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AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE TO THE STUDY
OF THE PRESENT DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHI-
LEAN TRADE UNION MOVEMENT.

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During crisis situations, both the limitations, as well as the essential qualities and therefore characteristics of particular social actors - such as unions - become apparent. The developments that take place during such periods expose them to strong challenges and constraints. Therefore, in order to understand the basic characteristics of Chilean unions since the 1930's, we shall focus primarily on the 5 year period of the present authoritarian military regime, and draw out of this experience the basic political "problems" they seem to be facing. We shall then discuss these problems on the basis of their present constraints, and their historical conditionings and experience and bring into our analysis theoretical and comparative aspects whenever necessary, including other studies which have been carried out and interpretations which have been offered, regarding the Chilean Union Movement and others about unions under similar - or supposedly similar - conditions.

For this purpose we shall analyse the unions on their differentiated organizational aspects (plant, sectorial, regional and national organizations) and the different institutions that condition both their behaviour and responses (the State, employers, parties, the church, international organizations).

Economic, ethnical, geographic and other more permanent aspects relevant to our analysis will also be considered.

1. The Union's development under Pinochet

A. Economic Policy and the Unions.

The government has drastically changed the economic policies being pursued by the different governments since most of the last 40 years of Chilean history. More than 300 state owned and controlled industries were handed over to the private sector (basically to the same financial capitalist groups that controlled them before 1970);⁽¹⁾ the economy was opened to foreign competition and exports were encouraged. Non-traditional exports grew from 9.4% of all exports to 32% from 1974 to 1978;⁽²⁾ an aggressive policy of reducing public expenditures and salaries was undertaken, which has resulted in a decreased inflation rate of 30% by 1978; decreased production (in 1976 gross domestic production was still below the 1970 year and still does not gain its 1972 peak);⁽³⁾ widespread unemployment with a foreign debt twice as high as that of the 1969-72 period.⁽⁴⁾ Two important efforts to strengthen these policies have been taken in 1975 (the "shock treatment" in public expenditure reductions under IMF pressure) and in 1978 through the "Kelly Plan" presented by the Planning Minister which has yet to be brought into effect; it is based on a scheme aimed at reducing "labour costs" as a means of attracting foreign investment.

(1) See Hugo Fazio, "Mercado de Capitales Y Concentracion Financiera" Documentos del Seminario, El Modelo Economico de la Junta Militar Chilena, La Haya, Dec. 1978. Las 91, (Santiago: Ediciones Barco de Papel, 1972).

(2) Latin American Economic Report, Vol 11, No.8, p.63

(3) Banco Central de Chile, Memoria '76, p.18.

(4) Banco Central de Chile, Figures up to August 1978.

Table 1. Indicates the structure of Chile's economy and work force at its most dramatic stage during the 1975 shock treatment process. Agriculture has since somehow recovered to a 9-10% GDP level, after its own 'shock treatment' of returning to private landowners almost one third of the previously expropriated lands.⁽⁵⁾ Mining, export industrial and agricultural products have been since that year the basis of the economic growth based on exports.

TABLE 1

	Gross Domestic Product, Active and Salaried Population, 1975 (in thousands)					
	GDP ⁽¹⁾	Active Population ⁽²⁾		Salaried Population ⁽³⁾		
		%	%	%	%	
Agriculture	2 395.5	5.7	610.3	20	231.9	11.0
Mining	3 546.9	8.4	89.7	3	86.5	4.0
Industry	8 638.4	20.1	528.5	17.6	467.3	22.3
Construction	992.1	2.4	170.3	5.6	129.2	6
Electricity	606.0	1.4	26.0	0.9	25.0	1.2
Commerce	13 316.3	32.0	436.0	14.5	210.0	10.0
Transport	1 628.5	7.0	199.7	6.5	160.0	8.0
Services	8 967.9	28.0	939.6	31.3	795.0	38.0
Total:	42 091.0	100.0	2999.8	100.0	2,104.9	100.0

Sources: (1) ODEPLAN (in "Boletín del Banco Central", Feb. 1978)
 (2) National Employment Survey of INE.

But as table 1, 2 and 3 also indicate, the productive sectors of the economy as well as the "salaried population", the workers and proletarians have maintained a basic key role in the economy, supported by a very high unionization level throughout the economy.

(5) Hugo Fazio, Resumen Economico Segundo Trimestre 1978, mimeo p.13

TABLE 2

Unionization by type of union and sector. Its relationship to the active population, salaried workers and unions "active on national problems", December, 1976 (in thousands)

	Industrial Unions	Professional Unions	Agric. Unions	Associations	Total	%	Unions "active on national problems" ⁽²⁾
Agriculture	8.4	19.6	282.4		300.4	21	20
Mining	72.3	32.7			105.0	8	3
Industry	154.9	140.3			295.2	21	58
Construction	5.4	53.7			59.1	4	6
Electricity	5.5	10.2			15.7	1	
Commerce	4.8	96.7			101.5	8	-
Transport	4.5	86.4			90.9	7	} 15
Services	8.8	62.2		316.6	387.6	30	
TOTAL	234.5	491.6⁽¹⁾	282.4	316.6	1,355.1⁽¹⁾	100	

Source: INE: CUT Technical Commission (projections); ANEF (State Employers Union) and author's calculations.

- (1) These figures include the "professional employers" union members (self-employed) 55,146.
- (2) This category indicates all unions more than 600 - which have been confronting the Government through public letters since 1977, calling for an economic and political change of national policies together with various specific union demands.

TABLE 3

Active population and the labour force (salaried workers) and self-employed unionization (in thousands) 1975-76

	Employ- ers	Unpaid family members	Self- employed	Workers	Employ- ees	Salaried	Prole- tarians
Active population (% %)	61.6 2%	87.1 3%	687.9 23%	1,226.4 41%	961.1 32%	2,187.5 ⁽¹⁾ 73%	56 ⁽²⁾
% union- ization			8%	60.5%	39.5%	57% ⁽³⁾	

Source: INE

(1)

ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics. In 1964 the % of salaried workers to the active population was slightly higher (74%), which could indicate a certain change in the structure of the active population, especially after the 1973 period.

(2)

Many more workers directly involved in the productive process and other manual workers are categorized as employees, especially the industrial skilled workers.

(3)

This figure could well represent almost the total amount of workers legally allowed to organize according to the previous (i.e. prior to October 1978) legislation. In 1968, 34% of the salaried workers were organized and 75.09% of the industrial workers legally allowed to form unions were organized (See F. Zapata, ILPES, 1968 p.124; CUT Memoria del CDN al 5º Congreso, Santiago 1968, p.51). This figure represents on the other hand 41% of the active population. According to ANEF, those figures are, considering the public employees "associations", 36% and 26% (of the active population and the labour force) in 1977. The main differences are the figures each give for the unionized agricultural workers (17,000 vs. 300,358) plus the one year difference. There have been unions banned during 1977, but they were few, and not concentrated in the agricultural sector - e.g. 35 were banned during the first semester of 1977, but 23 new unions were also formed. The agricultural workers organized is the figure they reached by 1973. However, of the total amount of unions, we do not know exactly how many were active. About 600 unions have signed petitions to the Government through open letters (what we have called the unions "active on national problems") during 1977-78. They represent the large and medium sized unions and plant workers that could be mobilized within a short period of time to confront the Government. Many more could have signed perhaps but did not do so for time and communication constraints or because they were involved "locally" bargaining informally with their management. However, since 1978, the whole of the 75 National Sectorial Unions have been "active on national problems." Although this is not an indication of reorganization at plant level, it does suggest a general reorganizational trend during 1978 in particular, active both in general or specifically on national problems (politically). Union leaders in Chile believe that almost the entire union movement reorganized at different levels up to this year, confronted with deep economic and political problems that directly affected them. The recent (October 1978) political measures taken by the Government dissolving the entire union movement at different levels, is consistent with our hypothesis of the reorganization of the great majority of unions up to 1978. (See Raul Gonzalez Flores, "La 'disolución' por decreto de los sindicatos Chilenos a 5 años de Régimen Militar: un primer análisis", Chile-America, Iona, 1978. Forthcoming.

It is perhaps because of this ability to maintain such an important social and political presence within the country that workers who have managed to stay employed, have been able to start recovering their previous wage levels, as Table 4 indicates.

TABLE 4

Real Wages

1970 =	100
1971 =	112.4
1973 (Dec) =	33.8
1976 =	81.7
1977 =	84.8

Source: Humberto Vega, Hoy, 6-12 Sept. 1978, No. 67, pp.22-23
Includes a re-adjusted Consumer Price Index (according to products of popular consumption; if not the difference with 1973 would be much higher) and does not consider the Minimum Employment Program's salaries (40% lower).

The earnings and salaries index and the minimum wage, according to the governmental statistics office INE, reached an 81.7 and 84.8 level (considering 1970 = 100) in 1977 (real wages were 112.4 in 1971), but if we compare this 1977 figure with the December, 1973 figure of 33.6, we can understand why the Government wanted to further reduce (or just reduce, given its constant rise since the 1973 low) the 1977 figure which indicates an increasing labour cost.

If the calculations are done on the basis of official CPI, the growth of real wages is even higher. A recent editorial by "El Mercurio", on inflation and employment problems is traced back to an increased production cost because of higher real wages, which must be stopped, according to the leading Chilean newspaper of the Edwards Monopoly group. What has happened is that the Minimum Employment Program has been reduced from 200,000 people to 150,000 and their real salaries have gone down from a 1975 = 100 basis to 94.8 and 77.2 (60% of the minimum wage), but this is a completely unproductive sector, totally controlled by the Government and enjoying no social security whatsoever. Therefore, those managers who have not run out of business, are running into supposedly increasing labour costs, given the Government's automatic salary readjustments and fierce competition from foreign products. The solution was a new economic (Kelly Plan) and political (the Government October 1978 union measures) repression for a new capital accumulation dynamics, based on private investment, which up to now has not taken place. Today, after a privatization of almost 300 monopoly industries, the Government is still responsible for more than 60% of total investment. Parallel to the union repressions, has been the drive of the monopoly groups to finish controlling key state industries (as CODELCO, the copper industry ranked 40th in world terms, which they are now demanding to be sold over to the private sector, even though it has been considered "strategic" by the military).

Even so, "labour costs" have dropped from 32% of the total costs in 1964-65 to 20.8% in 1977; a 37.5% reduction (Humberto Vega, Solidaridad 8-5-78, cited in Fazio op.cit.)

Between 1972 and 1976, salaried workers' share of National Income decreased from 62.8% to 41.1% (Economic and Financial Service. "Chile News". 12-6-78 . Cited in, Hugo Fazio, Resumen Economico. "Segundo Semestre 1978" mimeo). On the other hand Government social spending declined from \$1,400 million in 1972 to \$978 million in 1977 (New Society, p.183, 20 July, 1978).

Unemployment is 13.8% in Santiago but if we consider all those who would like to work, it reaches 22.2%. Both figures are much worse in other regions (38.1% in the industrial-mining area of Concepcion and Arauco, and even much worse in industrial Arica). The most affected sectors are industry and construction; in the latter, over 40%. In the middle and small mining sector, it is 70% (29,080 out of the previous 78,154 labour force). Among the unemployed, 61.2% are manual workers, 28.7% white collar workers and 10.2% are self-employed. (Departamento de Economia, Universidad de Chile, Taller de Coyuntura Economica, Junio, 1973). If we consider the Government's "minimum employment programme" (whereby workers receive 60% of the minimum salary) which is 5%, the under-employed and the 10% of the population who left the country, the real national figure of unemployment is about 40% of the active population and

well over that figure for the labour force or salaried workers. Traditionally, unemployment in Chile has been fluctuating between 3% and 8%.

Workers reaction to reductions in salaries and employment does not seem to have been merely passive. There tends to be a relationship between workers reorganization and the degree to which losses in salaries and employment have been reduced. Real salaries in manufacturing have been rising above the general index (115.2 in 1978 in relation to a 110.3 general index figure) and to a lesser extent those in the public sector (109.6). Mining is just below the index figure (98.3) and public utility services well below it (75.6)⁽⁶⁾ This fact as well as the relatively low percentage (28.9%) of land taken over from the peasants (although all 'legal' constraints for the government to act accordingly have been completely removed, e.g. D.L. 2. 247), as well as the inability of the government to further reduce Mapuches' landholdings, are correlated with the figures presented in Table 2: the most active unions on national problems are those in the industrial and agrarian sectors and to a lesser extent, those in the mining sector. Workers in the public utilities have been reorganized, but to a lesser extent, by C.FCH.

A way to further test this hypothesis is to look at the differentiated levels of employment in industrial sectors which have been most drastically affected by the general economic measures taken by the Government. We have done this in Table 5 and the relationship between the two variables

(6) Department of Economics, University of Chile, October 1978. Cited in, Jackie Roddick, "Labour Relations and the 'New Authoritarianism' in Argentina and Chile. Workshop of Industrialization and the State in Latin America, CEDLA, Amsterdam, 23-25 November 1978.

indicates that the sectors which have had a slower degree of employment reductions in relation to reductions in production levels, are textiles, furniture, printing, leather, rubber products, chemicals, non metallic minerals and the metal-mechanic sectors. On the other hand, shoe and clothing and the wood industry have had more rapid decreasing employment levels than its corresponding reductions (or growth) of production levels.

Table 5. Index of Manufacturing Industry Production and Employment in all sectors where a decrease in production has occurred.

Date	23		24		25		26		28	
	Textiles S.M.L (3)		Shoe & Clothing (4)		Wood Industry (excluding Furniture)		Furniture & Wood Products S.M.		Printing & Publishing S.M.	
	P(1)	E(2)	P	E	P	E	P	E	P	E
1970	96.0	97.5	104.8	93.9	102.1	64.2	113.4	116.5	109.5	100.2
1971	110.1	98.0	117.9	90.7	131.7	63.9	109.1	98.3	132.8	97.3
1972	113.1	120.2	123.5	102.0	146.7	60.6	155.6	97.2	126.4	113.7
1973	101.5	123.0	117.1	99.9	93.1	55.9	120.8	94.0	96.0	111.5
1974	98.3	115.5	105.1	83.0	87.2	52.2	113.7	111.9	64.6	115.2
1975	62.4	96.4	86.8	74.0	54.4	40.9	61.8	107.1	55.6	49.7
1976	61.5	80.1	74.4	71.2	75.5	32.4	72.2	97.5	57.2	72.8

Date	29		30		31		33		35		37		38	
	Leather, Rubber Products except shoes S.M.		Food Products (F)(4)		Chemical Products (F)		Products of non metallic minerals (F)		Metal Products (F)		Electrical Appliances (F)		Construction of Transport of Tractor, etc. (F)	
	P	E	P	E	P	E	P	E	P	E	P	E	P	E
1970	103.1	82.5	111.0	114.6	120.9	149.9	102.1	94.0	98.6	92.0	99.2	103.1	127.0	120.8
1971	119.7	77.0	135.5	109.2	144.0	115.3	120.9	88.6	102.1	99.0	113.3	87.7	111.9	107.4
1972	90.0	77.2	132.8	129.7	150.4	132.4	123.2	98.7	117.8	89.3	104.2	92.8	120.3	102.0
1973	85.1	84.4	127.5	136.5	147.6	132.2	126.5	102.3	121.4	101.5	89.1	134.5	130.7	97.6
1974	74.5	84.3	124.7	127.1	127.1	133.2	136.1	112.3	111.0	106.7	105.2	113.9	129.2	93.7
1975	70.6	77.0	35.8	121.8	79.7	131.7	76.1	105.2	59.7	102.1	75.7	109.2	59.0	87.5
1976	65.2	78.0	77.2	113.9	87.7	117.1	75.1	81.7	62.7	109.3	65.3	77.7	36.2	82.3

Source: Production, INE (Base Average 1968 = 100)
 Employment, ILD (Base was 1970 = 100, but was readjusted to 1965 = 100)

- (1) Production = P
- (2) Employment = E

(3) S, M, L = Small, Medium &/or large plants are predominant, including K & L industries, & Production. See Informe sobre la Distribución del Ingreso, Empleo y Heterogeneidad productiva en el Sector Industrial Chileno. FLACSO, Documento de Trabajo, October 1977, Santiago, pp. 16 & 40.

- (4) These sectors have large plants (F) - Biotecnología; general Inge & Firatone (see for 41, specific)
- (5) F = Foreign Capital (> 25%) See Siglo Veintiuno, El Ingreso de Capital en Chile (Santiago and Brown: Ed. Universidad de Chile, 1972) pp. 118-119.

As Table 6 indicates, these two last sectors have weak unions and all of the most powerful unions are also active on national problems today, (although being plant based), and are based in sectors which have managed to maintain unemployment as low as possible. However, both the rubber and furniture industries have also maintained higher employment levels in relation to parallel reductions in production levels and at the same time their unions have been traditionally weak and have not reorganized to confront national problems. But there are no cases of sectors with strong unions and higher unemployment levels. In both of these previous cases, however, we are talking of very small sectors, and the more general relations that seem to indicate these figures stand, even if we control by capital versus labour intensive or foreign controlled industries.

TABLE 6

"Salaried" workers, Unions, Unionizations and Unions "Active on National Problems in all industrial sectors where a decrease in productions has occurred"

	Salaried Workers (1967)	Union Workers (1968)	% Unionized	No. of Unions (1968)	%	Unions active on National Problems	%
Textile	45,000	33,329	74%	171	21.0	88	31.0
Shoe & Clothing	38,000	12,867	34%	123	15.1	9	3
Wood Industry	36,000	5,004	17%	59	7.2	8	2.8
Furniture	10,000	2,772	28%	38	4.6	0	0.0
Printing & Publishing	11,800	5,391	48%	60	7.3	14	5.0
Leather	5,500	4,554	83%	78	3.4	6	2.1
Rubber	3,500	23	0.8%	1	0.1	1	0.4
Chemicals	19,500	9,426	49%	101	1.44	60	21.1
Non metallic minerals	16,200	13,811	86%	63	7.9	18	6.3
Metal products	40,500	11,520	29%	(89)))
Electrical appliances	17,300	6,336	44%	170(44)	20.9	75	26.3
Construction of transport metal	32,000	3,036	9%	(37)		(*))
	232,300	108,109		814	100	285	97.9

Source: CUT, op. cit. pp. 62-65, and author's calculations:

(*) We do not have the means to distinguish among these three sectors.

In such very small sectors (like rubber in particular), one plant could be making up the majority of the industry's employment and therefore we could be tempted to conclude for a whole sector on the basis of one or two plant units (the opposite of the ecological - or in this case, the 'sectorial' fallacy).⁽⁷⁾ We obviously need more detailed plant level analysis. However, as we shall later see in more detail, unions have redeveloped at plant levels during these years precisely by negotiating in the first place for a maximum employment level.

(7)

In the case of the furniture industry, a few middle size industries (making up most of the sectorial employment), were taken over by the Government and enjoyed a high workers participation level in the running of the plants, and unions could well be active today.

B. The State and the Unions

Decree Law (D.L.) 198 has been the main policy instrument of the Government's new relationship with the Union Movement. Published on December 1, 1973, it recognises all unions and union leaders which existed at that moment; establishes a replacement of those unoccupied positions via denomination of the "older workers" of a given union; likewise recognises all National Union Federation and Confederations and their leaders and allows unions to meet under police supervision, but only for information purposes. This instrument has been a vital resource legitimizing union's reorganization process at different levels during the past five years. Previously, another D.L. was passed - the day after the coup - dissolving the National Trade Union Council, CUT, and some time later, the dissolution of the Teachers Federation, SUTE.⁽⁸⁾ By suspending all union activities (bargaining, strike, regular union meetings) and eliminating CUT (and SUTE, a key organization in the way of the Junta's educational control) and the systematic repression during almost four years of the Popular Parties, (and control of the Christian Democrats, C.D.) which led to massive imprisonment in jails, interrogation

(8) See Arzobispado de Santiago, Vicaria de la Pastoral Obrera "Algunas consideraciones sobre la situación jurídica de las actividades sindicales" Comisión Estudios de la Realidad, Documento de Trabajo No. 3, Dic. 1977.

and all of their plant based unions - Mining, textile, metal-mechanics, construction, and two peasant unions - were illegalized altogether. At the same time he called - with a four days notice, including a weekend - for elections to take place at plant level, with limitations imposed on those who could stand for office - like not having been related in any way politically with parties during the last ten years - those who could vote and unions that could hold elections. Only 16% of union members and 26% of the unions were eligible to participate in the elections. All national and plant union leaders not acting on behalf of a legally recognized union would be jailed. (11) The American ALF-CIO and its local Latin American affiliated ORIT, called in December of 1978 for a boycott of products to and from Chile, but the Government managed to negotiate with George Meany and Peter Grace (head of Grace & Co on behalf of ^{UNITED} AMB "AIFLD") and the boycott threat was suspended. In return the Government has called for a new 'Labour Plan', whose main deal is the previous commitment to develop by June 1979 a collective bargaining system at a plant level and continue to hold union elections. Payment of Union fees to Federations are to be allowed, but now hardly any 'legal' Federation exists. The local AFL-CIO Union Council "Group of Ten" leader Eduardo Rios, has called the Plan the "gangrene" of the union movement and Medina has declared that he has not been consulted in the State Council in relation to that Plan or the October D.L.'s. Meanwhile, the Venezuelan Unions affiliated to ORIT are asking for the boycott to be reconsidered. (12) Therefore the role of the State within these five years has been that of

(11) See Raul Gonzalez Flores, op.cit.

(12) El Mercurio 27 February, 1979, p.2.

dispersing workers and union forces by means of its economic policy in particular the development of a huge open and free labour market; a minimum employment sector with 40% of salaries below the minimum level and the abolishing of labour stability^x by means of illegalizing the whole of the labour movement and transforming it into a new wholly plant based and hopefully "dispoliticized" union movement.

Incorporation mechanisms were soon left aside as unions redeveloped and the military proposing them, retired; and union incorporation by the hard liners via 'force-show-off' mechanisms, union parallelism, appointment of inconditionals to key positions of labour representation and populist periodic gatherings with the President, were also and subsequently left aside. The government is to play no new significant role in direct union affairs and unions must again bargain exclusively at the plant level with management, on 'realistic' bargaining terms. And again, the State is to 'supervise' that this does take place. Whether this will work, has yet to be seen.

In the meantime, procedures of internal deportation of union leaders involved in strikes in key sectors (Copper : El Teniente), further military control by declaring a stage of siege in regions under such strikes (Chuquicamata) and removal of union leaders advocating strikes, have continued throughout these years. A new regionalisation of the country, (with each of the units under the command of a high ranking military authority)

parallel to the Armed Forces organic structure, has been tightly enforced and represents a fierce Military control of all basic activities in each region and local 'sub-units' of Chile. This fact has also had an important effect on the organisation of the labour movement as we shall see.

C. The Unions response

1. The Basic union level. The basic unit of the union structure is not limited to the plant level, especially since the late 1960s, with the emergence of "Communal" peasant unions. As Table 2 indicated Agriculture, Construction, Commerce, Transport, and Commerce, add up to 73,7% of the unionised population and to an even higher percentage of unions, and are not based on plant level unions but are interplant, communal, provincial or national unions. This is an important fact, because the Chilean Union Movement is normally analysed as being plant based. Moreover, important amounts of plant unions, have traditionally bargained at the national level, such as small industries sectors (printing, shoe, bakery and mills) and others such as Dockers, Chemicals, Vineyards, Rail roads, Beer, Mining, textile and Metal-mechanics; Federations have been coordination centres for the presentation and advice to local unions on key issues in their collective bargaining process (13). However, the strongest unions are those in mining and the industrial sectors; are plant based,(14) and their main bargaining process takes place within the limits of the plant. These facts are helpful to put into

(13) See Universidad de Chile, INSORA, Las relaciones colectivas de trabajo en Chile (Jorge Sarria) mimeo, 1965 and manual Sarria, El Conflicto Obrero en el Inclave Cuadrifero, Universidad de Chile, 1973.
(14) Zapata and CUR on.cit.

perspective the development of the unions during the authoritarian period under analysis.

Our information, based on interviews with some union plant and Federation leaders active in Chile, party official active for more than 2 years in Chile and daily newspaper clippings, magazine articles, union pamphlets, and an information bulletin specialised on union affairs such as "Paginas Sindicales" (a monthly 30 pages issue), indicate that unions have been active at the plant and other basic union units, throughout the period. The main issues^{raised} have been first of all the recognition of the union as such and second, the employment issue. Unions overwhelmingly used D.L.198 for their own benefit, although since 1977, once they were reorganised, they have systematically asked for its repeal. The way by which they achieved this during the first period after the coup, was by becoming active on behalf of their members on the key employment problem, which was a vital issue during the first years and is still important today. They reemerged playing a concrete role vis-a-vis the employers and the government and got the backing of their rank and file members as they achieved some concrete results within the limitations of the new political situation that had been created. (15)

(15) The search for a minimum unemployment was achieved by developing workers cohesion instead of intra-class competition. In many cases union leaders legitimacy reemerged after the coup by proposing "masive workers holidays" during certain days in the month and therefore reducing the total amount of workers layed off, sharing all of them at the same time the lowest salaries which resulted from a reduced working month.

among those sectors more reorganized politically.

Table 7 - Unionization by STRATA, June, 1977

	No. of Members	%	No. of Unions	%	"Active on National Problems"
Manual Workers	476,000	36.6	3,214	48.7	80%
White Collar Workers	182,000	14	1,462	22.1	
Peasants (1)	300,400	23	1,200	18.2	20%
Civil Servants (including SUTE)	316,600	24.3	257	3.9	
Mixed Unions	29,500		472	7.1	
Self-Employed	55,100	2.1	697		
TOTAL	1,304,400	100%	6,600	100%	100%

(1) Only civil servants "Associations" free unions are considered in these figures.
Source: ANEP

(1) IWC

Table 8 indicates the overrepresentation of both peasant and industrial unions, in particular the latter, facts which are related to the conclusions we have drawn from the previous table. It also indicates the strength of legal unions during periods of repressions, making it easier for them to reorganize, perhaps both because of the previous tighter cohesion of these unions, as well as the greater legal facilities at their disposal in their fight to obtain union recognition. Today they represent more than 10% of the unions active on national problems within each of these first three types of unions and perhaps as much as 30% or more of union membership, as they are based, it seems, on larger plants. But

Later they engaged in "unofficial", informal bargaining activities on salaries re-adjustments and again making use for their own advantage of the periodic salary re-adjustments dictated by the government. But those sectors which managed to reorganise to a higher degree, as we have seen, were the ones to achieve the better implementations of these salaries re-adjustment. Moreover, there is a direct relation between the most reorganised sectors (see tables 2 and 6) and the repression towards individual unions and Federations. In fact the 6 Federations illegalised together with their plant based unions (2 peasant unions, mining, construction, textile and metal), are in fact the most reorganised sectors, and the most "proletarian" sectors of the union movement. But the repressive October 1978 measures affect the whole of the union movement and indicates the extent to which all of it had reemerged and bargained, with the support of the National Federations and national Coordinating Councils, as we shall see.

2. Reorganization by plant, strata and type of unions.

Qualitative analysis on reorganization by plant size (which unfortunately cannot be fully tested because we lack the data on the size of many plant unions signing national petitions), tend to indicate that large and medium size firms are over-represented, a fact which is consistent with the information in table 6. On the other hand, as table 7 indicates, manual versus white collar workers are represented in general and in particular

this table also indicates the capacity of even non-legally registered "free" unions to reorganize under such difficult conditions.

Tabl. 8. Organization and Activity on national problems, by type of unions. December 1977.

	N. of unions	N. Unions active on National pr.	%
1. Professional workers unions	3.401 (1)	213	35,2
2. Industrial unions	1.829 (1)	203	32,0
3. Peasant unions	1.200 (2)	94	15,6
4. Associations, union groups, unions, Committees, "Uniones", and other "free" unions.	2.000 (3)	95	15,7
TOTAL	9.430 (4)	605	98,5

SOURCE: (1) ANEP, December 1977 (all ANEP information is based on official data of the ministry of Labour Statistics.
 (2) Calculated by the author on the basis of ANEP and INF figures
 (3) INSOA, Trayectoria y estructura del movimiento Sindical Chileno (by Jorge Barria) Santiago 1963.
 (4) This figure does not include more than 75 National Union Federations (see R. Lapata "Federaciones y sindicatos en el sindicalismo chileno" International Institute for Labour Studies, Geneva, 1970, pp. 5-8.

Our information indicates, that after a period of very difficult conditions and as unions were reorganizing and having a national presence—even within the government controlled media - the problems that workers were going through at the economic level, further pushed them to reorganize. In many cases, unions have been keeping their organizations going for more than 2 years after their plant went bankrupt. The reorganization of free unions is therefore consist with the government banning them, and threatening ~~them~~ with the imprisonment of leaders speaking on their behalf.

3. Reorganization by political orientation at the Sectorial and national level

Table 9 is an indication of how differentiations by economic sectors, find uneven appeal among political orientations of right to centre, centre and centre 'independent', progressive and those left wing orientated.

Table 9. Political orientation by sectors.

	UNTRACH	(1) GROUP OF TERN	CEPCH	FRT	ONE
CONTROL	Banking	Dockers	Commerce	Taxi Drivers	Mining (except Copper)
	AIRWAYS (LAN)		Retired	Private Road Transport	
	Post.....	Post	Chemicals	Clothing	Construction
	Health	Civil Serv.	Drug-stores	highways	textile
	Bus Drivers - - - - -	Bus Drivers inter city	Power	local Gov.	
	Truck Drivers	Railroads	Electricity	Wood	Metal-mech. and electronics
	Wheat Mills	Plastics			bakery (and left)
	Bakery	Track Drivers			Printing
	Leather	Paper Mills	Petroleum	Politechnics	
	Steel <.....			Steel	Paint
MINORITY	<-> Nitrate (left returned)	Sugar	insurance	Travel Agent.	2 Peasants for School Teachers Hotel - Restau
		2 Peasant Confed.....	1 and C		
	Retired	Industry & Copper Common (White Collar)	Banking Copper Auto & Electronics	Hotel Rest. Sugar	Copper Dockers
					Metalurgic Miners' State Construction Ministry
					Leather & Sho Health Retired Laboratories
	Railroads Copper Dockers Construction				
	5%	28%	7%	4%	56%

State Intervention of Repression - para Italiano

Source: next page.

Source: Public statements signed by the different union Councils, and Federations, published in the media.

(1) This column includes unions signing petitions when both Councils have made joint statements, but signing with neither of the two when these Councils sign separate statements.

(2) These percentages were calculated by adding the amounts of unions signing public statements with each council and dividing it by the total amount of unions which have signed petitions on national issues.

The National Union Councils that would later be known as the National Union Coordinating Committee (CNS) and Group of Ten, emerged just after the coup and the dissolution by an early Junta decree of the CUT, grouping basically what were (or became, in the case of the second group), the National Federations controlled by pro-UP and pro-CD leaders (16).

The Group of Ten acquired an important degree of stability during the most repressive stages, by supporting the Government's policies during almost a year and representing it in

(16) The Dockers, COACH, Copper, CTC, C-PCM, Civil Servants, ANIP, Steel, CAP, Health, Bakery and Shoe Federations, were lead by the UP up to the Coup, although CD had important influence in all of them, except for Bakery and the shoe Federation. After the repression of the UP leaders (including the killing of the COACH President), CD union official stepped in. In the last two Federations, it was the leaders who "gave in". Bank workers, lead by CD leaders, also "gave in".

the ILO annual meetings (it acquired for this reason the informal name of "Ginebrinos"). Military officers in key Government positions (Bonilla at the Ministry of the Interior and Diaz Estrada in the Labour Ministry) were supporting them. But soon, as the CD party's strategy of a quick return to a controlled democratic government under their leadership, (once the left had been 'wipped out') failed, their union leaders started to move, with the party, towards the opposition and publishing critical open letters on the Junta's union policies. (17) As they began to be attacked more thoroughly by the Government because of these stands, they started establishing links with the AFL-CIO American Union, as a means of protection against eventually following the same fate of the Army officers which had been backing them. The Americans had been eagerly looking for such a base within the Chilean Union Movement (as they historically, but without success, always had tried) (18) and were therefore quite willingly to come up with all the support that was necessary. At that movement, CEPCH left the Group and developed its historically 'independence' vis-a-vis political in fighting, and international intervention in this case, and restored to its even more traditional strictly 'union problems' struggle on behalf of the white collar workers they represent. (19).

(17) See an excellent chronology of Union events up to December 1977, Chile Monitor Nos.26-27, Spring 1978, pp. 25-36, London.

(18) See Serdino ~~Quel~~ Quel, President & Peons, Recollections of a Labour Ambassador Latin America (New York : Faulk & Wagnalls, 1967), pp.322-340.

(19) See Alan Angell, Partidos Politicos y movimiento obrero en Chile (Mexico : ERA, 1974) pp.162-166, and Tróvectoria op.cit. pp.15-17.

The CNS developed on very different terms. It started out by creating a broad 'Federation Coordinating Committee' (which functioned at a two buildings distance from the ex-CUT building in Cienfuegos street, provided by the Church), which included at times, with much reluctance from their part, the CD Federation Leaders. However the Ginebrinos refused at first to appear singing public statement with the UP Federation leaders. Most of these latter leaders (Mining, Textile, Metal, Unidad Obrero Campesina, Ranquil, and Construction) had been jailed and tortured, including the present CNS President the pro-DC Manuel Bustos, and CNS main spokesman Alémiro Guzman head of the Miners, who was jailed for over two years.

Chilean labour legislation allows Industrial Federations to be organised only for mutual assistance, sports and cultural activities. It was this fact and D.L.198, confirming Federation leaders in their jobs, that provided the basis for the pro-UP Federations to reorganise. The textile sector provided a forum for 10.000 textile workers to participate in a "song festival" and all Federations organised football championships both intra and interfederations including matches with rural unions, massively attended by local communities, especially in concentrated urban mining and peasant regions in Santiago, Valparaiso, Melipilla, Talcahuano Lota and Coronel in Concepcion and Lebu in Arauco. Labour day throughout these years was celebrated within the frameworks of the finals of a inter-union football competition,

which was usually broken up by the military. Last year they had already acquired the strength to gather ^{at} the end of the historic Plaza Bulnes, where for many years such meeting had taken place, with no need to use football activities as a 'camouflage'. Although union leaders from all over the world were present, repression was widespread. The Group of Ten has usually participated in these Labour Day activities, which were held in the morning and by noon or the afternoon, workers joined in for the Cardinal May Day mass at the Cathedral in Santiago. An important reorganisation conjuncture for both CNS and group of Ten Federations, came forth when ^{estrada} ~~Dia~~ Yrarda opened to unions the discussion of the proposed labour code reform in 1975. Federations leaders travelled around the country meeting local unions, only to completely reject it after two months of "base reorganising" work. UNTRACH was organised by the Government Labour Office, and consisted of union leaders who had turned to the Government in order to solve their key problems (employment, salaries); parallel Federations in key sectors where the CD leaders had refused to continue collaborating with the Government; plus two Government interveened, Copper and Teachers unions (where a "professional" society was created by the government, similar to that of the "liberal professions", but with no following whatsoever).

The final blow to the Government's union control policy took place just a few months ago, when a new deepening of the government's economic policies were announced in May: the Kelly Plan. The conflict over the Kelly Plan between the government and the unions was further reinforced by the Chuquicamata 'cantoen' strike in June, which lasted for over 3 months. A general 50% pay rise proposed by ^{CNS} supported in their petitions by the Chuquicamata workers ^(together with) the repeal of all repressive labour legislation and the support of the Chuquicamata strike, was forced upon the whole of the union movement, as further cantoen strikes, spread to the steel, coal, other copper and metalurgic plants. In June, 'Group of Ten' leaders joined CNS and by early September, UNTRACH and the Group of Ten had united in a coalition opposing the Government ~~supporting the basic unions demands in the CNS-FUT Sept. platform.~~ and, as was also the case of C.F.P.H., supported the basic unions demands in the CNS-FUT Sept. platform. CNS had formed a coalition with FUT and presented a union platform which was supported by ^{some} C.F.P.H. and UNTRACH unions. By late September, CNS had also managed to call, with the Church sponsored vicaria de la Pastoral Obrera, a seminar with all the National Union Councils and proposed ^{the} wider union platform, that called for the formation of a United Front with participation of peasants, small proprietors, the professional classes and native capital, to bring forth a new Democratic Government with workers participation orientated by a new nationalistic and protectionist economic policy (20). The seminar ^{concluded with a} call for the unity of the

(20) See the full text of the CNS-FUT, Group of Ten-UNTRACH and C.F.P.H. letters and the Federation unions supporting them, Arzobispado de Santiago, vicaria de la Solidaridad, Separata Solidaridad #.20, Sep. 1978.

union movement, and basic economic and political reforms. In October, after an Armed and Security Forces high command meeting with Pinochet (including the generals of the 4 branches), the Federations and plant unions which are the very heart of the CNS, were illegalized and the whole of the union structure banned, including the imprisonment of leaders of the banned organizations who acted on behalf of their members. Although the UNTRACH-Group of Ten alliance recently broke up after the AFL-CIO boycott threat was abandoned, all groups continue to openly speak out against the government, as their opinions once more reached the intervened mass media. Last February, new D.L. s have been passed (which still limit the right to hold free union meetings, restrict the free flow of union fees to their Federations and modifies the retirement procedures, from years in service to a 70 years age limit; without changing the ban on strikes).

Again, these D.L. have been completely rejected by all union bodies. UNTRACH openly opposed the Government on an interview with the press, after the D.L. s were announced and criticized Pinochet in particular, who they claim had promised to reintroduce the free flow of union fees to federations in June 1978. The CTC president-designated (by Pinochet), Castillo, is now openly opposing the sacking of 4 Chuquicamata union leaders who threatened last February to implement now a "production" strike if the Government did not support their demands (21).

(21) El Mercurio, 22 Feb., 1979, pp. C1 and C2. Santiago.

As Table 9 indicates, there are 5 main orientations within the union movement today in Chile and all of them are now, strictly speaking, in an open opposition to the regime:

1) First we have a group of Federations organized within CNS (in particular the 6 "out-lawed" Federations) which have maintained the radical tradition of the union movement in Chile since its very foundation and the majority and hegemony within it ever since: it was first based on the "Mancomunales" then on the FOCH, afterwards CTCH, later CUT and now on the CNS. Their many basis today are the big industrial plant unions of the industrial and mining sectors; the agricultural workers communal unions and the Provincial Federations (with Ranquil and Unidad Obrero Campesina representing 70% of the membership) (22) and the provincial based professional construction workers unions.

There are some main characteristics associated with all of these union sectors:

a) They represent the most "proletarian" (versus white collar and/or non-productive) union sectors, which provides them with a strong "class identification"; b) they are all sectors and unions developed more than forty years ago (except for the agricultural unions, which, although existent since the 1910's, they did not massively develop until the mid-1960's), and in some cases (miners), going back to the XIX century. Therefore they carry with them radical traditions and experiences of various kinds (including those of repression and reorganization at different points in time); c) they work for private capital, controlled

(22) In 1969, the UP enjoyed 29,8% of the agricultural workers support and the Christian Democrats 70,2%. In 1972 these figures reversed to 62,2% and 37,8%, a trend that indicates that by 1973, when 13,000 more workers affiliated, the figures should have roughly amounted to 70% for the UP and 30% for the C.D. backed confederations.

mainly by foreign or native monopoly capitalists (23) which in many cases is also foreign controlled (24), or worked for large landowners and therefore have been exposed to a direct "class to class" confrontation with key economic interests.

Their experience with the State has been one of repression and bureaucratic control, except on two occasions, when they enjoyed the backing of the State in their demands (but to a different extent in each case, e.g. Popular Front and Popular Government) (25).

(23) The textile sector had 22 out of the 91 basic enterprises of the Chilean Economy and the metal-mechanic - electronic industries (all within the FOMT Federation just banned), another 20 enterprises, accounting both for almost 50% of the "91". See "Las 91", op.cit. pp. 59-154; 192-200.

(24) Ibid and "El proceso de cambios", op.cit.

(25) During the Popular Front years, unionization rose from 125,972 to 263,085 members (see INSORA, Afiliación y finanzas sindicales en Chile, 1932-1959, Santiago, 1962, table II p.20); but strikes were no more than 10 to 20 a year (see Manuel Barrera "Perspectiva histórica de la huelga en Chile", Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional n.9, Sept. 1971, Santiago p. 154) which seemed to have been the CTCH and the S.P. and C.P. compromise for their participation in the Alliance. During the Unidad Popular period, there were 2,000 to 3,000 strikes a year (most of them "illegal") compared to 1,000 to 2,000 a year during Frei and less than 1,000 a year during Alessandri. (DARTEO, Cited in, "Informe Geminis", 3^{er} trimestre 1974, Santiago, cuadro n.29, p.72) Unionization grew from 34% in 1963 to 57% of the labour force (see table 3), basically during the Allende period. During the Popular Front period, CTCH participated with a few members in the Government Industrial Holding and Development

Agency's (CORFO) board. Under Allende 50,000 workers participated in the running of the state controlled plants, at the industrial level and in the council of ministers, including the appointment of the President and general secretary of CUR, as ministers of Labour and Agriculture in 1972-3 (see P. Zapata, "Las relaciones entre el movimiento obrero y el gobierno del Presidente Allende", El Colegio de México Cuadernos del CES 4 Mexico, p.20.

G. Palaballa, Clase Partido y Estado; La CUT en el Gobierno de la Unidad Popular, CIS-PA 10, Lima 1975. and A. Angell, "Political Mobilization and Class Alliances in Chile 1970-73", St. Antony's College, Oxford 1975, mimeo). On the other hand 54,924 agricultural workers were directing their own cooperatives (asentamientos and CRAS) Chile 1970-1973 (Stockholm: Civiltry akariat i Kristianstad, 1974) p.189.

d) the unions are within sectors of the economy that produce vital exports (mining in particular) (26) and products for internal consumption. This fact could have given them, both a strong bargaining power, as well as the basis for developing 'national' perspectives to analyse the country's key problems and solutions (e.g. where to invest foreign exchanges resulting from exports; the internal production of food, clothing, shelter, etc. for the people); e) the union's plants are at the same time spread all over the country and especially concentrated in the key working class regions of Antofagasta in the North, Santiago and Valparaiso in ^{the} Centre and Concepcion and Arauco in the South; and in the case of the construction and peasant unions, virtually in every corner of the country. Once again this fact reinforces the previous point, strengthening their national political perspective, and the feeling that the overall solution to the country's problems is intertwined with the solution of their own problems and that their solutions cannot be resolved without the very participation of the working class itself and moreover, with it playing the leading role. f) and finally, these are the union sectors with the strongest historical articulation with the working class parties. (27) This fact should be important, not only ^{in maintaining} their ideological strength and ability to comprehend the country's problems and solutions, but also important on organizational terms. The fact that many of these unions are based on many large and medium size plants and the intra class experience and better organizational skills associated with it, adds one more element to the political development conditions associated with these unions. Moreover, the fact that these sectors are based on industrial

unions of medium or large

(25) The present union response as well as the historic experience of the copper workers can well be assimilated to the CNS orientations and past experience.

(27) Basically the C.P., which has the key influence in 5 out of the 6 Federations. In the other Federation, is MAPU Obrero, Campe-

size plants, strengthens in the case of Chile, almost ideal conditions for highly democratic union structures, as many authors have pointed out, including a high turnover of the leadership, level of participation, and rank-and file identification with the leadership, as well as a 'militant' dedication to union affairs with hardly any union 'corruption'. It also seems that the ^{nature of the} very electoral process in these unions, makes it easier for a close party-union articulation and in this case, the working class parties (28).

In the case of the agricultural unions, we might add that it provides CNS with a key 'agrarian-link' which the FOCC, CTCM and CUT lacked almost completely up to the mid-1960's; a sector of vital importance in any societal transformation strategy

The Regional (Provincial) character of the professional construction unions, with only "union committees" at the plant level, is due to the nature of the production process in the construction sector, highly mobile and extremely labour intensive. Under such circumstances, plant union have no stability. These characteristics exposes construction workers to very peculiar conditions:

a) it is a sector which has recruited many radical workers, which were pushed out from the mining sectors due to economic crises and to political repressions there (29).

b) the construction worker's job stability is periodically threatened. This is an important fact, both in terms of their ability to resist under the present unemployment situation, and because construction workers in Chile can develop a "native radicalism", which is usually associated with job unstability.

(28) See in particular "Partidos Politicos" op.cit. pp.235-250
(29) G. Palaballa, Desarrollo del Capitalismo y formacion de clase: el torrente en la huella. Revista Mexicana de Sociologia, Ano XXII, Num.1 (Feb.-March 1970), pp.87-113.
Adolfo Gurreri and R. Zapata. Sectores Obreros y Desarrollo en Chile. ILPES, 1967 mimeo.

ty (30). On the other hand, by looking at the more general fluctuations of the construction industry they can judge the country's overall structure, because, at the very end, this instability is a result of such a structure. It therefore makes the system more 'transparent' and therefore ^{it} enlightens its comprehension. (31)

c) Construction is basically controlled by native capital. The local capitalists have also got a vital interest in maintaining the sectorial labour force stability in order to move along from one job to another and therefore a peculiar relationship of radicalism and mutual accommodation on both parts takes place within the labour relations system. It is therefore not at all strange that workers in this sector, although being political "spontaneous" and very radical, they systematically opposed the expropriation of the construction enterprises during the UP Government (because after all, there was almost no machinery to be expropriated at all apart from "administrative" entrepreneurial skills), but did mobilize for the expropriation of all key industries which supplied the basic materials which in fact are the essential elements, together with labour, in the construction labour process. They also demanded, and obtained, participation in the state sector in charge of controlling such basic construction materials and enterprises (CIMC). After the

(30) See S.M. Lipset, Political Man (London: Heinan, 1970)
 (31) In fact, after some experience on the job, construction workers can understand that their job instability is directly associated with the government's economic policy (fiscal policy, investment, social expenditures) in particular, the public housing program, a not primarily a result of a decision by the construction employers. They can therefore very clearly judge the nature of a particular government by means of looking at the supply of jobs in their sector. (For the case of the Cuban Sugar Workers see Maurice Zeitli, La Política Revolucionaria y la Clase Obrera Cubana (Bs. Aires: Amorrotu, 1973) Chapters 2, 11.)

coup, it is not surprising that strikes have frequently taken place within this sector, as our interviews suggest, and that at the same time the Federation has had the support from many entrepreneurs, who even maintained the Federation leaders in their jobs, although widespread bankruptcies and lay-offs have taken place; and ^{all} have continued the national bargaining system that existed between the proprietors and workers unions (and the "tarifado nacional" of basic salaries per craft) within the construction sector. After the banning of the Federation last October, its 'illegalized' President was called in by the employers, in order to solve some labour disputes that had arisen in the sector. The workers had demanded their leaders' intermediation and the employers had agreed....

We can conclude from these facts, that the construction workers' experience moves them away from an all proletarian front and perhaps is conditioning the search for a multi-class alliance, under labour control, which is precisely the CNS policy, as we have noticed before.

But CNS has a wider appeal that reaches beyond these six Federations. Actually, CNS has a direct influence in almost every single sector and working strata, including small industries sectors (tanneries, printing, bakery, leather and shoe) services (Health, Education), white collar unions, free union "committees" and the retired workers; which indicates to a certain degree, their recognition by the workers as the historical continuity of CUR, as well as shows its growth potentiality. Their alliance with FUT, has also opened other sectors to their influence, such as other small industries and services.

2). FUT coordinates Dockers and other services displaced

4) unions leaders and sectors of small and relatively weak unions. They are supported by the Latin American and World Christian Democrat Unions. Their support indicates both the strength and appeal of the CNS as well as the progressive orientation of weak unions.

3). thirdly we have COPCH, which brought together for the past 30 years important white collar national unions in industries and commerce, as a way to maintain the relatively privileged economic benefits they obtain within the salaried population, due to labour laws discriminations. (32) Their independence has not prevented them from having an open door for their members willing to endorse the CNS-FUR alliance more general program, nor from bargaining with the government and for its President to continue, up to 1978, to represent it together with other UNRACH leaders at the ILO annual meetings. The Government's banning of non-plant based unions and the order for professional unions to become just "workers unions" at the plant level together with manual workers of industrial unions, (which is therefore destroying their privileged status), has further pushed them away from the Government. For the employer, it means a reduction on "Labour Costs". The membership of industrial workers in key sectors within their ranks (Power, Energy and Sugar and some large plants as is the case of Glass, Rubber and Shoe Industries) sets the basis for the influence of working class interest with COPCH.

(32) White Collar Workers earned 37,7% of the National income in 1964 and represented only 18,6% of the Active Population. Urban workers were 47,7% and earned only 18,9% of National Income (Escuela de Economía, Universidad de Chile, 1964).

4) The Group of Ten union council also represents very distinct unions. These are:

- a) the different basic services of the state apparatus both the ones more related to the productive process (Dockers, Railwaymen, Drivers) as well as the more "bureaucratic" strata (Civil Servants, including the Post Workers);
- b) the modern, capital intensive industries (petroleum, plastics, sugar refineries and to a lesser extent auto and electronics).
- c) agricultural workers unions.

All of these union sectors have one basic and common characteristic: their association with the State since almost their very birth as a sector or unions (Services, the agricultural workers, and even some industrial sectors such as Petroleum and Sugar). Worker's high productivity is a distinct feature of the industrial unions joining this Council. This higher productive allows workers to receive higher salaries than workers, in less productive sectors. In fact, these industries can afford to pay most of the labour benefits that the struggle of the Chilean workers have managed to built up during their history. Therefore they are eventually receiving benefits for which they have not struggled for. But we also have among these particular unions another important difference with, say a union in a modern, highly productive textile plants. The difference seem to be the fact that such a textile plant was built into an old sector of the economy, with an old federation full of working class tradition and which, probably organized the workers in the new emerging plants. In fact, the leadership of the Metal and Textile Federations, are drawn precisely from these modern plants within the sector

and further more, the most radical working class base and the first plants to reorganize after the coup and openly confront the government and managers, were the most modern plants of these 'old' sectors. Two of the three group of Ten Union leaders that joined the CNS, come from two modern Textile (Sumar) and metal-mechanic (FNSA) plants. (33) Perhaps this is the reason why Copper workers, even though they have enjoyed higher salaries than most Chilean workers, have most of the time undertaken progressive union behaviours. In fact, copper workers have had ~~many experiences in the past to fight for~~ to fight for the higher salaries they earned, being on many occasions, badly repressed because of their military. The company as it modernized, was forced through their struggles to increase labour salaries.

The association of the service sectors with the state, apart from avoiding a direct 'class struggle' experience, developed among these workers a skill for accommodation (similar to the Populist experiences in Mexico, Brasil and Argentina) rather than a tradition of confrontation. It is possible that most of the agricultural workers that remained loyal to the Christian Democrats, come from farms expropriated by Frei, where absentee landowners did not resist land reform. Maquivil however, had the difficult job to organize the peasants against government that had stated a land reform. Unidad Obrero Campesino was based on the rural workers which were not afraid to break away from the

(33) See for instance the discussion of the President of FNSA with his boss, J. VIAL, the head of the most powerful financial group in Chile. La Bolsa, vol. N. 2, p. 19. In Sumar, repression had been especially fierce because ~~there~~ were engaged in armed resistance during 3 days, during which many soldiers and especially policemen were killed.

Government's control, and as Maquivil, grew strongly during the Unidad Popular period. This growth was based on the full implementation of the CD Land Reform and unionization laws; and by supporting the rural workers' own mobilization and struggle for the land. But we must also consider the degree of independence that the group of Ten unions have now developed towards the Government policies and even from the AFL-CIO, when they have left them down (as was the case with the boycott threat). Actually the Group of Ten are based on key service sectors of the economy representing large and strong national unions which sometimes engaged in fierce confrontations with the government through their history and have many times been lead by left wing leaders (which is the case of the Socialist Party among the Railroadmen). ANEP in particular, with a strong Radical Party influence, has played a key role both in the brake down of repressive governments economic policies (including C.R.P. right wing government), and in the creation and building up of CUT (34). Also, capital intensive plants, should not be considered isolated entities within the Chilean union movement. As the paint ~~industry~~ industry's example indicates, ^{these} sectors can also fully identify with strong class-orientations. But it also seems to be the case that the Chilean "left wing" message, which is so too many times full of unsophisticated "slogans", did not find the same appeal among younger and more skilled workers, engineers and technicians, as did among unskilled workers of non-automatic industries. It seems that in these modern sectors, the technical, more rational and less emotional appeal of the CU, had an impact during the democratic stage of Chilean politics.

(34) See "Trayectoria", op. cit.; and "Partidos Politicos", op. cit. pp. 766-172

On the other hand, the strong repression which has taken place in the countryside, seems to be a big wall separating the rural workers from the Junta.

5) Lastly, UNTRACH, although maintaining more conservative policies than the Group of Ten, has a following both similar to this latter Union Council (e.g. steel, banking, health) but enjoys also social basis among other workers with characteristics similar to those of the CNS and the RUT membership (buses, trucks, bakery, shoe). This fact is related both to the ideological weaknesses (in the case of services) associated with the working processes in the first set of cases; and the structural weaknesses of the second set of cases (small enterprises with low productivity and small unions). Workers in the banking sector also enjoy relatively higher salaries because of their privileged white collar status, without a need to fight for these benefits as did the Peruvian bank workers for example (e.g. in 1965 and thereafter) who are the main stronghold of the C.P. in the Peruvian union movement. Moreover it also seems to be the case that automatic continuous labour processes (l.p.), (the case of steel and Petroleum), versus automatic discontinuous l.p. (as in the case of modern metal-mechanic-electronic and textile plants) leads to a much more autonomous integration of the workers in the l.p. and therefore workers are less under constraints at their job (in the line) and therefore to the extraction of surplus via the intensification of work, that management can enforce at a given point. This fact could well be associated with the more radical political commitment of the workers in automatic discontinuous l.p..

The second set of unions have had a tradition of accommodation more than confrontation with management (which seems to be directly associated with their being weak) by engaging before the coup in 'non-legal' collective bargaining at an industry level; ^{a system} supported by the employers. However, they have also developed strong anti-state anarchic traditions in the past (especially in the case of the bakery, shoe and leather and printing workers) which should account for a restraining force from collaborating with the government. But the main point to stress here, is the clear identification of these small industries sectors with either of the two extreme political orientations, UNTRACH and CNS. This should be related precisely to their organizational weakness: or they identify with a strong State or they confront it to the possible extreme. ^{under a production crisis badly affecting the} However, apart from the fact that the Socialists were strong among the bakery workers and shoe and leather industries and the C.P. was the strongest among the Printers, we do not have convincing reasons why precisely one sector went with the CNS and the other with UNTRACH (or actually have split or have had ambivalent commitments).

We have located in between UNTRACH and the Group of Ten Councils, two important unions: the Paper mills workers and the Commerce and Industries white collar workers, both national branches of CDPCH. The latter is a parallel union to the Commerce workers FENATRADECO and organically weaker, and was reorganized by the Government in order to oppose the other Commerce Union. The Paper mills union enjoyed a privileged treatment by their employers (the monopoly group Matte-Alessandri) during the Allende period, as a means of avoiding the industry from being

taken over by the Government; a labour relation system which managed to achieve its objectives. However, since the coup, as labour conditions became harder for the workers, they have been speaking out, as they did during the Allende period, autonomously, as 'La Papelera', and against the government and the company's policies.

We have offered a series of explanations regarding the relationship between different sectors of the union movement and their political behaviour, by focussing on the nature of the specific labour processes, labour relation systems and historical experiences, they have been engaged in, together with other more structural conditions, such as plant geographical distribution. We do not intend to provide definite answers regarding these relationships, nor that they hold necessarily in other social formations (e.g. that construction workers are radical as well as pro-multiclass fronts all over the world), although there are ^{some} aspects in our analysis which could carry a more general explanatory power if we consider the comparative literature, such as working class isolationism (35), workers' employment fluctuations and others.

(35) Jose J. Petras and M. Zeitlin "Miners and Agrarian Radicalism" *Latin American Research Review*, 2 (August 1967), 4, pp. 578-586, USA; and F. Zapata, "Enclaves y Sistemas de Relaciones Industriales en America Latina", *RMS, Año XXXIX*, vol. XXXIX N. 2 (Abril-Junio 1977) pp. 719-731.

4. Union's development at the regional level.

The spacial distribution of union activity, has had an important shift since the turn of the century. Between 1810 and 1910, out of the total 323 strikes that took place, almost half of them ^{were} located in the northern mining-railroad-port enclaves, one third in the Santiago-Valparaiso central region, but as much as 12% in southern Concepción and Arauco. However, during the period that followed up to 1925, these figures (as much as 747 strikes) had already changed the relative strength of each of these regions: the North had dropped in importance to one third, the capital-main-port central region ^{area} to over 40%, the southern Concepción-Arauco region maintained its previous share of the labour disputes distribution (12%) and the extreme south had emerged with a 6% of the total amount of strikes in the country. The rest of the country had slightly raised its participation from 6,2% to 7,4% (36) by the late 1960's on the other hand, some of the changes were even more significant (if we consider a similar indicator and more related to the main objective of our analysis: unionization). In fact, the northern region had again decreased its relative union importance representing now 16% of the unionized workers, with Santiago Valparaiso ^{area} as much as 56% and Concepcion, still with a 13% unionization figure. Magallanes, the extreme south, had also decreased to a 1% share of these figures. The rest of the country accounted already for 14% of workers union members (37). But the final years of the Frei period and

(36) "Perspectiva Historica", *op. cit.* pp. 128, 134.

(37) F. Zapata, "estructura y Representatividad", *op. cit.* p. 39.

specially so during the Allende Government, more significant changes (although within the trends that followed the 40 years period that followed the mid-1920's) were to take place.

Table 10 - Unionization by regions and salaried population, including region's size, key products and unions "active on national problems" 1976 (in thousands)

Region	Miles ²	Key Prod.	Salaried ⁽¹⁾	%	Unionization ⁽²⁾	%	Unions "Active Nat. Probl."
I-IV North (Arica-Acum.)	1,200 X 100	Mining	322,600	9	159,6	12	121
R.M. (Srea)	30 X 50	All sectors	1,237,100	39	718,1	56	401 (4)
V. Valparaíso - Antofagasta	30 X 50	Ind./Trans.	361,400	11	121,0	9	71
VI-VII, (Central) (O'Higgins)	300 X 100	Agriculture	376,800	12	64,1	5	101
VIII. Ctr. Sth. (Ñ-Bio-Bio)	80 X 100	Min./Ind. Agric.	384,900	13	141,5	11	261
IX-X. South (Mall-Chiloe)	300 X 100	Agriculture	441,900	14	71,1	6	61
XI-XII, Ext. Sth. (Aysen-Magall.)	1,000 X 100	Agric. Petro.	64,200	2	11,2	1	21
TOTAL	3,000 X 100		2,188,680	100	1,286,6	100	1001

(1) INE 1975

(2) ANEP, 1977. ANEP figures did not include agricultural unions or public employees organizations. We have included these sectors in our calculations, and added them to the ANEP figures. They are approximate estimates only.

in fact, as table 10 indicates, the northern area has again decreased its importance within the country's union structure, Santiago and Valparaíso has apparently significantly grown in its unionizing (38), the Concepción region has maintained its share, as is the case with the extreme South and the rest of the country. However these figures prevent us from noticing the importance of two other aspects. One is the relative importance of the "rest of the country" because the Concepción region includes two important agrarian regions which were not included in the figures presented in our time series and the importance of the Concepción region on a more "qualitative" union analysis. Therefore if we look at the last column of table 10, those unions which are active on national problems, we can see both the importance of the agricultural workers, even under a repressive authoritarian regime and the key importance of the "Cuenca del Bio-Bio" region, Concepción and Arauco in particular, where the concentration of the mining, steel, industrial, lumber and paper mill plants in a relative small area, on the basis of both an old (Lota, Coronel, Curanilahue) and the most modern industrial proletariat of Chile (Talcahuano, Lirquen, Tomé).^{etc located} The Concepción Region represents 26% of the political unions and the rest of the country 16% (which should be even higher if we consider the agrarian Provinces of Bio-Bio and Ñuble within the VIII- Concepción Region) and Magallanes 2%. Still, almost half of the politically active unions are in the Capital-Port area, and as much as 65% of the unions and 50% of the Chilean workers. The reason why Santiago has such a large share of the union movement, must not only be (38) The State Services "Associations", were not included in the 1969...

related to the concentration of industries, services and commerce there, but also (as is the case with Valparaíso and San Antonio) because of the importance of the agricultural workers in these areas (20% of the agricultural workers unions and members were concentrated there by July 1968) (39).

The importance of the Concepción region could ^{be} somehow expected because of the regional concentration of proletarian masses both old and modern, but its importance has perhaps overcome these expectations. We therefore believe that geopolitical reasons could be of some importance. Chile has a tradition and the political-administrative conditions, for one to have expected a much higher concentration of political unions in Santiago and more so, considering the percentage of unionized workers the Metropolitan Region carries. It seems that the country's border problems in northern and extreme south areas and the military political control and repression in the Capital and its adjoining main port, has played a role in the relatively higher political development of a region like Concepción which is less affected by such internal and external circumstances.

The rural workers ^{development} which we have analyzed in previous sections was, to say the least, a surprising fact and yet it is of crucial importance as our regional union data suggest, by giving the union movement an even more national expression and ability to reach up to the very last corner of the country. Rural unions have a 20% share among the politically active unions, similar to their participation in the unionized population and this figure is well

(39) "Memoria del CDA", op.cit. p.66

above the 11% of their representation among the salaried population of the country, even though they have been perhaps the most repressed sector, facts which speak very highly about their political development, and resistance capacity. Miners, for instance, the very origin of the Chilean labour movement (40) represent 4% of the salaried population, and 8% of the union membership; but only 3% of those active politically (Tables 1 and 2). Anyway the Northern region has maintained its relative unionization/ political active unions proportion and even above the proportion of the salaried population they represent (Table 10). But the most important fact remains the redevelopment of these new sectors of the union movement, the organized rural labourers, which has provided the union movement with an even wider national organized workers presence throughout the country. The second fact that should be stressed, is the historical shift from a Northern concentrated union movement, to a central-south based one, especially so at the present stage. Once again, the development of the rural ^{and} the decrease of the Northern share within the movement, due primarily to the shift of the capitalist accumulation pattern and the agrarian reform and changes in the rural union legislation, account for the main reasons which are behind these facts.

(40) Within the miners, the nitrate workers in particular, there repression after the coup was extremely fierce and left by the thousands across the border to Argentina, fearing another "escuela Santa María" or something even worse. Since their union President has joined UMRACH (1977) and then left it. Recently (Feb. 1979) he has invited Pinochet to visit the Nitrate Plants. But the fierce repression that nitrate workers went through after the coup, does not seem a sufficient explanation of the limitations in their political development. Such limitations could also be related to their historical loss in bargaining power since the 1920's (as the industry decreased its importance in the economy due to the discovery of synthetic Nitrate), and the relative increases in salaries and living conditions that the company could offer them as the industry started modernizing. (A similar phenomena could well take place in the future in Bolivia, as the economy becomes less dependent on tin. See Lawrence Whitehead, "Los trabajadores mineros en Bolivia: Sus tradiciones y perspectivas políticas". I.P. Lima, July 1976).

We do not have quantifiable information of significant value to analyze the development of regional councils of unions. However, Concepción and Valparaiso, in particular the former, and certain regions of Santiago, have developed coordinations to relate with the military regional authorities, supported by the Church Provincial or regional organizations (Obispados) in the case of Santiago and Concepción. Such is the case for instance of the regional coordination of the Arauco and Lota-Coronel Coal unions' Coordinators' and wider coordinations set up on occasions by the Concepción unions. In Santiago, the Church Vicaria de la Pastoral Obrera of the region's Arzobispado, has set the bases for the coordination (and on last September for a 'unity meeting as we have already mentioned), of all Union National Councils. Therefore regional organizations seem to be a key driving force for the reunification of the union movement. In Concepcion, for instance, union basis of different group-tendencias have united to confront common problems, irrespective of the political position of their national Councils. However, no stable and strong regional organizations have yet developed; it is the National Federations and Councils which express the main political and organic activities of the Chilean Union movement; as they always have! (including local unions).

The strong military-administrative new regionalization of the country (See table 10), an strict control of all activities, is both a limitations for the development of regional union organizations-because of the greater regional control over unions- as well as a driving force in the organic development in that direction in order to relate to the regional political structure and express there, the political alternative they are searching for at the national level.

however, within some of the National Union Councils, there are certain Federations which are well organized by regions and have played an important role in the reorganizing of other unions within the Council and the union movement at large. This is particularly the case of the Construction and the rural workers' Confederation; they played such a role, by means of inviting other unions to participate in their own meetings at the communal and provincial level. CEPCH is regionally organized. We do not have information about the Group of ten being organized by regions, but ANFP, the Railmen and Dockers' unions do have regional unions. Within UNTRACH, only Bankworkers could have regional organizations, but this is not the case. Bank unions are organized by each one of the different banks, and the 'Banco del Estado' federation, the largest, with branches all around the country, has joined the Group of ten. Therefore it is the CNS unions in the first place (e.g. Concepcion and many other more 'agrarian provinces') and next to it, the Group of Ten unions that can provide for a basis to develop regional organization within the Chilean union movement. CEPCH, seems rather weak to play such a role. Out of 10 regions from a total of 12 they reorganized on June 1975 to confront the proposed labour code, they controlled only 4 by September 1974. In the case of Concepcion and to some extent Santiago for which we do have information, CEPCH branches work with the CNS unions. This could well be ^{also} the case with many regional plant or local unions of UNTRACH. We do know that this has ^{actually} been the case with some of the Dockers' ^{unions} those from Northern Antofagasta and Southern Concepcion. Because Federations are too weak to split, local branches, whose national Councils are controlled by a certain tendency, can work with unions whose Federations participate

in other Councils, without putting a threat to their own Federations' unity. This has been well understood, it seems, by CNS in its organizational drive, gaining a vast and national appeal.

5. The unemployed and the 'unemployed workers'

We do not have any indications that workers in the 'minimum employment' government unproductive program for the unemployed, are organized at all. There is only some indication that both the permanently unemployed and the workers who lost their jobs after the coup (unemployed workers) are organized. The first group is based in the different Chilean Counties (municipalidades) and receives a 60% of the minimum salary, (which is at the same time, more than 50% below a real minimum salary). This over-economic stress seems to be the main reason why they have not organized. The permanently unemployed, which during the UP Government reached only a 3% level, have not organized at all, although they do seem to join the local popular dining rooms set up by the Church in the slums (41). The unemployed workers, have organized labour exchange system ('bolsas de cesantes') in the most important industrial areas of Concepcion, Santiago and Valparaiso. In Santiago, they have even formed a 'coordinating body' of such 'bolsas' and have addressed critical letters to the authorities. However they seem to be very weak. In East Santiago for example, there are 22 such bolsas, but group only 600 persons of a total unemployed population of about 30.000, and seem to be the most militant among these group (42).

(41) See P. Frias "Cesantia y Estrategias de Supervivencia". FLACSO Documento de Trabajo, Julio 1977, Santiago.

(42) Pap recorded interview with leaders of the East Santiago bolsas May, 1978.

In Concepcion, there are proportionately many more bolsas and members (43). Another form of organization that the unemployed workers have developed, and perhaps the most important one, is their maintaining their links with the local union or the Federation, even though they are unemployed. This is particularly the case with the Construction Federation which has historically operated almost as a 'bolsa', and many communal and provincial rural unions. It is also the case with the unions of many industries going bankrupt, as a means to fight the benefits which the enterprise should pay them according to the law, and which they have systematically refused to do so. (44)

There is also another important aspect to be considered in relation with the unemployed workers. They serve as a link and diffusion of organizational experiences and ideology within other sectors of workers and the popular masses in general. In fact, they are placed within working class communities and during certain periods, mostly during the summer at harvest time, they join their peasant and rural workers families and friends in the countryside in order to better subsist during such periods (45) without being too much of a burden to them. In the past, crises in the mining industry and economic fluctuations in other sectors, pushed experienced miners, infrastructure construction workers and the rural rorantes across the country and with the spread of radical traditions (46).

(43) "Solidaridad" op.cit.

(44) See "Paginas Sindicales" (n.14) op.cit., Dec. 1978.

(45) "Cesantia", op.cit.

(46) See "Desarrollo de Capitalismo", op.cit. "miners and agrarian radicalism" op.cit. and "Sectores Obreros", op.cit.

today this is again the case and it could well be having an effect that the government has perhaps not thought of, and can hardly do anything about it!

A final point we would like to make, is related to the labour market and its characteristics during these years, of a complete free market economy experience. It has been suggested that in broad terms or in specific cases, there are distinct labour markets by type of capital; at least two specific kinds of markets. One supplies the labour for the capital intensive enterprises and is based on the skilled labour force and is less competitive; the other is based on un- and semi-skilled workers and supplies the traditional, labour-intensive, enterprises; is competitive and open(47). Moreover it has been also suggested that such markets under the present situation in Chile, are quite differentiated and segmented; one based on skilled labour having hardly any change at the present, because these enterprises do not suffer the effects of the economic depression which followed the new economic policies; while the other, based on the unskilled and semi-skilled labour force, grew to the utmost. Therefore the policy changes had affected only the traditional sector of the economy.(48)

Tavares de Almeida has shown that in the case of the autoworkers in Sao Paulo, based on capital intensive industries, the majority of the workers are not skilled and that there are no closed, internal markets among these working strata. Moreover the information presented in table 5. indicates that the depression

(47) See Victor Rokman "Income distribution, technology and employment in developing countries; An application to Ecuador" Journal of Development Economics 2 (1975) pp 49-80 and various articles cited in ...M. Tavares, "Desenvolvimento Capitalista y movimiento Laborales CIACSO y el Colegio de Mexico.

(48) See Alejandro Foxley and Oscar Muñoz, "Políticas de Empleo en Colonias Heterogéneas" Revista Paraguaya de Sociología N.38 (Enero-Abril 1977), pp.81-100.

has affected both traditional and modern sectors and as has been pointed out elsewhere, food-stuffs products have almost maintained production levels (49) and are ^{based on} small-medium size, most of the time labour intensive plants (50). Therefore we believe, (without having all the necessary information to fully support our claim), that in the case of Chile during these 5 years, we can hardly speak of differentiated labour markets; one of them being relatively close and the other open. There is, it seems, only one large labour market where we can find a M.Sc. Engineer working for some hours as a chewing-gum street salesman, a unskilled worker turning up to do whatever is asked for (the 'minimum employment'), and a housewife who has just started to look for a job.

We must also consider that unemployment in Chile is a shared phenomena; it is not an individual problem. The unemployed will move into a relatives house who is employed 'until he finds a job(51) which can take years.... This fact and our earlier discussion is important in terms of the wider cohesion among different sectors of the employed and unemployed working class. We do not find major break downs within the class on these terms, because the economic policies have affected every sector of the labour force and they seem to respond correspondingly.

(49) "Labour Relations", op.cit. p.17

(50) "Redistribucion del Ingreso", op.cit.

(51) "Cesantia", op.cit.

in fact in the open letters signed by the different Union councils, the problems and the interests of the unemployed, including the minimum employment, are permanently stressed (52).

It would like to conclude this section by pointing out, the importance of the Federation Unions during this five year period; their tendency to group up in national coordinations and then search for a wider unity; the importance of different types of union structures both industrial, professional, agrarian and 'free' unions; the hegemonic role of the more proletarian sectors of the salaried population and the overall opposition of every single strata of the union movement to the present regime, including the 'unemployed workers'. Some of these aspects have ^{been} dealt with in the past by the Chilean union and political literature. But, there is too often an implicit tendency to believe that miners are still the core of the union movement; that industrial unions are the pattern of Chilean unionization; that rural unions are dependent in general on the state; that Chilean unions are 'economistic' oriented and non-political, and that Federations have hardly any importance because of the supposedly plant based nature of the Chilean union movement. Perhaps the union developments during these 5 years are of crucial importance in arriving at a more thorough understanding of the nature of this country's union structure and their political awareness and behaviour.

(52) See Union Councils open letters on Apr. 1977 and May and Sep. 1978. in "Solidaridad", op.cit.

D. Unions and Parties.

Party/Union articulation, has been differentiated by parties, sectors within the union movement and by periods.

In general terms one can state with sufficient evidence after five and a half years have passed since the coup ^{that} CD, RP and SP parties have had a rather low articulation with the unions through out the period; CP and MAPU oc, a rather stronger relationship of various kinds and that other parties seem with no presence at all, as such or through the presence of their union leaders. This fact is correlated in the first place, with the nature of the parties' link mechanism before the coup, e.g. if they had strong Union Commissions, - which is exactly the case of the two second sets of parties - or rather weak Unions Departments - as is the case with the former political organizations (53). This relationship is also correlated with the previous union basis of each of the parties. While the first set of parties have a much wider basis all over the union movement and real hegemonic presence in only a few sectors (although the RP and CD were strong in the State sectors - with the RP especially based among the State employees and school teachers, and the CD being strong in the productive State sectors - and the SP in some small industries and transport) the CP and MAPU oc had their strongholds in the six illegalized Federations, and relatively a smaller

(53) See "partidos politicos" op.cit. Segunda parte

presence-almost no presence at all in the case of MAPU occur in other sectors and strata. This relationship stands only to a certain extent, because the CP^{also} has in general a wide spread influence in every sector, low as it may be, and the Christian Democrats are relatively strong in the countryside unions and the white collar workers in general. The socialist, are particularly present in almost every single strata of the union movement, even though with only an hegemonic presence in only few unions (54). These facts are well correlated with the general difused character with more general "classist" political slogans of the SP appeal and its explicit stand on behalf of the 'manual and intellectual' workers; the completely universalistic approach ('workers for a communitarian society' slogan) of the CD and the self-definition as representative of the 'middle classes' and 'intellectual workers' of RP; the working class party identification in the case of the CP and the workers and peasant party self definition of MAPU. MIR with only 1,8% of the workers' vote in the 1972 CUR elections (55) has had no presence at all during these years within the union movement.

The four parties' political orientation regarding the importance of the unions after the coup-various clandestine 'workers resistance committees' for example (that MIR and other more to the left political groups were advocating for) was important in their union articulation after the coup.

(54) I would like to thank Monica McFall for allowing me to share the CUR election 1972 results in some areas.

(55) See "Las relaciones entre el movimiento Obrero" op.cit. p.26.

In fact, their first priority was the rebuilding of the unions, whatever the limitations were, just as they have done on previous similar occasions (in particular the CP) and clearly established, in the case of the three marxist-leninist parties, the importance of distinguishing the party clandestine apparatus from the more open mass, legal (or not illegal) union movement. Under the new conditions and all of the parties' new, and more loosely defined articulation with the unions, there was bound to be a more autonomous class/party articulation. As a result there has been three main direction centres of the union movement: CNS, the American AFL-CIO and the Government, with the government being on the overall unsuccessful, but more so than during the CRAC union Council set up by the Ibañez dictatorship during the late 1930's and the 'Ibanista' workers in the 1950's (56) and the Americans somehow more successful than during their post-war revisionist policies (57).

We cannot identify CNS with any single party's clandestine or exterior union commission's direction. In fact CP and SP parties have been badly internally disarticulated at certain points in time but with CNS continuing to follow through these periods, their previous policies. It is also true that all parties within the CNS -including the CD- have experienced union political cadres. But this fact speaks very highly of the parties' own development & their ability to maintain their

(56) See Cornell University, NY State School of Industrial Relations Elites, intellectuals and consensus (by James O. Mooris), Cornell International industrial and labor relations reports N.7. NY. 1956 Chapter 9. and "Trayectoria" op.cit. pp. 34-120

(57) "Presidents and Peons", op.cit.

policies (mostly the UP parties), even though their links with the unions are weak or non-existent at times. Therefore we can say that there has been a true political development of the union during these years.

However, we mustn't draw easy conclusions out of this fact, e.g. that unions and union leaders have reorganized and developed politically by their own during these 5 years. The marxist parties' orientations are present throughout the period by means of the underground press and the daily twice a day transmissions of Radio Moscow, and in the case of the CD, by means of their own legal press. Moreover, during the first two years in the case of the SP, during the first three years the CP and throughout the period the CD, MAPU o.c. and RP have maintained basic levels of articulations with the unions, and if unevenly ^{already it is} because of the differentiated levels of repression and clandestine organizational and political ability of each one of them. The reemergence of the Federations on the first place, cannot be understood without the parties being relatively successful to resist repression - in the case SP and CP, a very fierce and bloody one: When the Junta was for a period successful in disarticulating these latter parties relations with the unions, the international isolation of the Junta, created by the UP and international solidarity, meant important reduction on internal repression (58) because it has somehow since neutralized the Junta's ability to phisically repress. In fact ~~CNS~~ union leaders who were detained, went from the DINA's headquarters directly into occupying their legal union

(58) This is well acknowledge by workers and leaders in Chile. "Chilean resistances cannot have developed, as it has without international help, as in fact has taken place" (tape-recorder interview with a 'bolsa de trabajo' leader in Santiago. See also the tape recorder interview with the leader of CNS Alamiro Guzman in "The Chilean miners Speak out". Chile Solidarity Campaign, Oct. 1978, London.

representations and none of them could be quicked put of the country, as was the case with the released 'political' party prisoners. Moreover, our information indicates that party clandestine apparatus played a crucial role in the federations and local reorganizations, especially in key working class districts. In no other way can we explain the 605 unions active on national problems, especially so if we consider the 'local' nature of the strongest and more working class based 'industrial' and rural unions!

Party clandestine officials were proud to tell me, for example, how the political orientations for an open union meeting in a province, had reached the local unions via party structure, before the national federation leaders brought this same orientation to the local union leaders. The respect for the 'party-people' has undoubtedly grown during these years. Allende set the example on September 11. Moreover, many CUT leaders, become key party underground cadres, as was the case with Victor Diaz and Juan Ponce the heads of CP and PS, Nicolas Lopez, Jaime Donato and others, all of them "disappeared prisoners" today. In the CD case, once again the 'pro-unity' sectors of the unions have prevailed; and within the party, the role of the pro-CNS; the party's relationship with the 'pro-americans' in the Group of Ten has been rather weak and critical, to say the least.

Two final points should be stressed. First the exact forms of party unions articulation. CUT is now the clandestine coordination of the Union Commissions and Departments of the parties represented in the union movement. It is at the Federations and their coordinations and Union Councils inter-

coordination levels, ^{that, th} 'real' CUT is now located at. In fact on one occasion, when the old 'Ginebrinos' and the pro-UP Federation leaders met during the early period that followed the coup and some of the latter leaders were worried because CUT had no real presence at that moment, someone mentioned (and all agreed) that they were in fact the CUT! But this issue should not be just considered on the merely analogous terms, between the previous and the present circumstances. In fact, it has a more qualitative and deep importance: the party union articulation (party, in a broad sense) is a more close relationship today, with the Federations playing the key intermediary role. We believe that this fact, (which has been very seldomly analyzed in the Chilean union literature, but is an obvious fact among party and union experienced officials), has always been present in the Chilean union-party historical experience, but today this form of party/union relationship, appears in its most evident expression. Here one must also consider the role of key local-union-party-articulation and their role at the regional and Sectorial-Federation-level. The Junta well understood this fact when it outlawed both the 6 Federations and their local unions.

Lastly we would like to stress the new developments in the inter-party relations within the union movement and that of the unions within the party. We cannot understand the political role of FOCH, and those of CTCM and CUT, as well as the process that lead to their reunification, only on the basis of a party 'supra-leadership', which is so many times mistakenly stressed, within ^a certain 'party chauvinist' tradition.

The party/union relationship, also works the other way around, (which does not mean that we believe that it has on the whole an equivalent weight in the structuring of the relationship). In fact, the historic and today's influence of the unions and their leaders (with their own, direct class experience with the State, the new economic and labour conditions and the proprietors and the industrial relations system, which we have stressed in this paper) on the parties is quite significant. The prestige of "los viejos" (the experienced union leaders, including, of course, the ex-CUT leaders who went underground to engage in party organizing, during these years), have at least matched that of the party leaders who stayed behind in Chile in the underground. The need for unity and the breakaway of sectarian party politics, the unavoidable multi-class alliance, and the proud proletarian sentiment about the historic hegemonic role of the workers, is part of a direct workers' and union leaders' experience, which reinforces party lines at the general level, but makes it specific, away from purely rethoric statements. Moreover, in the case of the CD, it has invariably broken through official party orientations bringing the party line in accordance with party union's programs(59). It is in this respect, that the broader CD-UP unity being searched, is, as both parties and coalition theoretically state: it should be, a phenomena developing form a direct mass experience.

(59) See "Partidos Politicos", op.cit and "Trayectoria", op.cit.

G. Unions and employers.

Although 83% of the employers in the industrial sector were for a plant union based industrial relations system or called for greater government control over the unions during the Alessandri Period (60), by 1968, they had accepted a labour relations system industry based (61). Nowadays however, both the Agriculture and Industrial Societies (SNA and SOPOFA), supported the recent government union legislation and the full introduction of the plant level bargaining system throughout the economy. Paroch, the SOPOFA President, called for greater Government control on union activities and said that although within the industrial sectors there was both industrial and plant based collective bargaining systems, their opinion was clearly for the latter system (62). The Construction, Mining and Commerce Businessmen Association, have restricted from giving any opinions, a fact which could be related to their wide small and medium size business associations ^{as provided in their organization}. This is not the case with the industrial and landowners societies (63). Moreover the SNA President, is now the minister of Agriculture and the leading economic groups control the Foreign Relations, Finance, and Labour ministries. The Public Construction Ministry, is one of the few owners of large construction enterprises and has been in conflict with the Construction Chamber (64). However, all business societies supported the Kelly Plan when Pinochet called them to his office after Gral. Leigh was out-stead.

(60) "Partidos Políticos, op. cit. p. 88.
 (61) Jorge Berría, Trabajadores, INSORA, Santiago, 1969, pp.18-24
 (62) El Mercurio, Jan. 25, 1977
 (63) "Trabajadores" op. cit.
 (64) Up to 1970, these business Associations in particular SOPOFA and SNA, did influence to an important extent government policies and had representation in key government general and sectorial policy boards. See Constantino C. Gomez, "Public Policy and Organized business in Chile", WIA, 20, 343-365 (1966)

In fact the October labour decrees are a key instrument for the Plan's implementation. It seems that these two government policies, although beneficial on the long run to monopoly group interests, they do support immediate small business groups, by reducing salaries and labour negotiating power. Small business, seem to contradict monopoly capital rule, but at the very end, they support anti-labour legislation, confronted with an internal economic depression and see no clear alternative to their own problems. Unions' response to business interests, has been ambiguous. On the one hand they have criticized the government policies for "siding with the bosses", and have demanded a 50% pay rise 'across the board'; on the other hand, they have called for an alliance with small and medium size capital and for measures to protect national capital and their exports within the Andean Pact (from which the Government withdrew 4 years ago).

F. Unions and the Church.

The Chilean Catholic Church has an important political experience. During the Post-War period the Church was active in creating a national union council, ASICH, to promote a 'free union movement' (within the same orientations of the American ORIT) (65), but with hardly any success. Their more progressive sectors started a vast land reform, by giving up the Church lands during the conservative administration of Alessandri. This fact won them an important mass support. As a consequence, they fully identified with the Frei administration and most of the church social

(65) "Partidos Políticos", op. cit. p.183-4.

organizations and civil staff, went over to the governments' newly created peasant and slum organizations. During the Allende period, they enjoyed complete freedom of speech and activity and their opinions were decisive, on matters which ^{were} of vital interest to them. (e.g. the education reform, ANU). The Cardinal, with the Church backing, fully and publicly supported a CD-UP Government understanding in 1973, in order to avoid a bloody coup, but was unsuccessful. These experiences- in particular the failure of the Frei administration that they had so fully supported and the 'democratic' experience with the Allende Government - and the continuous loss of spiritual support among the Catholic Chilean masses, together with the conflicting experience with the present regime since the start, have had an impact on the Church response to the unions; the people's search for the church backing in their economic and political problems as well as the religious uprising that followed it since the coup, has had a significant effect upon the Church. As a consequence in relation with the union movement, they have stand for:

- A united union movement
- A secure influence within the workers at large
- A non-violent transition to democracy; in particular the union response to the government policies.
- And against party political control and sectarianism; although they have openly expressed they opinion for a multi-party based democratic political system, and a 'nationalist' economic policy.

The response of the union leaders has been a positive one, including the fear and respect of the those who have been supporting

the Government. Their best relations are with the CNS and have supported them in every respect.

At first, some of the CNS leadership was particularly worried with their relations with the Church (especially those sectors which had never related with it) and afraid for loosing 'class independence'. That is the reason why autonomous May Day meetings have always been held, although increasingly workers and leaders have been attending the public mass at the Cathedral by noon or afternoon on that day. The attitude has been slowly changing, as the more suspicious leaders have realized that the priests have nothing for them to fear about, 'under the robe'. In fact their association has been mutually beneficial. For the unions, an immense support and a channel to gain a wider societal consensus for their policies; for the Church, a voice that is being heard, by becoming "the voice of those without a voice", as the Cardinal has often put it. The relationship seems to be a longstanding one and with mutual effects; the Church has not only linked with the people through the campaign for the disappeared prisoners, the return of the exiled and the slums popular dinning-rooms, but with organized labour; for the unions a strong humanistic-progressive influence that will surely have an important ideological impact. (66)

G. Unions and the International Sphere.

Chilean Unions enjoy a vast international appeal, because of its radical-democratic tradition, the wide forum gained by the Frei, Allende and present administrations, (although for very different reasons) and because of their independence vis-a-vis

(66) See "Solidaridad" op.cit., in particular the May issues.

the main international union groups and pro-Latin American union movement's unity stand since the creation of CUT. The control drive of every one of the main union bodies has been a permanent factor of Chilean union history, in particular the drives to break CTCH and CUT since the post-war period by the Americans on the first place and Christian Unions next (67). After the coup this drive has been of course stronger, with some success on the part of the Americans, although the Right Wing Social Democrats, were active in the same direction (expecting to achieve an even wider split, including the UP e.g. the 1977 Lima union meeting), but have been unsuccessful. Pinochet on his part, has only managed to promote his union training school, with the backing of the right wing German CD, Strauss. However, the CUT Exterior Committee has won a certain consensus within the SD, CD and Marxist Unions to respect Chilean union independence, ^{and for a wide} solidarity and the channelling of aid only through CUT (which has not always been the case).

However, the Group of Ten search for the AFL-CIO's support is a significant demonstration that the general policies set by CUT and CUB within the non-American union movement, has been a success in broad terms. It has been nevertheless the structuring of the national union bodies within Chile, that has opened the way to the foreign union penetration that has taken place.

On the one hand, Chilean unions need international backing in order to develop their own activities in Chile, both on the financial and the political aspect (the international isolation of Pinochet); on the other hand, foreign links can imply a loss of

(67) "Partidos Políticos, op.cit, Apendice II.

independence. This is especially the case with the American unions, and the Group of Ten seem to be learning the lesson. ^{year} Lastth Americans, after a meeting with Pinochet demanding union rights to be reestablished, they called for the unity of UINTRACH and the Group of Ten in an anti-communist union body. The unity came, but almost became a wider unity, which the Americans would have ^{rather} without any doubt. Anyway the Group of Ten has avoided creating such a body and continues ^{to be} undecided between the wider alliance or their links with their northern 'brothers' (who have just recently let them down on the boycott issue).

11. Problems faced by the Chilean Unions today: An historical approach to the study of their strength and weaknesses.

a. The 'Natural' and Economic conditions.

Chilean workers' ethnic, linguistic and cultural homogeneity, has been an important basis for its social cohesion. This fact was important in the early development of the movement, because it allowed it to be based on its own class experience with the government and the managers, and away from foreign or native subcultural influences (68). It also set the conditions for an important amount of working class literature to develop and reach a common audience.

Moreover, the country's geography, long, thin and flat, facilitated intra-class communication. The geographical distribution of its natural resources played a similar role. In fact, as mineral resources (a basic product in the country's development, especially so during its early days), were spread throughout the country and next to these, port and railroads were set up. The location of the capital of the country in its centre, further facilitated such a communication condition (69), as well as the development of cities and industrial set-ups next to these port and mineral activities (Antofagasta, Santiago-Valparaiso, Concepción-Arauco and Punta Arenas).

(68) "Partidos Políticos", op. cit., "Sectores Obreros", op. cit.. A difference with Argentina for example (See H. Cabello et. al. "Un sindicalismo artesanal", in T. Di Tella et.al., Estructuras Sindicales, Ed. Nueva Vision, Bs.As., 1969) and the USA (See Mario Tronti, "Workers and Capital" in CSE Pamphlet 1, The Labour Process and Class Strategies, London, 1976).

(69) A sharp difference with Bolivian Miners isolationism within a region perhaps correlated with its inability to bargain politically. "Los trabajadores" op.cit.

Mineral extraction set the basis for the development of a strong and relatively modern proletariat and transport workers, as well as produced the basic foreign exchanges that industry needed in order to develop (70). These are basic and permanent features and are the very basis of Chile's union strength. Which are the main structural weaknesses of the Chilean union movement ?

It has been argued that it is their fragile industrial and artisan basis. It was not until the 1930's that industrialisation changed from its weak artisan basis. In fact, between 1907 and 1930, while Mining employed 4% of the labour force, it produced 20% of national income, (71). The more radical Mancomunales were set in the mines in particular, while more moderate "mutuales" were amongst the artisans. The Sociedades de Resistencia were based on the industrial workers and dockers. By 1925, there were 204,000 workers organized in unions and Federations coming from the Mancomunales and Sociedades de Resistencia. Miners represented 25% of the unionized workers. There were also 90,000 Mutualistas (72). The 1929 Crisis seems to have had a deep effect upon the industrial sector; it changed its employment share of the active population from 21% to 15.9% (73). But afterwards and up to 1967, the industrial population had fluctuated in its share of total employment between 18% and 21%, while mining has maintained its 4% level throughout the period (74). However the internal composition of the industrial sector had an important transformation between 1925 and 1967

(70) See Oscar Muñoz, "Crecimiento Industrial en Chile". Universidad de Chile, IEP, 1968 pp. 1-68.

(71) Markos Manalakis, The growth and structure of the Chilean economy. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976) p.15.

(72) "Partidos Políticos", op.cit. Chapter 2.

(73) Ibid.

(74) Sergio Aranda and Alberto Martinez, "Estructura economica: Algunas características fundamentales", in, A. Pinto et. al. Chile Hoy (Mexico; Siglo XXI, 1970) pp. 56-7.

as Table 11 shows.

Table 11. Industrial-artisan relationship, 1925-67 (in percentages)

	1925	1940	1950	1960 (1)	1967 (2)
industrial	29	48	49	54	88
artisan	71	52	51	46	12

Source: (1) Up to 1960, "Sectoros Obreros", op. cit., p.49.
 (2) Calculated by the author, on the basis of the 1967 Industrial Census.

This fact is also correlated with both the decrease of Mining's share in National Income from 20% in 1907-30 period to 8% in 1940 and since fluctuated between 4 and 8%; while industry had steadily increased its national income share to 25-26% in 1955-59 and since has maintained this / weight up to 1972. Therefore the industrial sector has increased its share of national income (75) maintaining it at a relative equal productivity (employment/income relationship) level to Mining and correspondingly has sharply decreased its artisan sector.

But the 1925-1930 period and thereafter, did not only decrease the economic importance of the mining sector and prompted the industrial sector, it also changed the weight of the industrial sector within the union movement, doubling the amount of union members which the miners had by 1967 (although mining had a higher percentage of workers organised within its / , 62% versus 40%) with 75% of those legally allowed to set up unions organized (76).

(75) "The growth", op. cit., and "Estructura económica, Ibid., BCC, Feb. '78, p. 51.

(76) "Memoria del CDN", op. cit. p. 51.

We must also account for the fact that the anarchists, who were the main strength with the Sociedades and had set up Union Councils at various points in time, appeared to be still strong by 1953 (a fact which is not well recognised), during the Unity Congress that set up CUT with 8% of the delegates, and maintaining a 2% influence up to 1962 (77). They were based (as when they started their influence within the union movement) in the industrial sectors, in particular what then became the small industrial unions and an important union support basis for the SP. We must also consider that by today, professional unions, state employees, associations and peasant unions, represent 71% of the unions which are not based in the industrial membership and mining sector (Table 2), and also 80% of the unions (Table 8). These facts, together with our previous analysis, should put the argument about the weakness of industrial plants unions within a broader perspective.

We must also consider that ^{plant} unions are not only a plant based phenomena; even if they are bargaining at that level specifically, they are ^{also} at that very moment bargaining at a 'society level', ^{societal} This is because of the consensus they have achieved at many points in time, ^{which even} holds up today. Those unions bargaining today

(77) "Trayectoria", op. cit., p.333.

locally and by sectors as Daroch, the President of the Chilean Industrialists Association put it recently, do not do so on the basis of their own strength; behind them is the church, the international opinion, the Federations and union bodies speaking out - and before were the parties and congressmen - and even the businessmen who feel that things could suddenly change against them, since workers have been so miserable for the past 5,5 years. A West German union official once said, that at the negotiations table, there were in fact not three but four parties: the Businessmen, the Unions, the Government and the German 'redies' in the East. This is exactly the case in Chile; if not, how can we understand that Pinochet has been giving 'immediate readjustments' of salaries every 4 months since 1973 and that real salaries have been constantly going up, and Marxist Leninist leaders are interviewed by El Mercurio, after only a month ago a decree law called for the imprisonment of those union leaders of non-legal organizations speaking on behalf of their members (and this of course particularly applies to the CNS and the 6 Federation leaders)?

b. Importance and limitations of union organizations at different levels

It has been argued that plant based unions are both the solution for the development of workers radicalism and that they are a basis for apoliticism and "businesslike unions" (78). Here we

(78) See John Humphreys, "Accumulation Class Composition and Class Appliances in Brazil : The Working Class 1950-75". BSA Conference Study Group, London, 26.6.76.; "Desenvolvimento", op. cit.; Elizabeth Jelin. "Espontaneidad y Organizacion en el Movimiento Obrero" CLACSO. 1974. "Orientaciones e ideologias Obreras en A.L. CEDES, 1976; "Huelgas en la Argentina, 1973-1976" CEDES, 1977.

would like to express in Angell's words our own conclusions that in the case of Chile "union leaders seem quite capable of distinguishing between their political beliefs in the long run and their day-to-day union matters; or between the way in which they act on political matters and the way in which they act on economic grounds. If the unions understand the aims of their unions on basically economic grounds, this does not mean that they expect the same behaviour of their Federation, Confederation or their party." (79); not to mention the workers' attitude when the Allende Government was time and again threatened by the businessmen strikes, conspiracies and at the polls (e.g. March 1973). The essential characteristic of the Chilean Unions movement and its strength, (at least under a democratic government), is its high degree of union levels interrelations, with the Parties' meeting the unions in CUT, CNS, and the CUT meeting the unions at the 'Conferencias' and 'Plenarios' (the first one with regional and sectorial union representation, the second with only the latter represented for more medium time and conjunctural objectives) and the unions in particular with their Federations (80). These union bodies grew in power and importance, when Frei was forced to change the constitution and created sectorial bodies of employers, unions and a State representative, autonomous from the Government's control and with decision making power (81).

(79) "Partidos Politicos", op. cit. p.90.

(80) "Trayectoria" op. cit. "Clase Partido"; op. cit.

(81) Jorge Barria, "Historia de la CUT" (Santiago: Ed. PLA, 1971), p.151.

During Allende, these spread to almost every sector of the economy and we have seen that they are in fact active even today. They did not contradict union bargaining at the plant level, but only set a 'minimum level', a most ideal solution to protect both small industries and large plant unions ! The Chilean union movement has never been hung up by legal constraints, as was also the case of workers in Spain and the development of the 'Comisiones Obreras' (82). FOCH was actually non-legal, and so were all of their affiliated unions; most Federations and as many as 2,000 unions by 1963 as well as most strikes carried out throughout the Chilean history have also been of a 'non-legal' nature. The problem of the unions has been knowing when to accept the legal limitations and when to overcome them with new facts (as was the case with the resistance to the Frei administration's drive to divide CUT and impose a compulsory workers saving system, forcing the Government to sign by the end of its ^{acting} period, a national salary readjustment with CUT President/on behalf of all Chilean Workers). In fact, the problem of how to react to the 1925 new Labour Code and its 1931 final version (by which FOCH became virtually illegal) was never clearly attacked by the CP but in a somehow contradictory way. It was the SP, after the overthrow of the Ibañez administration and the "Socialist Republic" that actually 'used' the new legislation to organize legal unions, set up a New Confederation and drive them (together with/by then weak FOCH) into the formation of the CTCH under their control. This same problem is at stake today, after the banning of both non-plant

(82) Interview with national union officials.

unions and also plant based industrial and professional unions and the order to establish (one or more) plant "workers unions". If the political analysis of an almost 'immediate' fall of Pinochet, as has been encouraged by some sectors, is at stake, then no such 'legal' rebuilding drive shall take place. The question is whether FOCH's late 1920s experience is being repeated again. The Portuguese experience of CP penetrating 'official unions' (as Chilean union leaders and party officials did in the 1930s, especially so during the Popular Front) and ended completely controlling it, could well be worthwhile looking at (83).

The other historical problem unions are facing today in very acute terms, is the very weak regional councils' organizations. This is well correlated with the 'centralized' nature of Chilean Economy and Political System and the 'evolutionary' minded struggle the Chilean labour movement has engaged in. It is paying now a price because of the lack of regional union councils, as it did during the Unidad Popular. In fact the "cordones industriales" (although very weak organizations and not the 'Soviets' that many say they were), had to be almost imposed over CUT by the workers 'drive for direct power'. The 'unity problem', we believe, is also very much related to this regional organizational aspect as we have already mentioned. But this was not the case during the Mancomunales, Sociedades de Resistencia, Mutuales and FOCH period, (when unions were 'outside' the Chilean elite's 'democratic' system of the parliamentary regime) ^{when they} set up relatively strong regional bodies.

(83) Interview with national union officials.

And that experience shows that FOCH, with a much more restricted proletarian basis, was tremendously effective ! As is well known, this aspect was sufficiently stressed by Lenin, and in the case of Chile, it does apply to a union and labour movement with the decision to play a hegemonic role in the development of Chilean society.

Finally, the unions stress the importance, both today and historically, of union fees and finances. As a detailed study of this aspect indicates, (84) unions in Chile, due to law restrictions, are very weak financially, an important fact explaining many of their organic development problems, specially so at the sectorial level. The case of the Argentinian unions is a good example of the importance of this issue for the development of a strong union movement especially at the industrial level. The American AFL-CIO could not, at the very end, gain this concession from the Pinochet Government allowing union members to pay fees directly to the Federations, and the Group of Ten, in particular, is most disappointed about this.

c. The Unions 'Unity' problem

A united union movement has been an essential objective of Chilean workers throughout their history, perhaps precisely because they have experienced it, as well as the consequences of losing it. Once again, this is a most important issue today in Chile.

(84) "Afilación y Finanzas", op. cit.

Which are the problems that lead to disunity and the breakdown of the unions' national organizations and which were the conditions for regaining it ? In the case of FOCH, it was the repression and the laws controlling the unions as well as the lack of a clear strategy on how to react to the new labour code (perhaps because the situation was, after all, not very clear indeed !). But also important was the sectarian politics of FOCH, on too many occasions almost identifying the CP and the Union organization. In fact, both the Democrats and Anarchists were constantly 'pushed aside' and consequently only half of the union members belonged to FOCH. (85). There were also political problems of "principles" involved (the Democrats wanted to form a Labour Party, uniting Party and Unions in one single body, and the anarchists rejected Recabarren's participation in Parliament), but this is always the case within a united union body.

Also important was the Anarchists IWW affiliation, but CUT resolved that problem quite swiftly.

CTCH was formed basically because of the appeal and drive of the recently borne SP. They put all their strength into the formation of legal unions and the union body that was to be a hegemonic force in the formation of CTCH. The Dimitrov successful drive to gain consensus within the International about the alliance with the Socialist and SD parties, had its effect in Chile over the re-emerging clandestine CP apparatus and the process of overcoming sectarian politics. Therefore, the

(85) "Partidos Politicos", op. cit.

formation of the "Frente Popular", was also of key importance in CTCH build-up, which took place just a few months after the Front's formation. CTCH included also the Anarchists, but they soon left because of their anti-State and Party principle. The break-down of CTCH was a consequence of its almost identification with the Frente and Government avoiding permanently confronting the government although they had a full participation, - almost as a political party - in the alliance and government. The infights within the SP and between the SP and CP, especially the ex-CP Trotskyites, was a permanent source of tension as were the discussions about continuing or leaving the alliance. The struggle for control on both sides, opened the way for populist and opportunist leaders such as Bernardo Ibañez, who started as a pro-CP within the SP and finished with the Americans and the anti-communist Gonzalez Videla Government. The CP on its part had used internal problems within the SP, to advance for its own sake, in the control of CTCH, in order to participate in the Duhalde Government. The strong repression and legislation which followed with the setting up of the Gonzalez Videla Government, although it affected the CP in particular, it was used to repress left-wing politicians and the unions. Any strong union leader could be accused of being a Communist and removed from his job. At this movement we believe that the role of the white collar (CEPCH) and State employees (JUNECH) unions, played an important role (after reuniting their own unions) in the reunification process that led to the formation of CUT. 'Proletarian' Unions, were too exhausted to play any significant role, because of the infights during the last CTCH period and the repression that followed. They joined in later, also eager to regain a stronger bargaining position that they had lost since the Popular Front Governments, to play their own role within the unity process once and united / having overcome the previous problems of sectarian

politics, to a large extent. Both JUNECH and CEPCH were strong, privileged or State-linked unions, but their membership was going through a general decrease in real wages due to the government's economic policy. Once again, the foundation of this time /new political all-proletarian-front by the SP-CP (Frente del Pueblo) was a significant conditioning of the pro-unity stand of the two CTCH groups. Students from the University of Chile, FECH, helped to support a nationwide movement against the fall in purchasing power, and the Anarchists and SP splinter groups as well as the 'Ibañistas' who were to gain office, joined in the economic struggle which criss-crossed the pro-unity movement. Ibañez himself, after being elected on a popul programme, was expecting to become the Chilean Perón and hoped to gain the unions' support by accepting the formation of CUT.

Therefore we must stress the fact that in both the emergence of CTCH and CUT, the union Federations' own drive for unity was a key factor, although more important in the second case. Federations had emerged as a means to coordinate the relatively dispersed and isolated plant unions, but their own non-legal status as bargaining bodies, pushed them, specially so under a repressive government, to unite because of their own weakness and inability to obtain their own objectives. CUT, up to the coup, maintained its unity, perhaps due to this very fact; on the whole the Federations preferred the greater bargaining power they managed within CUT vis-à-vis the Government, Employers and the Parties (with whom they made specific alliances in order to implement CUT's platform), than the weakness that came associated with independence. Both the Copper Workers and CEPCH left CUT (CEPCH actually left at the end of the pro-unity movement) because they are the strongest sectorial unions of the country, but rejoined again when CUT offered to support ^{their} key demands. This is

not to say that parties played no role, in particular, in the CUT; but that role, we argue, was less significant (as is the case today, we believe) under a repressive Government that disarticulates to an important extent party activity. Allende, supported by a divided SP and a weak and clandestine CP, managed in 1953 to get no more than 3% of the votes, which indicates the limitations of these parties at that stage.

During CUT's 20 years, 5 divisionist drives were stopped:

1) the ones promoted by the CD Government and the American Unions; 2) the ones that came from the more to the left political orientations, who called for an 'unending national strike' in order to bring down the Ibañez and then the Allesandri Governments; 3) the CD call for a milder CUT declaration of principles; 4) the CD critical attitude due to its identification with the Allende Government and the supposedly UP 'control' of the 1972 CUT elections; and 5) the more to the left positions that promoted the local workers' committees "cordones industriales" as autonomous organizations both from the Government and CUT. To all these problems, CUT answered with a high degree of flexibility but only to the extent that the forces behind the breakway were of a significant importance and CUT's autonomy was not threatened, nor did it imply stepping away from its convention strategies.

A more general political problem through^{out} the union movement's existence since FOCH (for 70 years), has been the almost permanent CP control or key directing role within the movement and the reaction and confrontation that its rule has arisen.

In more broader political terms, this brings in the problem of unity and hegemony. On the whole, the CP has managed to direct the union movement up to the very present but still, 'make room

for the interests of others', and promote the unity of the unions as a matter of principle, and generally speaking, has been successful. But as we have previously noticed, this was rather a process than an accomplished fact since the beginning. But time and again the movement has been crushed under CP leadership, including last October's union ban. Therefore the problem of hegemony, consensus and the limits of such consensus, as well as the general strategy has reappeared time over again.

At a more 'union' level, problems have developed with specific strata,^{such} as the white collar workers, the workers of the copper industries, small enterprises and the modern capital intensive plants, with a general ability of the union movement and its different tendencies,^{to} look for the way to avoid breakaways and even gain wider representation. It is, in fact, amazing to attend a "Plenario de Federaciones" (which links the board of CUT and the sectorial unions of the country) for instance, and see how so many different working class strata interests are expressed, each one of them attended, and how a final consensus is arrived at (e.g. "100% pay^{rise},^{the fight for} the d.l. on behalf of the retired workers which has not been signed yet and the support of the copper strikers").

A problem that time and again has come up about the international union affiliation, was solved by allowing each union to affiliate at its will, but CUT remaining independent, with friendly relations with all union international bodies, and promoting Latin American union unity.

d. The Party articulation problem

The relationships of the political parties with the unions are different in each case, as we have already seen. In general, the

b) the pressures from the union movement for the democratization of the political system, e.g. the repeal of the defence of democracy law, the extension of the voting system, nationalization of key resources, the extension of social security and the carrying out of a radical land reform; c) the permanent call for workers' participation in the State apparatus, in the running of the State enterprises and in the key economic agencies of the Government (87).

The different Governments on the contrary, (with the exceptions already mentioned) have systematically, up to today, applied a policy of limiting workers' rights, enforcing bureaucratic control over the unions, repressing them at times including banning ^{setting up} and/parallel unions (Ibañez, Gonzalez, Frei) and finally returning them, as weak as possible, to the local plant ^{for collective bargaining.} proprietors/ They have tried at times to 'incorporate' the unions, but this has lasted no more than a few months (Ibañez, for example). However, it is a well known fact that unions have been systematically unsuccessful in ensuring for themselves a stable basis of participation and power. The reason is, we believe, the contradiction between being a 'power control oriented' union movement and its inability to open a gap within key sectors of society. These facts can well be expressed by the labour movement concept of "obrerismo". It refers to a class sectarian approach, which both reinforces class militancy, identification, ideology and cohesion, as well as frightens possible allies, in particular those who monopolize the means of repression and the intermediate strata of different kinds. The basis of "obrerismo" policies is both a strong class experience and tradition and yet a weak ideological development, that prevents both the development

(87) "Clase, Partido"; "Trayectoria"; Memoria(s) del CDN and "Resoluciones" op. cit. The president of CUT was most critical about CUT complete participation in the UP Government, losing therefore its weight and prestige. (London 1975).

of "class confidence" (away from the fear that the allies will eventually control or corrupt you) and the development of a clear cut strategy that will solve the crucial problems that affect the unions (which in the case of Chile has been a consensus for socialism . See the Memorias of CUT to the different Congresses, the resolutions taken and the UP Government Programme). President Allende used to express this very often in his speeches, "this is the Government of the workers" and, in fact, / ^{his Government programme} was the nearest expression to the CUT consensual will. However the UP Programme called for a wide alliance. This fact and the way out of this problem has been, ^{perhaps} the essential contradiction of the union's strategy and for that matter, of the Chilean labour movement in a broader sense.

This problem could be clearly identified in the set-up of

'committees for looking after production' ('comités de vigilancia de la producción') in the private sector up to the last worker plant. The title of the committees reflects, together with the lack of the participation of small capital, (there are 40,000 plants in the industrial sector only) in the industrial/committees ^{state and unions run (textiles, metal, etc.)} except for collective bargaining purposes, ^{reflects} the underlying "obrerismo" within the Chilean left as a whole. Today, it was again the case as we saw with the 50% general pay rise that all unions were demanding, as was the case with their criticism that the Government was siding itself with the capitalist, (without making any distinction between small and large capital) and at the same time calling for a broad alliance that considered the interests of every sector profoundly affected by the Junta's programme. This point is related to our next discussion.

f. The legal problem, mass struggle and the military correlation of forces.

A special meeting of the Military High Command (all the generals of the 4 branches) with Pinochet a few days before the October Union bannings and the November 2 final date for the negotiations with Argentina, decided these measures "for national security reasons" (e.g. ban the 'internal enemy' in order to confront then the external one). The question is: Would this have happened if the unions and the UP parties had called time before for the workers' independent decision to defend the country's territory if invaded (and only if), irrespective of which course of action the government decided to take? We doubt it. The point to be made here is that parties and unions were just not taking into consideration the military correlation of forces (as the UP Government ^{also} and dramatically showed it). Just a few weeks before this happened, CNS had called (literally) for the overthrow of the Pinochet Government (88). How? With the masses! Unarmed masses can well overthrow a Government, as Iran has so astonishingly demonstrated (and this could well be the case in Chile), but you need in any case, and even more so in such an alternative, a military strategy and programme. None of that was present in any sector of the left during Allende nor today. This has been a historical problem of the Chilean labour movement and unions, including Clotario Blest's tendency, nor the CDT consensus, had anything that resembled such a strategy: the Ibañez or Alessandri's Government would fall as a consequence of a massive, general, non-ending strike, or the Government ^(and power) would ^{be} won by elections. And the military? No reasonable answer was given.

(88) "The Chilean Miners" op. cit.

The answer to this union problem (not to the problem itself, of course) is a very difficult one, because workers and parties' experience with military repression is no isolated phenomena as many have wanted to believe. And yet, the historic tendency of unions and parties has been that one ^{to} wait the 'better weather' to come ^{out} and do whatever is possible in the meantime to change the situation. The military-government alliance has been strong, close and effective in almost every Government in Chile and has been systematically used against the union movement in particular; yet, a more wider-spread mass based struggle was the answer and again no attention was placed on the military - and decisive - level of the political struggle, as Gramsci put it and discovered it during fascism.

However, the 'pacific way' has had its results and it is having it now, but history has demonstrated, that it does not stop, as Allende said. ^{However, it} does come back and today it has come back to Chile like a tremendous snowball and there is no indication that a qualitative change has taken place ^{within the left and the unions' ideological development} in this respect. We do not have a definite explanation to this problem, although it does seem associated with the 'ideological development' problem ^{itself,} which is also at the heart of the "obrerismo" problem.

7. A concluding note: the unity between the historical and present union experience.

Our previous analysis has stressed the continuity of the Chilean union movement, without major breaks, since the mancomunales, sociedades de resistencia, mutuales and FOCH. The problems it has faced, and is facing today, the response of the State, the employers and the workers at large, are also astonishingly common. The question is whether the 'military' lessons of history will

be learnt or if history will continue to be a recurrent phenomena for the Chilean people, workers, unions and parties, because of this 'military/^{ideological}problem'. However, the ability of the Chilean labour movement (and the unions in particular) to solve many of the problems we have analyzed here and to accumulate experience, does indicate that a wider, more prospective analysis can actually be undertaken in order to also tackle this problem. The development of Union's Technical Commissions at different sectorial and regional levels, or technical consultant bodies, whose services they may demand, can well help in the solution of this problem and other political and technical problems and at the same time have organic bodies such as these where class and party can meet. But in this case, they would meet 'in the class' (and not in the party's union commission or department) and for the sake of the political development ^{of the unions} and ^{their} response to the country's most important economic and political problems.

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