuri (1975: 28). This sentiment is by no means limited to the MAPU-OC amongst the political parties that constituted the Popular Unity Alliance.

16. The uncertainties, and some tentative calculations for the last years of the Frei government, are examined in Angell (1972).

17. Borón (1975: 91) gives a figure of 1,068,912 in unions in 1972, an estimated 38% of the active labour force.

18. Petras (1973: 26). Chuquicamata employs about 5,000 blue collar workers and 5,000 white collar.

19. Zapata (1974b: 17). It should be noted that Chuquicamata's political behaviour had always been somewhat deviant, as it was the stronghold of the dissident Popular Socialist Party. I am grateful to Dr. Zapata for sending me this and other of his unpublished works.

20. Petras (1973: 32). 'Few of the workers are members of any political party ... the level of consciousness within the plant did not go very far beyond 'economics' - mostly concerned with trade union issues.'

21. Landberger and McDaniel (1975). Quoted by kind permission of the authors. The article also appears in *World Politics*, July 1976.

22. Mattelart, M. (1975: 15). General Leigh, a member of the military junta, paid this tribute. 'The women really taught us, the men, a lesson. They never lowered their heads by accepting something they did not want; they proved themselves unyielding, ready to defend what was just. They met every challenge with resistance. We want them to participate in the administration of this country. The women will play as important a role as the trade associations, the armed forces and the political parties (sic)' quoted in Mattelart, from *El Mercurio*, September 23, 1973.

23. Barraclough and Fernández (1974) contains information on women's role in agriculture. In a survey of union membership of seven provinces in central Chile, on average only about 5% of members were women.

24. Muller-Plantenberg (1972: 162-4). The figures given are percentages of the total electorate not of votes cast. The pattern was the same in rural communes; 27% of men voted for Allende compared with 21% of women; for Alessandri, 27% of men voted, compared with 32% of women. For some reason not explained, female participation in elections is higher than male. In the election of 1970 20% of men abstained or voted in blank compared with 15%

of women.

25. Much of it conducted in the Centro Interdisciplinario de Desarrollo Urbano and published in the review EURE.

26. Castillo et. al. (1973b: 10). Women in the campamentos were organised in Centros de Madre (Mothers Centres). They increased from 800 in 1970, to 4,000 in 1972.

27. 'The basis of an effective policy of worker participation of control over enterprises rests in the formulation of concrete plans aimed at increasing labour efficiency, production and productivity, and the profitability of the enterprises ...' Barría (1972: 87-88). Principios was a communist monthly.

28. Marini (1974: 11). The author draws the parallel with the countryside, where the bulk of the work force - the landless labourers and the subsistence farmers - were similarly neglected in favour of that small proportion incorporated into the reform sector.

29. Garretón (1971: 159). Oscar Garretón held a post in the Economics Ministry in the government. He added later in the article, quite correctly, that the principal problem of incorporation of the working class to power lay not so much in the enterprises but rather more at the level of the State, the government, its dependent organisations, and the political parties.

30. De Vylder (1976: 154). It has been estimated that participation according to the norms only existed in about 60 factories. Raptis (1974: 32).

31. This lack of participation was very marked in the

rural sector. As Barraclough and Fernández (1974: 198) write, 'Peasant participation, one of the fundamental points of the agrarian reform programme, has been weak, not to say non-existent...'

32. Zapata (1974a: 15). Though most of the enterprises were in industry, there were some in other sectors of the economy - in transport, commerce, fisheries, etc.

33. Barrera et. al. (1973). The factory produced metallurgical goods and was located on the outskirts of Santiago, employing 593 workers. There are also some references to the failure of the participation experiment in the case of Chuquicamata in Zapata (1974: 12-14).

34. See for example, the criticism of MAPU (1973: 154). 'In the A.P.S., for example, participation doesn't exist - or is understood in a purely bureaucratic or administrative fashion.'

35. This statement of the Communist party's position is not intended as a criticism. Who can now say which choice was the 'right' one?

36. Zemelman (1973: 200). According to Raptis (1974: 52), there were also 100 'people's enterprises', small factories taken over after being abandoned by their owners. They employed about 5,000 workers.

37. As was also shown by worker hostility to the proposal of the Communist Minister of the Economy, Orlando Millas, to return 123 factories to their owners, just before the March 1973 elections. Eventually, facing strong hostility in the Socialist party, the government backed down. Raptis (1974: 72-3).

38. Raptis (1974: 105) stresses the danger of being 'turned into transmission belts for state policy and be dominated by the political and administrative bureaucracy'.

39. For example, one study of twenty campamentos found the following situation either of identification with, or domination by a political party; in 7 with the Christian Democrats, in 4 with the MIR, in 3 with the Communists, in 3 with the Socialists, in 1 with the Radicals and in 1 with the MAPU. In some campamentos one dominating party was challenged by a well organised minority party. Equipo de Estudios CIDU (1972: 80).

40. An excellent detailed study of the politics of housing in Chile is Cleaves (1974).

41. 60% of the smallest enterprises received less than 2% of investment from the government programme of investment in private sector construction. Castells (1973: 28).

42. A record 73,000 housing units were constructed in 1971, 40,000 of them with public finance. Castells (1973: 28).

43. Corden et. al. (1973). I am very grateful to Monica Threlfall, one of the co-authors, for the loan of this document. The summary of the development of the Cordón in the text is taken from this document. The Commune of Maipu is an important producer of capital goods (the fourth largest in Santiago) - though it also includes several districts that are predominantly rural. Of the estimated population of 105,210 inhabitants, 12.4% worked in industry, though of the active labour force, industry, which employed 35% of that force, was the single largest source of employment. The commune is an important supplier of market garden products for the large Santiago market. Though

only 5% of the population lived in the rural districts, many more worked there (and lived elsewhere).

The dominant unions in the area were the metallurgical ones; of the 15 unions of more than 200 members in the commune, 11 were metallurgical. 20% of the unions locally were created in 1971-2. There were also 3 rural unions in the commune - 2 of them with more than 400 members each. There were 22 campamentos in the commune, with 3,178 families.

44. Even at the time of the October strike, the provincial CUT had arranged a meeting, the agenda for which contained no reference to that strike. Corden et. al. (1973: 34).

45. Sathyamurthy (1975: 628). According to the author of this very interesting article, 'the strategy adopted by the CUT to undermine the rank and file cordones was to organise its own cordones with a view to creating a Congress of Cordones in which the CUT would be able to control policies by ensuring a majority in its favour.'

46. There were after all examples like the massive wave of factory seizures in Turin, Italy in 1920. For a graphic description of those seizures, which suggest parallels with Chile, see Williams (1975).

47. Estates larger than this were defined as latifundia and hence subject to expropriation. 80 basic hectares was the measure for the fertile central valley; the poorer the land, the larger the permitted size.

48. The basic work is by Barraclough and Fernández (1974). See also Billaz and Maffei (1972), Cantoni (1972), and Maffei and Marchetti (1972).

49. Barraclough and Fernández (1974: 55). Another

form of organisation, the comités campesinos, also in practice resembled the asentamientos.

50. Gazmuri (1975: 16). Touraine (1974: 19) gives an interesting example of the view of Chilean social development held by the Chilean Academy of History, 'The formation of the Chilean State is, without any doubt, a model of smooth progress. It is the conquest of the nation's historical destiny, based on the effort of the whole community in its struggle with nature ..., on the continuing search for social justice, and on the internal harmony of its social groups.' There was obviously, in this view of Chilean history, no conflict between classes or repression of the majority by a minority.

51. For examples of the style of such reporting see Whitehead (1974: 32-3). The left had its caricatures too, but the campaign in government newspapers was mild compared with the hysterical frenzy on the right.

52. Following, for example, the advice of Gramsci that 'to prepare the working class ... to reach its historical goal, means precisely to organise the working class into a ruling class. The working class must make for itself a psychology similar to that of the present bourgeois class. Moreover the working class must become in its totality the executive power of the workers state.' Williams (1975: 188).

53. For two such examples see Castillo et. al. (1973a), and, amongst many other articles by the two same authors, Armand and Michèle Mattelart (1972). There is a useful collection of articles from this review in M.A. Garretón ed. (1975a).

54. See the interesting comments of Hernán Valdés in

the introduction to Carretón (1975a). 'Unfortunately, these studies (mostly those of Mattelart) never went beyond a purely superstructural level.'

55. The parallel with the Italian camera del lavaro is a suggestive one. The cameras 'provided a centre for all the local unions and workers institutions of a particular commune or district... Union members were always a minority among workers, union dues irregular, organisation often sketchy. Unions had to lead a non-union 'mass' ... The camera 'tended to breed a populist and communal, sometimes a class rather than a trade or craft mentality. It embraced a much wider range of workers...' Williams (1975: 23-4).

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