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THE CHILEAN COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE
THIRD UNDERGROUD PERIOD.-

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Tab. 1

Estimates of Communist Parties size, by country (Latin A.)

| <u>Country</u> | <u>1959</u> | <u>1963</u> | <u>1966</u> | <u>1969</u> | <u>1973</u> |
|----------------|------------------|------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Argentina | 70-80.000 | 40-50.000 | 60.000 | 60.000 | 70.000 |
| Bolivia | 4.000 | 4- 5.000 | 4.000 | 4.000 | 1.500 |
| Brasil | 50.000 | 30.000 | 20.000 | 15.000 | 6.000 |
| Chile | 20-25.000 | 25-30.000 | 30.000 | 45.000 | 120.000 |
| Colombia | 5.000 | 10-12.000 | 10.000 | 8.000 | 10.000 |
| Costa Rica | 300 ¹ | 300 ¹ | 450 | 600 | 1.000 |
| Ecuador | 1.000 | 2-3.000 | 1.000 | 750 | 750 |
| El Salvador | 1.000 | 500 | 200 | 200 | 125 |
| Guatemala | 1.200 | 1.300 | 1.000 | 750 | 750 |
| Honduras | 400 | 2.000 | 1.000 | 300 | 300 |
| Mexico | 5.000 | 3.000 | 5.000 | 5.000 | 5.000 |
| Nicaragua | 200 | 2-300 | 200 | 200 | 100 |
| Panama | ----- | 3-500 | 500 | 250 | 500 |
| Paraguay | 500 | 3-4.000 | 5.000 | 5.000 | 3.500 |
| Peru | 6.000 | 8-9.000 | 2.000 | 2.000 | 2.000 |
| Uruguay | 5.000 | 10.000 | 15.000 | 21.000 | 22.000 |
| Venezuela | 40.000 | 30.000 | 10.000 | 5.000 | 8.000 |

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Title:

The Chilean Communist party (PCCh) and the third underground period (1973-1980).

Introduction:

The Chilean Communist party was the strongest in Latin America, after the Cuban one, and a very important force in Chilean politics until the coup d'Etat of 1973 (tab 1). The object of this essay is to analyse its third underground period (1), considering its analysis of the Allende's experiment and the defeat of 1973; the party's structure in Chile, in exile and its leadership; considering also the latest development in its political strategy.

(1) The first underground period is dated between 1927-1931 during the first Ibañez government. The second, between 1948-1958, when the Radical government of Gonzalez Videla (elected with the support of the Communists) launched the "Ley Permanente en defensa de la Democracia". The PCCh emerged within legality in 1958.

Source: U.S. Department of State, World Strength of the Communist Party organizations (Washington, D.C., 1960-1964-1967-1970-1974), in Williams E. Ratliff, Castroism and Communism in Latin America, 1959-1976, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington D.C., Hoover Institution on WAR, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University Press, 1976, p.58.

1- The PCCh' analysis of the Popular Unity Experiment.

"Our defeat has been the expression of the isolation of the working class. This produced the victory of the country-revolution in the struggle for power. This means that more than a military defeat, it was a political one" (2). This was the first official document of the PCCh in relation to the analysis of what happened during the Allende's years and the reasons of his defeat. It is certainly true that the coup of 1973 represented a political defeat of a political strategy that was basically implemented by the PCCh. The coup ended twenty one years in which the PCCh worked and struggled for the realization of its political project based on three assumptions: a) the formation of a broad alliance of all progressive forces under the hegemonic role of the working class and the Communist and Socialist parties. b) a programme of transition. c) A political process carried out by the "peaceful road". If we synthetize these three assumptions ^{there} is no doubt that the PCCh achieved the first two; the victory in the elections of September 1970 with a coalition of different political forces and a programme that was looking towards socialist transformations. The alliance of the left started in 1952 with 55.000 votes and nearly won the election in 1957. In 1970, after the defeat of 1964, the Popular Unity was elected to power with the first Socialist President in the history of Chile. But, in the space of three years, the organized labour movement and the political system of Chile collapsed under the invention of the Armed Forces.

We will try to analyse the PCCh' views of that defeat. From the official documents of the Communists we could summarize their analysis as follows:

- a- The U.S. intervention in Chile (1970-1973)
- b- The absence of a united directive among Popular Unity:
 - 1- The extremism of the M.I.R. and its influence on the Socialist party.
 - 2- The non agreement with the Christian Democratic Party.

(2) Cfr. René Castillo (member of the Political Commission of the PCCh), "Chile: enseñanzas y perspectivas de la revolución", in Documentos oficiales del Partido Comunista de Chile emitidos en Santiago después del golpe militar fascista, pp.120-121

- c- The lack of a defensive apparatus with which to fight the coup d'Etat.

- a- The U.S. intervention in Chile (1970-1973).

There is evidence of the U.S. involvement in Chile during the Allende's years, in the activity of destabilising the Popular Unity government. But the intervention of the U.S. was not a direct one, nor a military one. There was U.S. intervention but was certainly not the most important element in the defeat of Allende. Unless there is direct military intervention the reason for the defeat of a regime in a particular country must be found within the political forces of that country and their actions in the class's struggle. Plus the role of the Armed Forces, and their degree of intervention in politics, particularly in Latin America. This does not mean that the U.S. intervention in Chile was not considerable (3), but it was not the most important reason for the coup, as some Chilean politicians suggest.

According to the PCCh more important was the symbiosis between the U.S. imperialism and the reactionay forces of Chile: "the succes of the coup of September has been possible because imperialism and the reactionary forces achieved a broad front against the popular government. From a Class point of view, this front included, apart from the monopolistic bourgeoisie and the agrarian oligarchy (that represented the reactionary center), the majority of the middle class. From a political point of view, apart from the reactionary parties, the golpistas had the support of the majority of the Christian democratic party led by Eduardo Frei (..). From a military point of view, the enemy had the support of the majoriry of the Armed Forces and Carabineros and thus prevented the defence of the democratic regime" (4). According to the PCCh it was possible to defeat the imperialistic intervention depending on the degree of agreements that Popular Unity could have reached with some sectors of the Chilean political arena, particularly with the Chistian Democratic party. This argument has been and still is

(3) Cfr. ITT-CIA: Subversion in Chile, Spokesman books, 1972, The Bertrand Russel Foundation Ltd.

(4) Cfr. René Castillo, "Chile: enseñanzas y perspectivas de la revolución", in op. cit. p. 122.

motive of debate within the Chilean left.

b- The absence of a united directive among Popular Unity.

All the leaders of the PCCh and of the other political parties of Popular Unity agree that "one of the most important factors of the defeat was the absence of unity (in tactics and strategies) between its political forces; the absence, therefore, in crucial moments of a united directive of the revolutionary process"⁽⁵⁾.

It is very difficult to achieve a high degree of unity in an alliance where different political forces are taking part, with their consequent different ideological approaches. From 1957, there are within the left alliance two political projects. Although they aim at the same result (the construction of a Socialist society), their strategies and tactics to achieve it are different. This presence of two conceptions within the revolutionary process, represents, according to the PCCh, the most important reason for the defeat of 1973. The absence of a more united directive was expressed by two tendencies:

1- the role played by the extreme left ⁽⁶⁾ and its influence among popular Unity. 2- the manifestation of mistakes of derecha.

(5) Cfr. Volodia Teitelboim (member of the Political Commission of the PCCh and one of its historical leaders), interview, Rome, April 1976. Already in July 1974, René Castillo in his article (now official document of the party) expressed the same concept: "The popular movement and the political parties of Popular Unity recognize that one of the clues to our defeat has been the absence of a united directive of the revolutionary process able to carry out a policy of principles in order to avoid mistakes of izquierda and derecha" (Cfr. René Castillo, "Chile: enseñanzas y perspectivas de la revolución", in op. cit. p. 112).

(6) Cfr. PCCh, El ultraizquierdismo caballo de Troya del imperialismo Santiago, Noviembre 1975. This official document, because of the hard line against the M.I.R. (Movimiento de izquierda revolucionaria) and its influence in the Socialist Party (according to the PCCh), provoked a strong reaction in the left.

1- The PCCh, when referring to the ultraizquierda means the MIR in particular, and the aims of this political group to represent a "revolutionary pole" that could have changed the reformist policies of Popular Unity dominated by the Communist Party. "One of the reasons that led to the problem of a united directive has been the permanent (...) attempt against the Communist-Socialist unity and the Popular Unity, carried out by the ultraleft in order to implement a "revolutionary pole" with a clear anticommunist definition. This position has some influence in the Socialist party"⁽⁷⁾.

According to the PCCh this tendency conceived dogmatic positions; for example; to consider as enemies, all the social sectors that were not proletarian or semi-proletarian. This approach isolated the working class and pushed the middle class towards the front of the opposition. "The ultraleftist elements implemented (during the Allende's government) a primitive policy of confrontation with small industrialists by expropriating their factories, without taking into account their sizes"⁽⁸⁾, and this action contributed to creating enemies and isolating the working class and the government. This argument has some degree of truth. There is no doubt that by expropriating the small latifundios and factories, these political positions created fear and panic among the small producers, who found the only means of regaining or retaining their small properties by joining the big companies and landowners in their struggle against Allende. It is also true that these kind of actions had considerable support among a sector of the Socialist party.

The same differences were present in other central issues during the last two years of Allende: i.e. the relation with the armed forces and the conception of the State in general. The PCCh maintained a more moderate approach in order not to create the conditions for a break of the "constitutionality" that could give space to an intervention by the armed forces. While the PS and other political sectors maintained their conviction that the bourgeoisie State should be replaced, by creating an alternative poder popular.

(7) Cfr. René Castillo, "Chile: enseñanzas y perspectivas de la revolución", in op. cit. p. 113.

(8) Ibid.

Although this idea was present in the programme of Popular Unity, the interpretation of the PCCh and PS were quite different. The poder popular was conceived as an alternative to the bourgeoisie State, an embryo of the future orientated State. Essential structures were to be the Cordones industriales, Comandos comunales, Consejos campesinos. The Socialist Party and other political groups supported this interpretation.⁽⁹⁾ The question was, was there in Chile in 1972-73, a situation favourable enough so as to present these structures (areas' organizations of factory workers, peasants, surrounding the major cities)⁽¹⁰⁾ as the starting point of a new form of organization of the State. The Communist party conceived the poder popular differently; Luis Corvalán declared that the PCCh "supported the Cordones industriales, Consejos Campesinos, Comandos comunales, but we believe that these (new) organizations (...) cannot be conceived and orientated in opposition to the government of Allende (...) nor could they be considered alternative organizations of other structures of the people"⁽¹¹⁾. According to the PCCh they should not have been an alternative of power, but an integrated structure of the State itself. From these interpretations could be deduced that the PCCh feared that a more substantial recognition of these popular structures could produce a negative repercussion on the CUT, undermining its role, and creating a nonguided mass movement that the PCCh was determined to prevent, in order to continue in controlling and guide, according to its policies, the masses. The more radical conceptions of the Socialist Party, MIR and MAPU contributed, according to the PCCh's analysis, to the hostile reaction from the centre-right parties, and the Christian Democratic party in particular, thus creating a vacuum between Popular Unity and the middle class resulting in the progressive isolation of the government. This dual conception had great significance on the relation between Popular Unity and the Christian Democratic party.

(9) Cfr. Alain Touraine, Vida y Muerte del Chile Popular, Ed. Siglo XXI, Mexico, p.13.

(10) Cfr. Alan Angell, Political Mobilization and Class Alliances in Chile: 1970-1973, "Institute for The New Chile", Rotterdam, Holland, 1980, p.45.

(11) Cfr. Luis Corvalán, interview, "Chile Hoy", No. 43, April 1973.

On the issue of a possible collaboration between the left and the centre-right parties, there were already in 1957 substantial differences between the PCCh and the PS. In fact, one of the conditions put forward by the Socialists in order to form the alliance (FRAP), was the exclusion of any non-left party, while the PCCh was in favour of an alliance between the left and the progressive political forces. During Popular Unity this problem had been a crucial one. In the PCCh' analysis, the non-alliance with the Christian Democratic party lies with the ultraizquierda, particularly because they condemned any compromise and alliance⁽¹²⁾. According to the PCCh the ultraizquierda considered the CDP to be a reactionary party, without taking into account the complexity of this political force, and a possible alliance with it. Certainly the importance the PCCh gives to the ultraizquierda, as one of the most important reasons of the defeat of Popular Unity, is the result of the failure of an agreement with the Christian Democratic Party, and more in general, of its failure to contain the revolutionary process within the limit of the bourgeoisie "constitutionality". We believe that this approach is not valid for two reasons:

- a) because the MIR as a political movement did not have the force to influence the Popular Unity strategy.
- b) because the actions described by the PCCh as positions of ultraizquierda did not determine the "constitutional break". It seems to us that the real target of the famous document (El Ultraizquierdismo caballo de Troya...) was not the MIR, but the Socialist party. And on this respect, there should be an analysis (by the PCCh) on the relations with the Socialist party, not on the basis of responsibility to this or the other group, but as a revision of their relation as the hegemonic force within Popular Unity. The absence of a united directive should be found within the alliance and not outside in order to accuse ^{this} of that party of political adventurism and extremism. In focusing the attention of the ultraizquierda; the PCCh eludes other central issues that determined the defeat of 1973.

(12) Cfr. René Castillo, "Chile: enseñanzas y perspectivas de la revolución", in op. cit. p. 114-115. Also Gladys Marín (member of the Political Commission of the PCCh), "La clase obrera y su política de alianzas", in Los 1000 días de revolución, Ed. Internacional "Paz y Socialismo", Praga, 1978, pp. 101-102.

2- According to the PCCh, the absence of a more united directive of the revolutionary process was not only the result of the ultraizquierda, but also of mistakes of the derecha. The PCCh stated that "often such deviations come from the same political and social sectors". These deviations were evident on the issue of the excessive demands of some sectors of the working class. Instead of concentrating on the issue of power, these sectors, influenced by the ultraleft stressed a policy of demands. The struggle to increase production should have been, according to the PCCh, the main task of the government. Instead, "the leaders of the ultraleft stated that the problem of the economy and production were not so important in the class struggle, and that it was responsibility of the big capitalists to increase production"⁽¹³⁾. This kind of position increased the disorientation of the working class and consequently the already serious economic problem of the government, as result of the "U.S. imperialism and the national bourgeoisie"⁽¹⁴⁾.

Emerging from this analysis, there are some considerations to be made. For example: the fact that the responsibility for non-agreement with the Cristian Democratic party was not only the result of the "ultraleft positions" but also of the non-willingness of an agreement from the CDP itself. If it is correct to assert that the triumph of the Popular Unity was mainly the success of the Communist strategy, why doesn't the PCCh consider in more depth its role and failure? Unfortunately in politics it is not possible to act in accordance with a scale of tasks or stages in carrying out a revolutionary strategy; sometimes there is the necessity to change, the urgency of reacting quickly to circumstances that the original political strategy did not contemplate. Here is where the PCCh failed: in adapting its original project to new situations. For example, when it was clear that the agreement with the CDP had no future, particularly in the summer of 1973, the PCCh still continued to pursue it. Or, when it was clear too, particularly after the attempted coup of June 1973, that the Army was preparing to overthrow Allende, the PCCh still insisted in its slogan, "no a la guerra civil". In general terms its failure lies

(13) Cfr. René Castillo, "Chile: enseñanzas y perspectivas de la revolución", op. cit. p. 117.

(14) On this Cfr. Chap. IV of our research in progress.

in the determination to implement and support the same tactical and strategical objectives, when the dialectic of the revolutionary process required a change of direction. In particular it was clear that the next objective of Popular Unity was not the next Presidential elections (1976), but to find a solution for its immediate survival. The social and political process run ahead of the political strategy pursued by the Communists and Allende.

c- The lack of a defensive system of the Allende government. One of the striking aspects of the coup was the absence of an effective resistance from the political parties on the left. No serious attempt to defeat the military was possible, particularly because of the preparedness of the left. But, most important because of the isolation of the government's positions among the military (with the exception of an handful of senior generals, already isolated from the Command, like Carlos Prats). There is no doubt, that in spite of the previous attempt by the military in June, the Popular Unity did not organize itself for a possible resistance. This is an issue that unites (at least) all the parties of the Chilean left; particularly important for the PCCh being the main force committed to the "peaceful road". Although the PCCh asserts that they had an armed apparatus (a modest one), it was certainly committed to the "peaceful road" as the only realistic strategy for Chile at the time. Luis Corvalán (General Secretary of the PCCh from 1957), asserts that at the moment of the coup the PCCh had around one thousand militants able to use arms, and some had military training on armed tactics and strategies. Another two thousands were able to use arms as a means of personal defense⁽¹⁵⁾. The other forces of the left, particularly the MIR and the Socialist party, also had some degree of armed preparation. But obviously, against an Army there was no chance of combat. While the Socialist party and the MIR stated the necessity of "arming the masses", the PCCh maintained that only through constitutional means was it possible to defend the government; i.e. isolation of the reactionary forces, alliance with the Christian Democratic party, support

(15) Cfr. Luis Corvalán, "La revolución Chilena, la dictadura fascista y la lucha para derribarla y crear una nueva democracia", in El Pleno de Agosto 1977, op. cit. pp.29-30.

from the democratic wing of the Army. "The decisive aspect, in the defence of the revolution, is the Armed Forces, and in general terms the relation of forces at the militar level. The possibility of all revolutionary roads to succeed (...) has to go through this problem"⁽¹⁶⁾. In relation to this issue, why did the Armed Forces not defend the constitutional government of Allende, the PCCh find the origins in two problems: a) the absence of a correct policy from the Popular Unity towards the Army. For example: "There was an impression given that the government used the military only in specific political circumstances" and not as an attempt to integrate the Army in the national process of installing an advanced democracy"⁽¹⁷⁾. b) The Armed Forces were alarmed by the attempt of the MIR, MAPU and PS to infiltrate its rank and file. More in general, the PCCh asserts that "in the relation between the UP and Armed Forces wrong conceptions predominated(...). We refer to the belief that the Armed Forces were different (in Chile), that they would be subordinated to the civil powers"⁽¹⁸⁾.

The PCCh believe that only an integration of the Armed Forces in the process of political changes could have meant a different role for them. Today the PCCh is working on a strategy that would divide the military. It will be interesting if it achieves such a division, in order that a sector can take part in the struggle of the popular movement⁽¹⁹⁾. So far there are no signs of it.

(16) Cfr. Jorge Insunza (member of the political Commission of the PCCh), "Las dialecticas de las vias revolucionarias", in Los 1000 días de la revolución, op. cit. p.83. On this issue, an interesting study is that by Pedro Rodriguez (another member of the political Commission of the PCCh), "El problema de la defensa del poder Popular", in op. cit. p. 106-119.

(17) Cfr. Luis Corvalán, op. cit. pp 27-28. The role of the army in an advanced political project has been considered in an interesting paper by Jorge Arrate (one of the leaders of the Socialist party), Seguridad Nacional y política democrática, Institute for the new Chile, Rotterdam, Holland, 1980.

(18) Cfr. Luis Corvalan, op. cit.

(19) Cfr. Sergio Rojas (a Communist leader underground in Chile), "La releación entre la línea política y la política militar del movimiento Popular", in "Boletín del Exterior", Noviembre-Diciembre 1980, n.44, pp. 47-61.

In our opinion, the analysis by the PCCh in relation to the Allende's years is not satisfactory. More than an analysis of the defeat of September 1973, it is an attempt a posteriori, to justify its policies during that period. Basically it says: if we should have done like we proposed things could have gone better. Now, if it is correct to assert that the defeat of Popular Unity was basically the end of a political strategy mainly supported by the Communist party, sure there must be some kind of motives of new analysis, critics to that strategy beyond the ultraizquierda, and the non-alliance with the Christian Democratic party. What it is strange is the insistence of the PCCh in defending its policies and in reversing the responsibilities of the defeat on other political forces. Because it is common within the traditional Communist parties to have suddenly changes in their strategies, we may have in the future a different approach on these issues.

2.- The organizational structure: Chile-exile.

While the Socialist party did not unite its rank and file after the coup, the PCCh looks more united than ever (so its militants and official documents claim). Although there has been a debate in the party regarding the rigid structure and the political strategy emerged in 1977, the PCCh seems the better organized party of the Chilean left, particularly in Chile⁽²⁰⁾. Particularly because in the first period of the coup the PCCh gave the political directive to its militants to retreat and save the organization, "because it was not right to throw all forces in an equal struggle"⁽²¹⁾. Looking back the PCCh and the other parties of the left had no chance at all to defeat the military. A different political directive (fight the military as the MIR suggested) would have meant political suicide. If we want to understand why the PCCh survived the strong and permanent repression we have to take into account this direc-

(20) Cfr. Luis Corvalán, "Discurso emitido en la Conferencia Regional de Suecia", Taller Ricardo Fonseca, London, ano II, p.11, on the debate following the Pleno of 1977, cfr. Carlos Marino, interview, London, 22/12/1980 and Pedro Gonzalez, interview, Rome, 3/8/1980. Both names are assumed names of Communist militants.

(21) René Castillo, "Chile: enseñanzas y perspectivas de la revolución", in op. cit. p. 122-123. Also L. Corvalan, op. cit. p. 34.

tive. The other parties of the left, because of their different internal structure were, during the first months of the coup, almost crushed. This does not mean that the PCCh did not suffer from the repression, quite the contrary. For example six members of the Central Committee were killed by the military during the first period of the coup, and eleven have been arrested and now are desaparecidos⁽²²⁾. Another six who died of natural causes mainly because of their ages, they did not survive the illegal situation or the difficult conditions of exile⁽²³⁾. Only two thirds of the Central Committee of 1973 are alive. It is very difficult to establish how many Communist militants died during the coup, or have been in jail. The PCCh asserts that "thousands of militants have been killed, in jail or are in exile". Certainly the Junta severely repressed it, but did not manage to destroy it. This means that a new generation of young cadres is directing the party underground, particularly because most of its well known leaders were arrested or sent into exile.

In terms of its organizational structure in the conditions of underground we can distinguish two periods: from 1973 to 1976 and from 1977 up to now. The first is the period in which the party tried to adapt its structures to the new circumstances of

(22) There are around 2.500 desaparecidos. They have been arrested and no one knows if they are alive, dead, or where. Among the desaparecidos are Exquiel Ponce, Ricardo Lagos and Carlos Lorca, head of the Socialist party underground apparatus until 1976 (Cfr. "Latin America", 1976, vol.X, n. 43, p. 338). According to the United Nations Commission for Refugees there are around one million Chileans into exile, both for political and economic reasons. In Europe are the more politicized ones, 18.500 (Cfr. "Latin America", 1977, vol. XI, n.23, p. 180).

(23) Members of the Central Committee of the PCCh killed are: Isidoro Castillo-Enrique Paris-David Miranda-Alberto Molina-Juan Lopez-Marta Ugarta. Members desaparecidos are: Victor Diaz (Vice-General Secretary of the party and head of the underground apparatus until 1976) -Mario Zamorano-Uldarico Donaire- Jorge Muñoz-José Weibel-Fernando Ortiz-Jaime Donato-Fernando Navarro-Bernardo Araya-Cesar Cerda-Manuel Vargas. Another six died of natural causes: Pablo Neruda-Oscar Astudillo- Hector Corvalan-Eugenio Vallejas-Luis Figueroa (former President of the Central Unica de Trabajadores). Cfr. PCCh, El Pleno de Agosto 1977..., op. cit. p. 3.

illegality, and to organize an illegal apparatus, that did not exist before the coup, in order to preserve the cadres and prepare itself for a long term battle. As in 1948 the Communists adopted the same policy and once again the conditions were not favourable for a frontal attack against the military⁽²⁴⁾. Principally, after the coup the PCCh maintained a more rigid structure based on the cell-system. Vertically organized so that the militants are isolated from each other and their contact is maintained by the leader of each cell. In order to avoid treason the party isolates a militant from the organization for a certain period, once he has been in jail, to make sure he is not followed by the secret political police⁽²⁵⁾.

The major crisis in the underground apparatus was in 1976, when almost the entire Dirección of the party was arrested, it seems because a militant of the Youths organization talked under torture. After the arrest of the General Secretary, Luis Corvalán, in October 1973, this was the major setback for the PCCh. The party remained for a short period with only a few member of the Dirección who survived the arrest. But, when Victor Diaz was captured the major task of the illegal apparatus was to try and reorganize an affective organization, and this task was almost accomplished. The party was well organized and even the arrest of the head of the illegal apparatus proved that only through treason of one of its members could the military reach the Dirección of the PCCh. And, because of its rigid and vertical structure the arrests did not allow the military to touch the rest of the underground apparatus. The new leaders of the PCCh in Chile (after 1976) are not known for security reasons. But they certainly are young cadres, unknown before the coup. In fact almost all the distinguished leaders of the PCCh are dead, desaparecidos or in exile⁽²⁶⁾.

(24) Cfr. Ernest Halperin, Nationalism and Communism in Chile, the M.I.T. Press, 1965

(25) Cfr. Carlos Marino, interview, op. cit.

(26) The Dirección of the underground apparatus of the PCCh before 1976 was composed as follows: Victor Diaz-Mario Zamorano (it seems he was the author, under the name of René Castillo, of the famous official document, "Chile: enseñanzas y perspectivas de la revolución") - Uldarico Donaire - José Weibel - Jorge Muñoz - and (...). Cfr: PCCh, El Pleno de Agosto de 1977..., op. cit.p.79.

The sector of the party in exile presents a different situation. They are organized in cells and vertically divided in Regionales. There operate, the section of the Central Committee and a Comité Directivo and all the structures that the party had before the coup. The contacts between Chile-Underground and exile are maintained by the members of the political commission, Comité Directivo and some members of the Central Committee (tab. 1)⁽²⁷⁾. The General Secretary, Luis Corvalán, after his release⁽²⁸⁾, lives in the Soviet Union, where the Centro Exterior of the party is established. The activity of the sector of the PCCh in exile has two specific tasks: organising the solidarity campaign and financing the underground apparatus in Chile, and secondly, preparing the sessions of the Central Committee, to guarantee the security of its members when they travel to take part in the meeting with the rest of the leadership in exile. It is understood that the Socialist countries play a major role in this last procedure, particularly Cuba and the Soviet Union. One of the interesting aspects is how the two centres of the party operate (underground-Chile and exile). What kind of contacts and continuity is there. At the moment it is impossible to know, for security reasons, and because the Communist do not talk on this question.

(27) The leadership of the Communist party in exile is: Luis Corvalán (General Secretary)- Volodia Teitelboim (responsible of the PCCh organization in exile until the release of Corvalán in 1976) - Orlando Millas (former Ministry of Allende and economic expert of the party) - Jorge Insunza (most people suggest he could be the next General Secretary) Gladys Marín (former General Secretary of the Juventudes Comunistas). Other well known leaders are: José Cademartori - Luis Guatafino-Jorge Montes.

(28) Luis Corvalán was released in December 1976, in exchange of the Soviet dissident Vladimir Bukovsky (Cfr. "Latin America", 1976, vol. X, n.50, p. 393.

- 3- The PCCh' programme for the future Chilean Democratic system: a) Character of the system and political alliances.
b) Programme.

In the context of the Chilean political situation the important question today is: what kind of strategy and programme should Popular Unity implement in Chile in order to re-establish a democratic regime? In our specific approach, what political strategy is the PCCh elaborating for the future? It is interesting to note how, even in direct political circumstances, the debate within the Chilean left regarding the programme and class-alliances is concentrated on the same basic issues that divided the left not only during the Allende period, but from the start of the alliance. Now more than ever, there is a need for a new approach and new conceptions. But, it is sometimes depressing to realize that within the left there is not an abandonment (or the reformulation) of the past issues. For example: the left and a possible alliance with the Christian Democratic party. Again the two main forces of the left, Communists and Socialists, are facing this issue with past points of view and arguments. Another point of disagreement is the character of the future political system that will replace the present fascist one. These old disputes, even if producing an interesting debate, do not contribute to create a new image of the left, particularly in Chile. The Chilean people are tired of listening to the same arguments discussed by the same political leaders. Now, more than ever, because of the political circumstances in Chile, it is necessary that the left abandons the old disputes and divisions and launches a consistent movement and class alliances in order to gain the confidence and support of the Chilean people. This is important if they are to have a chance of replacing the present fascist regime of Pinochet.

We will concentrate on the programme launched by the PCCh and discuss the issues on which there exist disagreement within the left.

- a) Character of the system and political alliances.

The central question on which the programme of the PCCh is based, is that this party does not intend to replace Pino-

chet with "the formation of a Socialist State nor of a typically bourgeoisie one. In other words the dilemma is not fascism or bourgeoisie democracy. What it is needed is a new democratic, popular, national regime, which would favour and promote changes arising from the objective needs of social progress"⁽²⁹⁾. This conception of a progressive democracy as a stage between the bourgeoisie State and the Socialist one is a project that the PCCh carried out from the early 1950's, with its elaboration of an "anti-imperialistic, anti-oligarchic, anti-feudal revolution", under the political directive of a Frente de Liberación Nacional⁽³⁰⁾. In the approach proposed by the General Secretary of the PCCh, Luis Corvalán, the guidelines are to be found in the 1950's.

The proposed new democracy by the Communists is different, for example, from the Socialist party's (the pro-Almeyda one)⁽³¹⁾ strategy of a Bloque por el Socialismo, in which it states that

(29) Luis Corvalán, Our democratic project, Taller Ricardo Fonseca, London, año II, 1979, p.1.

(30) On the emergence, during the 1950's of this strategy, Cfr. Carmelo Furci, The Chilean Communist party (PCCh) and the origins of its political project (1951-1956), "Institute for the new Chile", Rotterdam, Holland, 1980.

(31) The Socialist party had suffered a serious crisis in 1979. At the moment it seems there is the existence of two groups, one under the leadership of Clodomiro Almeyda and the other one under the leadership of a new General Secretary (but in order to place its political positions, we can say that at the moment of the split was under the leadership of Carlos Altamirano), (Cfr. "Le Monde", 28/4/1979, and 5/5/1979). It seems, at the origin of the crisis there were some basic political discrepancies: A) Conception of the party's role and apparatus. While the pro-Altamirano PS states that the party organization should operate in such a way as to maintain a pluralism of debate and tendencies; the pro-Almeyda supported the need to have an homogeneous party, with a strict internal discipline, almost a "Communist style" organization that produced many critics. b) Election and promotion of cadres to senior posts. The majority of the Central Committee of the PS was in Chile, and new senior posts and responsibilities were assigned to young cadres in order to replace the militants who were arrested or forced into exile. According to the pro-Altamirano PS, the leaders of the Central Committee in Chile elected members that were hostile to Altamirano's positions in order to create a majority that could replace him; as it happened, (Cfr. "Chile-America", Dossier, n.53-54, Rome, 1979). The PCCh position has been contradictory (Cfr. Declaración del Partido Comunista de Chile, 18/5/1979, in "Boletín del exterior", n.36, p.100.

the struggle against the military dictatorship must be contained within the struggle of constructing a Socialist society, denying the validity of a policy that considers a stage in between, but considering it as one process. "El Bloque por el Socialismo, is not stated as an attempt to create a partido unico, but basically as a mass movement around (...) a common democratic programme, socialist orientated that allows the accumulation of forces in order to defeat fascism and develop democracy in Chile. And, as only one process, to create favourable conditions for the final establishment of Socialism in our country"⁽³²⁾. The differences in approaches are evident. In relation to the class and political alliances, the PCCh has been proposing again a strategy on the basis of a broad alliance of the political and social forces opposing the fascist regime. To reconstruct the democratic system "it is necessary to bring about the reunion of all anti-fascist forces, of all non-fascist ones, civil, military, marxist, lay and Christian"⁽³³⁾. May be the only novelty is the inclusion of the "democratic sector" of the Armed Forces. The PCCh states: "We believe that the soldiers, junior officers and not only a few senior officers, can and must use their experience and knowledge to the institutions of national defence in the future, under a new democratic regime"⁽³⁴⁾. The PCCh was in favour of the formation of a Frente Antifascista that should achieve the defeat of the military dictatorship, the disruption of the totalitarian State and the construction of a new State of Law, democratic, antifascist, national, popular and pluralist⁽³⁵⁾. The central issue in this strategy is the alliance with the Christian Democratic party. From the formation of the alliance of the left in 1952 and particularly with the emergence of the FRAP in 1956, the relations between the left and the center right parties have been an issue on which the left argued for a long time. In fact already in 1956 the PCCh' and PS' strategies (Frente de Liberación Nacional and Frente de Trabajadores)

(32) Cfr. Clodomiro Almeyda, Carta publica, Octubre, 1979, p.20

(33) Luis Corvalán, op.cit. p.58

(34) Ibid, p. 22

(35) Cfr. PCCh, Al Partido y al pueblo de Chile, official document, Santiago de Chile, Diciembre 1974, inc op.cit.p.177.

had to face this problem. In 1956 the PS' strategy (non-alliance with political forces outside the left) prevailed, mainly because the PCCh was still underground and played a less important role than the PS. In fact the FRAP was made up of left-wing political forces only. But, with the formation of Popular Unity in 1969, and the inclusion of the Radical party and MAPU (at the time this last party left the CDP) the less class-orientated policies of the PCCh prevailed. This was mainly because of the progressive division (around its political strategy) of the Socialist party and the more left-orientated strategy of the Radicals.

During Popular Unity the PCCh sought an alliance with the Christian Democratic party, but failed. a) because of the progressive right-wing domination in the leadership of the CDP⁽³⁶⁾; and b) because of the opposition of Socialist Party and other political force inside Popular Unity⁽³⁷⁾.

Today, according to the PCCh, this issue is fundamental, "from the point of view of the contribution of political parties to unity, the main issue is the alliance with the CDP"⁽³⁸⁾. While in the Socialist forces (or at least in majority of it) there is a less favourable approach.

Certainly the CDP could not accept an alliance with the left if the latter is to implement policies aiming at a Socialist orientated society after defeating the military. It seems there is some kind of agreement between Popular Unity and the CDP on the need to replace Pinochet with some kind of provisional government, but how, and what will happen after, it is difficult to imagine, particularly for the non-definitive positions of the CDP.

But the alliance is more complicated in terms of a long one. The left and the CDP have different ideologies and international links, thus different programme, and different conceptions on the means by which to achieve the defeat of the military. It is difficult to foresee a strategic (rather than tactical) alliance, as the PCCh may suggest and intend.

(36) Cfr. Luis Badilla Morales, La via Cilena e i Cristiani rivoluzionari, Coines, Rome, 1974.

(37) A good analysis on the relation between Popular Unity and the Christian Democratic party is provided by Ricardo Israel in his paper La Unidad Popular y la Democracia Cristiana, Institute for the New Chile, Rotterdam, Holland, 1980.

(38) Cfr. Luis Corvalán, La revolución Chilena....., op.cit.p.59.

b) Programme.

The session of the Central Committee of the PCCh in August 1977 was an historical one; a) because it was the first to follow the coup d'Etat, b) for the analysis of the Popular Unity period, and c) because the PCCh proposed a programme for the reconstruction of the future Chile. Although three years have gone by, that programme is still in force. We will try to synthesize it.

As an immediate step, once the military are defeated the PCCh propose the establishment of a Gobierno Provisional, integrated by Popular Unity, the Christian Democratic party and the "democratic sectors" of the Armed Forces. This provisional government should prepare a Constituyente that will set up the guidelines for a democratic revival of Chile⁽³⁹⁾. This government should

(39) Cfr. Luis Corvalán. La revolución Chilena, la dictadura fascista y la lucha para derribarla y crear una nueva democracia, in El Pleno de Agosto 1977....; op.cit.p.64. This kind of Gobierno Provisional emerged in similar circumstances in Italy in 1944 after the fall of dictator Benito Mussolini and the following emergence of the Constituente in 1946. The PCCh has been studying very carefully the experience of the Italian Resistenza to fascism (1941-1945 is the period of the armed struggle; but the opposition to fascism is dated between 1922 and 1945). In fact a member of the Central Committee of the PCCh, among other tasks has been in charge with studying that experience and informing the party. The Provisional government and the Constituente are proposals that the PCI carried out successfully (Cfr. Paolo Spriano, Storia del Partito Comunista Italiano, six vols., Edizioni Einaudi, Torino. Luigi Longo, former General Secretary of the PCI and in charge of the armed apparatus of the PCI during the Resistenza, and now President of the party) Sulla via dell'insurrezione nazionale, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1974. Also Giorgio Amendola, in charge of the GAP in Rome (he died last year), Lettere a Milano, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1974).

It is necessary to mention that although the PCI has good relations with the PCCh, regarding activity of solidarity, their ideological positions are different. While the PCCh, as it is known, is heavily linked with the Soviet Union and its foreign policy, the PCI has developed (since its VI Congress in 1956) an autonomous strategy culminating in the theory of Eurocomunismo and the support of the Polish movement Solidarnosc (it should also be said that the PCI condemned the invasion of Czechoslovakia (1968) and Afghanistan). For a study on the new collocation of the PCI Cfr. Giorgio Napolitano, Intervista sul PCI, ed. by J.Hobsbawn, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1975. Santiago Carrillo (general Secretary of the Spanish Communist party) "L'Eurocomunismo e lo Stato", Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1977. It should also be said that the support to Solidarnosc by the PCI created serious conflicts with the PCUS at its recent Congress in Moscow.

carry out "a political, economic, social, moral, cultural reconstruction" based on the following tasks:

- a- Political measures
- b- Economic strategy.
- c- Social policies.
- d- International relations.

a) In relation to the immediate political measures the PCCh propose: 1- respect of human rights. 2- Freedom of the people to choose their political future through the universal suffrage for all Chileans over eighteen years of age. 3-creation of new democratic institutions: new Parliament, New Judicial Power, etc. 4- Right of democratic opposition. 5- Disruption of the fascist forces. 6- Democratization of the Armed Forces (40).

b) The economic strategy should contemplate, according to the PCCh the following measures: 1- Invalidity of all the agreements, contracted by the military that gave basic national resources to foreign and private companies. 2- The creation of five forms of proprieties: Social-mixed-private-cooperative-self managed. 3- Redefinition of agreements with foreign capital within the Pacto Andino (41).

c) Regarding the social policies the PCCh propose: 1-Freedom for all political prisoners and general amnesty for all people persecuted by the Junta. 2- Dissolution of the secret police. 3- Necessity to put on trial all "criminal fascist". 4-Right of all political refugees to return to Chile. 5-Re-establishment of the trade unions. 6-Freedom of education and autonomy of the Universities (42).

d) The foreign policy should follow an "advanced conception" of the World: 1-Autonomy and sovereignty of Chile within the guidelines of the "peaceful coexistence". 2-Re-establishment of diplomatic relations with those countries that Pinochet opposed. 3-Collaboration with the Socialist Camp and the non-aligned countries. 4- Collaboration with Latin American countries (43).

(40) Cfr. Luis Corvalán, op.cit. pp. 64-65.

(41) Ibid, pp. 66-67.

(42) Ibid, pp. 67-68.

(43) Ibid.

4- The emergence of an armed struggle strategy?

The Chilean Communist party has never adopted the armed struggle as its official line, nor considered this possibility as a realistic one in the development of its political project in the period 1922-1980. But, from the end of 1980, for the first time, the PCCh is putting forward a proposition that could be interpreted as a novelty in the recent development of its strategy. We are referring to some statements from two leaders of the party and an official declaration in Santiago⁽⁴⁴⁾. These two statements represent the first attempt by the PCCh⁽⁴⁵⁾ to adopt the armed struggle to defeat the Chilean military dictatorship. This creates a new phase in the political debate of the Popular Unity alliance, and at the same time, this proposition could push the Christian Democratic party and its strategy (pacific-moderate opposition within legality) to make a decision: to commit itself to a definitive alliance with Popular Unity, or to seek an alliance with Popular Unity, or to seek an alliance with conservative political-military forces opposed to the Junta. The debate to come will be interesting and will be of substantial importance on the future of the Chilean political system. On the other hand, the new approach by the PCCh on the means by which it is possible to return to democracy had the effect of unifying the Popular Unity alliance, and the left in general.

But, is there a new strategy within the PCCh? Apparently there is. Various Communist militants maintain that after the session of the Central Committee in August 1977, there was some dissatisfaction within the party, particularly because the PCCh still preferred a more moderate line in order to attract the Christian Democratic party. This was sustained on the ground that the CDP

(44) Cfr. PCCh, Discurso del Secretario General del Partido Comunista de Chile, Luis Corvalán, (3/9/1980), Moscú. Also PCCh, Discurso emitido por el Secretario General del Partido Comunista de Chile, Compañero Corvalán, en la Conferencia Regional de Suecia, Noviembre 1980, Taller Ricardo Fonseca, Londres, año II, 1980. PCCh, Declaración del Partido Comunista de Chile, Santiago, 23/12/1980, in "Boletín del exterior", n.44, pp. 13-16.

(45) According to "Latin America" (26/9/1975, vol. IX, n.38) already in 1975, Gladys Marin, member of the Political Commission declared that the armed struggle was the only way to defeat the Junta. Although this may be true, as such a statement does not appear in official documents, in a Communist party, it should not be considered party-policy.

would accept an alliance only if it was to be carried out by peaceful means. And that, before proposing other steps and alternatives the party had to explore all possible "roads" that could avoid an armed confrontation. In fact, some affirmation by the General Secretary, Luis Corvalán, might suggest the existence of such dissatisfaction. Speaking before the Regional Conference of the PCCh in Sweden, Corvalan referred to this by saying that "the party must give an answer to the doubts of the militants. First of all all comrades have the right to state them. They can do it in their cells. They can, according to our Estatutos, directly to the Central Committee. Even more, the party can and must organize special Conferences in order to analyse specific issue on which there exist doubts"(46). He even suggested a revision of the strict internal organizational structure on the ground that "the conditions of the party in exile are not the same as that of the party in Chile. In most of the countries where we have an organized party we are acting almost in legality. We have to correct its functioning in these countries in order to develop internal democracy, and answer within the party the difficult problems of our time (...) and correct excessive centralism"(47). This internal dissatisfaction should be taken into account, when considering the emergence of the new strategy, as a pressure from the militants to change the "road".

With the new approved Constitution (if it could be defined as such in its real meaning), Augusto Pinochet will stay in power for a long period. This development of the Chilean fascism could be the most important reason in order to explain the PCCh' move towards the armed struggle. Until the end of 1980 the PCCh maintained the possibility of a non-armed solution by means of a transitory government that could unify all the progressive anti-Junta political and social forces. But, with the new Constitution, and the consequent institutionalization of the military regime; political changes are possible but not beyond the Constitucionalidad dictated by the military, i.e. there is no room for ma-

(46) Cfr. PCCh, Discurso op. cit. p.9
 (47) Cfr. Luis Corvalán, Discurso op.cit. p. 11

noeuvre for the traditional political parties, because they continue to be illegal. Once the military achieved this "status", the people of Chile will discover in the struggle, the specific forms of expression of its revolutionary methods (..) that could lead to victory"(48). Once the PCCh realized that all possibility of "liberalization" of the military regime were at an end, it stated that "the right of the people to rebellion is even more indisputable"(49). Luis Corvalán, never stated clearly the armed struggle. He referred to the right of rebellion and the possible use of violence. The official documents of the PCCh in relation to this states that "there is no other road than the frontal struggle against dictatorship"(50). But the official documents of the PCCh (and of the traditional Communist parties in general) have never been famous for being clear, and there are assertions like "Fascism is reactionay violence(...). We must put an end to this violence (...). For this purpose there are many ways of combat(..). When the reasons are not enough, or these are not listen to, we have to use the force"(51). According to the PCCh (if we interpreted these declarations) the time, for the left, to consider the armed struggle, has come.

If we look at the theoretical elaboration of the peaceful road made during the 1960's(52), we will realize that the PCCh, considered as a remote possibility the idea of the armed struggle, or better, the PCCh never stated a priori a refusal to adopt it. When the Sino-Soviet dispute started (1960) and the consequent Conference of the 81 Communist parties to discuss the "Chinese heresy" (the theory of "both legs", peaceful and armed), the PCCh supported the "peaceful road" as its official strategy, but it considered the armed struggle as a possible "road" in exceptional

(48) Cfr. PCCh, Discurso en Suecia, op.cit. p.4.
 (49) Ibid
 (50) PCCh, Declaración del Partido Comunista de Chile, Santiago, 23/9/1980, in "Boletín del exterior", op. cit. p. 15.
 (51) PCCh, Discurso en Suecia, op. cit.
 (52) There are three interesting articles by Luis Corvalan, in Luis Corvalán, Camino de Victoria, Empresa Horizonte, Santiago, 1971.

circumstances: "We Communists will take the road that best suits the specific conditions of each country. But in speaking of the two possibilities we are not proposing a dual strategy; that is, we should be prepared for both possibilities. I repeat, we are preparing for which suits us best, i.e. the peaceful road, and if this road is closed to us and the non-peaceful road present itself, we shall not hesitate to take up the armed struggle (...)" (53).

The conditions imposed by the military prevent, according to the PCCh, a peaceful solution, thus "the right to rebellion and use of violence has come". At the moment there is no doubt that the PCCh is working in this direction.

It is difficult to foresee the development of this new approach. In one hand, it facilitates a more united action with the Socialists and the other parties of the left, but, it also creates difficulties with the Christian Democratic party and its moderate "conditional" solution. There are already difficulties between Popular Unity and the CDP regarding the future organization of the Chilean political system, once the Junta is defeated. The Christian Democratic party cannot accept a socialist-orientated system (54). The move by the PCCh will create more problems within the Frente Antifascista, particularly if the PCCh will elaborate more and decides to implement a pro-insurrection policy. There could appear two different anti-military alliances: Popular Unity and the MIR with a more radical policy and carrying out the armed struggle; and the CDP and the civil-moderates will "fight" the junta within legality, looking at opportunities that the Junta may permit.

Unless there is a situation as in Italy during the 1940's, when the left and the center-right parties acted in alliance. But this was mainly the result of the German occupation of Italy (late in the War), therefore there was a reason (defend the Nation) to unify opposite political forces (even Monarchists took part in the struggle of liberation).

(53) Cfr. José Gonzalez, in El Partido Comunista de Chile y el movimiento comunista internacional: documentos de Plenos y Congreso del PCCh, in Ernest Halperin, Nationalism and Communism in Chile, the M.I.T. Press, 1965, p.68

(54) Cfr. "Hoy", n.186, Febrero 1981, p.8.

Conclusions.

It is apparent that the PCCh is the better organized party of the left in the difficult circumstances of being underground and under a strong, permanent repression. During the seven years since the coup it suffered severe repression and setback, but always managed to reorganize its structure when they come under strong attack (like the case of the entire internal Dirección lead by Victor Diaz). This is because of the experience of some of its leaders and militants at being underground for ten years before, 1948-1958. If we compare these two underground periods, there are similarities and differences. In both instances the official policy of the PCCh at the beginning, has been to "retreat in order to save the cadres and the Organization" (55). In terms of repression suffered, the 1973-1980 period has been (and continues to be) the most difficult one because the clandestinity is absolute and the repression always there.

While in the period 1948-1958 there had been acute repression (1948-1950, 1955) but there were periods when the PCCh was semi-clandestine, and was able to take part in two political alliances (1952-Frente del Pueblo; 1956-FRAP). While the PCCh was underground in 1949 there was a dispute between the Reinoso-Cares-Palma group and the rest of the party regarding the political strategy. During the period 1973-1980 there was never a major split or strong debate, and because of its internal organization and strict discipline it was unlikely that this could occur in a short time. But the crucial difference lies in the tremendous number of Communist (and Chileans in general) militants and leaders in exile. This is a new experience, not only for the PCCh but for all the left. For the first time in its history the PCCh is "divided" into two major groups: underground and exile. One awaits with interest the full details of the relationship between exiled Chilean Communists and the underground apparatus. In some Communist parties during the fascist-Nazi period (and the consequent division between exile-underground) there have been debates, organizational problems, different interpretation of the political line, particular because of the lack of communication and differences in experiences (these factors, for example, pro-

(55) An interesting account of the first moments of the coup and a meeting of the Political Commission of the PCCh is provided by Jorge Montes (one of the leaders of the PCCh now in exile) in his book La luz entre las sombras, Editorial(?), 1980, pp. 172-173.

voked the crisis of the Socialist party) ^{in 1979} (56). But so far, the PCCh appears well united with a good degree of organization in Chile and in exile. May be the help it receives from the Socialist camp and the Soviet Union in particular is a decisive factor. It seems that even underground in Chile the PCCh is the more active and organized. It could be suggested that a more rigid and vertical organization survives the severe circumstances of clandestinity better than other kinds of party-structures. But it is another question when the same principles of organization and party-structures are maintained in normal circumstances, and this has been the case of the Chilean Communist party.

The latest development in its political strategy (armed struggle) may have influence in other Latin American Communist parties (very small and with no major influence). If this is the case, then it will be interesting to know which kind of position the Soviet Union will take on this issue. Certainly, a Communist party aligned to Russia, as the PCCh, will not take such a step, without at least some kind of contacts with the PCUS.

If the Soviet Union will endorse the armed struggle in Latin America (as the case of El Salvador may suggest), basically it will be the result of the triumph of the Nicaraguan revolution and the climax of Cold War that is prevailing. Its approval will produce new motives for conflict with the U.S. imperialism and this could push its government (particularly with the election of Ronald Reagan) to give more support to the military regimes (57).

If the PCCh and the Chilean left will adopt the armed struggle (as it seems) the result of it is very difficult to foresee, but certainly the system of class and political alliances in Chile will change considerably, and with this, the trend of Chilean politics.

(56) A good example of divisions during the fascist-Nazi period is the Italian Communist Party. On this Cfr. Giorgio Amendola, *Letter a Milano*, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1974.

(57) Cfr. "The Guardian", 9/3/1980, p.5.